Chapman v. United States Forest Serv.
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-01531-BAM |
| Decision Date | 23 June 2023 |
| Parties | MATTHEW CHAPMAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND (DOC. 1)
Plaintiff Matthew Chapman (“Plaintiff'), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) on November 29, 2022. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff's complaint is currently before the Court for screening.
The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro se and in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiffs complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff alleges that his land in Tuolumne County is adjacent to the Stanislaus National Forest and is subject to an easement under the jurisdiction and management of the Defendant United States Forest Service (“USFS”). The easement provides for public access to the National Forest. Plaintiff claims that his home, which is next to the forest access easement, stands to be imminently adversely affected by the actions of the USFS.
(Doc. 1 at pp. 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that he has partaken of the announced USFS administrative scoping regarding the matter and submitted extensive commentary. He appears to seek review of USFS compliance with NEPA pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. (Id. at pp. 4-5.)
Plaintiff explains that there are two separate commercial recreational projects that were proposed for development. The lands for the projects are divided by “a state Federal-Aid highway.” (Id. at p. 6.) Two parcels south of the highway comprise one project and two parcels north of the highway comprise the second project. Plaintiff indicates that both projects propose and require secondary access that can only be obtained through use of adjacent National Forest System Land roadways. The instant action involves the project to the south of the highway, known as Under Canvas. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, Under Canvas had initially been approved by the local planning agency with a declared mitigated negative declaration pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) without the need of a secondary access. On the day set for approval before the local planning commission, the local planning agency cancelled the presentation and announced a full CEQA Environmental Impact Review (“EIR”). A CEQA EIR process ensured and a CEQA decision of approval resulted, which declared required “USFS road permits as a condition to project approval.” (Id. at p. 7.)
Before, during, and after the CEQA decision, Plaintiff requested USFS involvement from Jason Kulken, Stanislaus National Forest Supervisor. Plaintiff claimed that the USFS must involve itself, that it had jurisdictional control over the roadway proposed for required secondary access, that the project land parcels were the result of an unlawful land division and survey fraud, never having been lawfully zoned, and that any road use permit proposals were beyond the authority of the USFS to grant. (Id.) The Forest Supervisor answered Plaintiff's concerns and asserted a lack of jurisdiction concerning the matter.
Plaintiff further alleges that the spur access proposed, presumably for the special use roadway permits, derives from a forest access road, but the “roadway” does not exist on the current Motorized Vehicle Use Map. Plaintiff claims the Stanislaus National Forest has neglected to address occasional use of the spur access.
According to Plaintiff, a USFS administrative scoping period was announced May 25, 2022, concerning the project's required special use roadway permits. This scoping was to proceed with the USFS exercising jurisdiction, which the Forest Supervisor had previously denied. Following the scoping announcement, Plaintiff resubmitted previous submittals that had been sent to Mr. Kulken, along with additional submittals. These submittals appear to have included assertions of fraud, based on allegations that the state highway was designed, planned, and constructed as a Federal-Aid project. Plaintiff alleges:
The basis of the fraud rests on a deed processed thru the Office of the County Surveyor. That deed's legal description represents the Federal-Aid highway, as having been built in the wrong place; and a false claim of 12 acres of excess land having been properly deeded back by the State of California (no deed from the state with its legal description exists) Those 12 acres of land, by deed description creating 2 parcels. Those 2 parcels providing for an unlawful land division, those 2 parcels comprise the lands of the Under Canvas development. The unlawful land division also implicates the lands to the north of the highway and the pending second proposed development.
(Id. at p. 12.) Plaintiff asserts that the fraud and false claims in his administrative submittals have never been considered by their factual and legal merits. Plaintiff submitted relevant evidence to the Federal Highway Administration and CalTrans.
On September 6, 2022, CalTrans issued a determination declaring no abnormalities in the right of way. Subsequent contact with CalTrans indicated that the matter concerning the claimed transfer of 2 acres of land was before the CalTrans legal department for resolution.
Six days before the CalTrans determination, the USFS released a Decision Memo on August 30, 2022. The memo determined to issue the proposed three permits and claimed to Categorically Exclude the action from an environmental assessment (“EA”) or an environmental impact statement (“EIS”).[1] Plaintiff claims the “determination [was] made, apparently unaware, or in disregard of the ongoing CalTrans investigation, yet to be released, six days later.” (Id. at p. 13.) Plaintiff gave notice to the Stanislaus National Forest, to be relayed to Forest Supervisor Kulken, of the intent to file a civil action and the intent to make a formal criminal complaint pursuant to the Federal Land Policy Management Act.
Plaintiff alleges that despite assertions within the Decision Memo, the determination did not consider all comments of public respondents and avoided consideration of his submittals regarding the regulatory hurdles. Plaintiff further claims that the CE determination cannot be justified. Plaintiff also appears to claim that the USFS failed to comply with its NEPA statutory obligations. (Id. at p. 14.)
As best as the Court can determine from the complaint, Plaintiff is alleging claims based on the following assertions: (1) failure to consider his administrative scoping submittals; (2) the USFS improperly determined that the permits at issue were categorically excluded from an EA and EIS analysis required by NEPA because the project could not be built without the USFS road permits: (3) the USFS' environmental analysis is conclusory; (4) the CalTrans right-of-way determination was never considered by USFS and the Decision Memo was issued despite an ongoing investigation; (5) the USFS acted in violation of its authority under the Federal Land Policy Management Act; and (6) the permit scheme was not properly considered and was an attempt to circumvent an express limitation of the USFS' authority to act.
Plaintiff's complaint fails to comply with Federal...
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