Chapman v. United Auto Workers Local 1005

• Decision Date: 01 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–3616.,10–3616.
• Citation: 670 F.3d 677,192 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3020
• Parties: Brandon CHAPMAN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. UNITED AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 1005; General Motors Company, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

192 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3020

670 F.3d 677

Brandon CHAPMAN, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.UNITED AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 1005; General Motors Company, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 10–3616.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 2, 2011.Decided and Filed: March 1, 2012.

ARGUED: David W. Neel, David W. Neel, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Joan Torzewski, Harris Reny Torzewski, L.P.A., Toledo, Ohio, Angela M. Tsevis, Lathrop & Gage, Kansas City, Missouri, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: David W. Neel, David W. Neel, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Joan Torzewski, Harris Reny Torzewski, L.P.A., Toledo, Ohio, Angela M. Tsevis, David C. Vogel, Lathrop & Gage, Kansas City, Missouri, for Appellees.Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Circuit Judge; MARTIN, BOGGS, MOORE, COLE, CLAY, GIBBONS, ROGERS, SUTTON, COOK, McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, WHITE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.^*

OPINION

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge.

Brandon Chapman brought an action against his employer, General Motors (GM), alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement, and against his union, the United Auto Workers Local 1005 (UAW), alleging breach of the duty of fair representation, a combination referred to as a hybrid § 301/fair representation case. He alleged the UAW failed to pursue his oral complaint against GM through the contractual grievance procedure. Chapman did not challenge the alleged union error through the appeals procedure mandated by the UAW Constitution. Instead, he filed this suit.

The district court held that Chapman was barred from suit because he failed to exhaust his internal union remedies and granted summary judgment to GM and the UAW. Chapman appeals, arguing that our decision in Williams v. Molpus, 171 F.3d 360, 369 (6th Cir.1999), requires that his case be remanded for a trial on his fair representation claim to determine whether the exhaustion bar to suit is excused.

This case was accepted for initial en banc review to determine whether we erred in Molpus when we held the general requirement that a plaintiff must exhaust internal union remedies or be barred from suit is excused if the union breaches its duty of fair representation. Our reasoning on this issue in Molpus resulted from a misunderstanding of Supreme Court precedent and the national labor policy upon which it relies. For the reasons articulated below, we overrule Molpus in part and, to the extent noted, its progeny, Burkholder v. Int'l Union, 299 Fed.Appx. 531 (6th Cir.2008). We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of GM and the UAW.

I. BACKGROUND

Chapman was hired as a temporary hourly employee at GM on June 5, 2006, was released from employment during the regular two-week summer plant shutdown and rehired in July 2006. In June of 2007, Chapman wanted to take an additional week off after the annual shutdown to tour with his band. Chapman asked his stepfather, Bill Newman, who was a Union Committeeman for UAW Local 1005, if he could take off the additional week. Chapman did not speak with his assigned union representative or any member of GM management.

Newman spoke with Tom Danzey, a GM labor relations representative, about Chapman's situation. Danzey told Newman temporary employees were not entitled to leaves of absence; but, because Chapman had a clean record, he would not be barred from consideration for future temporary positions. Newman then told Chapman he was “good to go on vacation.” Chapman never spoke with any management personnel at GM regarding the request for time off nor did he request or receive any paperwork showing that the time off had been approved.

After his absence, Chapman did not contact GM management about returning to work nor did he attempt to return to the plant. Instead, he spoke with Newman who contacted Danzey. Danzey said there were no openings for temporary employees. Chapman again talked to Newman, who said he would “take care of it” though Chapman stated he did not know what Newman meant by that. Chapman understood he could file a grievance but never filed one and never spoke to anyone in GM management, his own union representative, or anyone from the union except his stepfather. Newman discussed Chapman's situation with the new UAW Shop Chairman, Danny Smith, who told Newman not to write a grievance for Chapman. Chapman took no further action for a year.

On June 16, 2008, Chapman was re-hired as a temporary employee at GM. He alleges that around this time he learned that UAW representatives had not filed a grievance on his behalf and approached Ken Jelen, the UAW Shop Chairman who had replaced Smith, to explain his situation. On October 30, 2008, Jelen sent Chapman a letter explaining Chapman had no case to pursue. Chapman alleges Jelen told him that Smith had “messed it up” and Chapman's predicament should have never happened. Chapman did not pursue an appeal of Jelen's decision through the internal grievance procedures as required by the UAW Constitution.

Instead, Chapman brought suit. His hybrid § 301/fair representation action alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement against GM and breach of the duty of fair representation against the UAW. See 29 U.S.C. § 185. The district court granted the motions for summary judgment of GM and the UAW and dismissed the case. See Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, No. 1:09–CV–74, 2010 WL 1417008 (N.D.Ohio Apr. 6, 2010). To litigate the merits of his § 301 claim against the employer, the district court reasoned, Chapman must first prevail on his fair representation claim against the UAW. Id. at *2. The court held that Chapman's fair representation claim failed because Chapman did not exhaust his internal union remedies as required by the UAW Constitution. Id. at *3.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo and considers the facts and any inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. White v. Detroit Edison Co., 472 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir.2006). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). When the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof, the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment is proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

III. ANALYSIS

The case before us and the aspect of Molpus we reconsider hinge on understanding the difference between two sets of remedies: contractual remedies arising from a collective bargaining agreement and internal union constitutional remedies. Here, the contractual remedy is the grievance procedure established in the contract between the UAW and GM, a procedure created to settle disputes between an employee and GM. The internal union remedy is the appeal procedure established in the UAW Constitution, a procedure created to settle disputes between the UAW and the employees it represents in the workplace. A hybrid § 301/fair representation case encompasses both sets of remedies, each of which has its own distinct exhaustion doctrine. In Molpus, we applied the wrong exhaustion doctrine. An overlap in terms and doctrines led to our confusion; an overview of labor policy and case precedent will clear it up.

A. Historical Underpinnings of Exhaustion

Congressional policy is the touchstone guiding development of the labor-law case precedent that applies to this case. Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) provides, “[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.” 29 U.S.C. § 173(d). The seminal Supreme Court instruction on this national policy is found in the Steelworkers Trilogy,¹ three labor law opinions issued in 1960 that explain why the judiciary shall defer to the method of dispute resolution selected by the parties. Congress and the courts determined that allowing the parties to implement their own system of industrial self-government would help achieve industry stabilization and industrial peace. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578–79, 80 S.Ct. 1347. They also recognized that rapid and industry-specific resolution of all disputes between the parties would relieve the judiciary from the adjudication of disputes that otherwise could overwhelm the court system.

The two doctrines of exhaustion in question here developed in response to these historical purposes. The extent of judicial deference was first made clear in the application of exhaustion requirements to contractual grievance procedures. In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, the Supreme Court held that, before bringing suit, employees are required to “exhaust” contractual grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. 379 U.S. 650, 652–53, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). As will prove important to this case, the Court referred to both codified national labor policy and the practical need to solve a problem at its source when holding: “employees ... must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress[;]” and “there can be no doubt that the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf.” See id. at 652–53, 85 S.Ct. 614 (emphasis added). Failure to exhaust contractual remedies thus became a bar to litigation.

The workplace realities that prompted judicial deference to contract remedies also set limits on that deference. The Supreme Court recognized that a litigation bar for failure to exhaust contract remedies can work an unacceptable injustice when the union acts in such a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach its duty of...