Chapman v. State, No. 92-03976

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Writing for the Court: BLUE; THREADGILL, A.C.J., and LAZZARA
• Citation: 639 So.2d 682
• Parties: 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1488 Ronald CHAPMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 06 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-03976

Page 682

639 So.2d 682 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1488 Ronald CHAPMAN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee. No. 92-03976. District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Second District. July 6, 1994.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and Allyn Giambalvo, Asst. Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Dale E. Tarpley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

BLUE, Judge.

Ronald Chapman appeals his convictions for four counts of capital sexual battery ¹ and one count of handling and fondling. ² Of the several points he raises, we agree with one. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152, Chapman filed a pre-trial motion to sever the sexual battery charges from the handling and fondling charge. We agree the trial court erred by denying the motion to sever. Because Chapman admitted committing the handling and fondling offense, any error regarding this

Page 683

count is harmless. Thus, we affirm the handling and fondling conviction and sentence but reverse the sexual battery convictions and remand for a new trial on those counts.

The sexual battery charges were based on acts involving a ten-year-old girl; the handling and fondling charge involved one act with a fourteen-year-old boy. All charges are similar only because they are sex offenses involving minor children. They are different because they involved separate episodes, committed at different locations and times, under different circumstances, with victims who differed in gender and age. In addition, the sexual battery charges involved a series of acts occurring over a seven-month period while the handling and fondling charge involved a one-time occurrence.

As in Ellis v. State, 534 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), the trial court here erred by denying the motion for severance when the charges were so dissimilar. The trial court's reasons for denying the motion were the difficulties in sanitizing overlapping evidence and the fact that the handling and fondling count was outnumbered by the sexual battery counts. Efficiency and economy, however, do not outweigh a defendant's right to a fair trial on each charge. Crossley v. State, 596 So.2d 447 (Fla.1992). In addition, the prejudice results not from the number of counts charged for each offense, but rather the danger that evidence from one charge will improperly bolster the state's case on other charges. Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d 991, 999 (Fla.1993). That danger was evident...