Chapman v. Tristar Prods., Inc.
| Decision Date | 24 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:16-CV-1114 |
| Parties | KENNETH CHAPMAN et. al., Plaintiffs, v. TRISTAR PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
[Resolving Docs. 43, 45, 47]
Plaintiffs Kenneth Chapman, Jessica Vennel, and Jason Jackson bought pressure cookers from Defendant Tristar.1 The pressure cookers allegedly opened while still under pressure. Plaintiffs originally sued for personal injury damages and other damages. With the lawsuit, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant's pressure cookers have a design defect that "allows users to open the Pressure Cooker while it still contains a significant and dangerous amount of pressure."2
Plaintiffs now move for class certification.3 For the following reasons, this Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.
Pressure cookers cook food by building-up and trapping steam within the appliance. After use, the accumulated pressure gradually dissipates to allow a user to safely open the device.
During 2015 and 2016, the Plaintiffs each purchased a Power Pressure Cooker XL ("Pressure Cooker" or "Cooker") from Defendant Tristar. The Plaintiffs say that the Pressure Cookers have an inherent design defect that "permits them to be opened while pressurized and creates the unreasonable and dangerous risk that their contents will suddenly and violently erupt during use."4 The Plaintiffs' expert Dr. John Pratt agrees, saying that the Pressure Cookers are defective and "unreasonably dangerous" because the Cookers "can be opened while still pressurized."5
Plaintiffs forego claims for any class-wide claims for personal injury damages. Instead, Plaintiffs argue the Cookers' defect makes the Cookers worthless.6 With their claim that the Cookers are worthless, the Plaintiffs ask for class-wide return of the Cookers' purchase price. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs seek to certify the following five classes:
As to the nationwide express warranty class, Defendant Tristar attacks Plaintiffs' motion on several grounds. Defendant says Plaintiffs cannot satisfy Rule 23's commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, or superiority requirements.7 Tristar also says the Plaintiffs' class is over-inclusive because the overwhelming majority of Cooker purchasers have not suffered injuries.8 Relatedly, Defendant says that Plaintiffs' proposed class necessarily seeks refund damages for purchasers who have never had any problems with the Cookers. Finally, Defendant says Plaintiffs' damages model necessarily grasps at straws to come up with a model that would allow recovery for the overwhelming number of purchasers who have never had a problem with the Cooker.9
Regrettably, the parties skirted briefing the implied warranty, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Colorado class claims.
The Court next analyzes Rule 23's certification requirements for the various class claims and addresses the Defendant's arguments when applicable.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls federal class action lawsuits. Under that Rule, a court may certify a class action if the class seeking certification meets Rule 23(a)'s procedural requirements, and if certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3).
"Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard."10 Instead, a party seeking certification of a class action "must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance" with Rule 23.11 As a result, courts should give a "rigorous analysis," which may "overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim."12 But courts should consider the merits of the case only to the extent that "they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied."13
Rule 23(a) sets forth the four prerequisites to class certification: (1) the class must be so numerous that "joinder of all members is impracticable"; (2) there must be "questions of law or fact common to the class"; (3) the claims of the representative party must be "typical" of those of the class; and (4) the representative party must "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."14
"No class that fails to satisfy all four of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) may be certified, and each class meeting those prerequisites must also pass at least one of the tests set forth in Rule 23(b)."15 Here, Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires showing that (1) common questions of law and fact "predominate" over any questions affecting only individual members; and (2) the class action device is the "superior" method of resolving the controversy. The Court has "broad discretion to modify class definitions" "to ensure that a certified class is properly constituted."16
The Court partially certifies the Plaintiffs' proposed classes. First, the Court determines that each Plaintiff's home state's law governs that particular Plaintiff's claims. Second, we certify an express warranty class, but only for Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Colorado purchasers. Third, the Court certifies an implied warranty class, but only for Colorado purchasers. Fourth, we certify narrowed Ohio classes for strict liability, negligence, and unjust enrichment. Last, the Court certifies a Pennsylvania unjust enrichment class.
"When a putative class action contains members from several states, the Court must undertake a choice of law analysis to determine which states' laws apply to plaintiff's claims."17
Although the parties do not brief this matter directly, they agree that individual state laws control the express and implied warranty class claims.18 We concur.19
Accordingly, each purchaser's home state's laws control that home state plaintiff's claims.
The Plaintiffs say Tristar breached an express warranty that the Cooker's lid would not open "until all pressure is released."20 Plaintiffs allege that this defect makes the Cookersworthless.21 Plaintiffs argue that Tristar's alleged failure to provide a Cooker that complies with Tristar's representations violates Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") § 2-313's express warranty provision as adopted in all 50 states.22 Accordingly, the Plaintiffs seek to certify a nationwide class of consumers who purchased roughly 1.6 million Cookers.23
Certifying a nationwide class is inappropriate because individual state law questions would predominate. Instead, the Court certifies an express warranty class of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Colorado purchasers.
The following section details why the three-state class satisfies Rule 23(a)'s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. Next, the Court explains how the Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Colorado class satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance and superiority requirements while the proposed nationwide class fails. Finally, we conclude by addressing Tristar's additional defenses—defenses that mostly go to the weight of Plaintiffs' damage model.
Rule 23(a)(1) provides that a class action may be maintained only if "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." There is no strict numerical test for determining when too many parties make joinder impracticable. Courts look to the specific facts of each case to determine if there is a "substantial" number of affected class members.24 Often, classes with more than fifty members satisfy the numerosity requirement.
Since late 2015, Tristar has sold over 1.6 million pressure cookers.25 As a rough calculation, this yields 32,000 Cookers sold per state if sales between states were equal. Acknowledging Cooker sales are not uniformly spread across all states, Tristar nonetheless soldenough cookers to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement as to Ohio, Colorado, and Pennsylvania.26
Rule 23(a)(2) provides that a class action may be maintained only if "there are questions of law or fact common to the class." Commonality is satisfied if the claims of the class "depend upon a common contention" that is "of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke."27 ...
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