Chapman v. State
Decision Date | 19 November 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 02S00-9802-CR-72.,02S00-9802-CR-72. |
Citation | 719 N.E.2d 1232 |
Parties | Termaine Donte CHAPMAN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
P. Stephen Miller, Fort Wayne, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Rosemary Borek, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
A jury convicted Termaine Donte Chapman of murder and robbery as a Class A felony. He was sentenced to sixty years for murder to be served concurrently with thirty years for robbery. He raises the following three issues in this direct appeal: (1) whether sufficient evidence supports his murder conviction, (2) whether his robbery conviction can be enhanced based on the infliction of serious bodily injury (death) for which he was also convicted under the murder count, and (3) whether the prosecution violated Brady by withholding evidence.
On September 5, 1996, Chapman, Carlos Young, Jr. (C.J.), his cousin Jerry Young (J.D.), Chris Smith, and Johnny Washington were gambling on the second floor hallway of an apartment complex in Fort Wayne. C.J. won several hundred dollars, and Chapman lost "quite a bit" if not all of his money. At one point, Chapman left the game and returned a few minutes later with a handgun. According to Washington, Chapman pointed the gun at the group and told them to put their money on the floor. When C.J. refused to drop his money, Chapman grabbed C.J., put the gun to his head, and asked him, "[D]o you want to catch a bullet?" Without any physical struggle, Chapman fired a single shot to C.J.'s head.1 J.D., Smith, and Washington all ran from the scene after the shooting. The only money found when the police arrived was $1.77 in C.J.'s pocket. C.J. died from a gunshot to the head.
Chapman first argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed a knowing or intentional killing. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well established. We do not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. We look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support the verdict and will affirm the conviction if there is sufficient probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1110 (Ind.1997).
"[T]he use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious bodily injury is sufficient evidence of intent to support a conviction for murder." Torres v. State, 673 N.E.2d 472, 473 (Ind.1996) (citing Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1073, 1082 (Ind.1989)); accord Storey v. State, 552 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ind.1990) (). Smith and Washington saw Chapman hold a gun to C.J.'s head and fire it, and J.D. heard the gunshot immediately before C.J. fell over against him. Moreover, immediately before the shooting Chapman asked C.J. if he wanted to "catch a bullet" or "take a bullet." This is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of a knowing or intentional killing.2
In addition to being convicted of murder, Chapman was also convicted of robbery as a Class A felony. Robbery as a Class C felony is defined by statute as a "person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from another person or from the presence of another person: (1) by using or threatening the use of force on any person; or (2) by putting any person in fear...." Ind.Code § 35-42-5-1 (1998). The offense is a Class B felony if committed while armed with a deadly weapon or if it results in bodily injury to any person other than the defendant. Id. It becomes a Class A felony if it results in serious bodily injury to any person other than the defendant. Id. Chapman contends, correctly in light of our recent decision in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), that his robbery conviction cannot be elevated by the same serious bodily injury (death) that formed the basis of his murder conviction. Here, the only injury was the fatal wound from a single gunshot. As a result, the same evidence used by the jury to establish the essential elements of murder was also included among the evidence establishing the essential elements of robbery as a Class A felony, and the two cannot stand. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to reduce the robbery conviction to a Class B felony.3
As a final point, Chapman argues that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), when it failed to disclose the likely testimony of witness Andrea Baldwin, a resident of the apartment complex who saw Chapman with a handgun and heard but did not see the shooting. According to Chapman, the State knew what Baldwin
Baldwin testified at trial that she saw Chapman leave the craps game and, when he returned he was carrying his shoes, had a "little gun" in one shoe, and then took his shirt off. Baldwin watched the men gamble a "little while longer" then returned to her apartment where she and her boyfriend heard a single gunshot "about twenty or thirty minutes" later. Her boyfriend then left the apartment and saw that C.J. had been shot. Baldwin called the police, and ultimately she spoke to several different police officers about the shooting. However, only one police officer prepared a report, and a copy of that report was provided to defense counsel in the course of pretrial discovery.
After Baldwin left the stand, Chapman moved for a mistrial on the basis that the State withheld evidence relating to Baldwin's testimony. Chapman did not offer the detective's report into evidence during the hearing on his motion for a mistrial nor has he otherwise included it in the record of proceedings on appeal. Based on the testimony of the detective who prepared the report, however, it appears that the report did not mention Chapman's taking off his shirt or shoes or Baldwin's seeing Chapman with a gun in his shoe or elsewhere. In response to Chapman's motion for a mistrial, the State pointed out that Baldwin was listed as a witness on the charging information "since day one," and defense counsel "could have taken her deposition at any time." The trial court denied Chapman's motion, concluding that the items omitted from the report (Chapman's taking off his shoes and shirt and his possession of a gun) were not exculpatory.
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