Chappell Hills, Inc. v. Boatwright

Decision Date14 November 1985
Docket NumberNo. A14-85-483-CV,A14-85-483-CV
PartiesCHAPPELL HILLS, INC., et al., Appellants, v. John BOATWRIGHT, et al., Appellees. (14th Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

James H. Pearson, Eugene Pitman, of DeLange, Hudspeth, Pitman & Katz, Houston, for appellants.

William K. Betts, Jr., of Betts & Kruse, Houston, for appellees.

Before J. CURTISS BROWN, C.J., and SEARS and ELLIS, JJ.

OPINION

ELLIS, Justice.

Appellants, Chappell Hills, Inc. and Thomas P. Duncan, appeal from an order certifying a suit as a class action. On February 20, 1985, appellees, John Boatwright, A.O. Sander, Mary Brown and Roderick McNeil appeared in person and by their attorney, for a hearing on their motion to certify them as class representatives pursuant to Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and a motion to certify this litigation as a class action. Appellants appeared by their attorney. The court, after hearing and considering the evidence and the argument of counsel, granted the motion for class action certification. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order granting the certification of a class action under Tex.R.Civ.P. 42. Such an appeal is authorized by the 1979 amendment to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2250 (Vernon Supp.1980).

This suit was originally instituted by the appellees individually, on March 9, 1984 and is one brought on common law and statutory theories of recovery against defendants for various acts of negligence, breaches of contract and statutory violations. On December 24, 1984, the named plaintiffs (appellees) amended their pleadings and first commenced this suit as an action both on behalf of themselves and also on behalf of all other persons similarly situated. Also on December 24, 1984 appellees filed their Motion for Class Action Certification in the trial court. On February 20, 1985, a hearing was held on this motion. On May 20, 1985, the order certifying this suit as a class action was signed and this "Class Action Order" is the basis of this appeal.

Appellees are owners of property in the Chappell Hill Subdivision of Washington County, Texas. At various times, appellees purchased their lots from the appellants, Chappell Hill, Inc., and Duncan. Appellant, Duncan, individually and/or on behalf of Chappell Hill, Inc., represented to appellees prior to purchase and on many occasions since that certain facilities would be constructed and maintained on common areas of the subdivision for the use and benefit of property owners in the subdivision. The appellees allege that appellants' representations were not fulfilled.

As a result of appellants' alleged misrepresentations appellees claim a gross disparity between the value received and the consideration paid for their respective properties. Appellees filed this suit seeking recovery of monetary damages and injunctive relief enjoining appellants from interfering with or in any way prohibiting appellees free access to the use of the common areas of the subdivision.

The appellant's first point of error alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by certifying this case as a class action because there is no evidence to support the prerequisite of a class action. Under Rule 42(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to certify an action as a class action can be granted "only if" the potential class meets the following requirements:

(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members in impractical;

(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) The claims or defense of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Appellant's second and fourth points of error also raise the issue of no evidence. Appellants allege in the second point of error that the trial court abused its discretion by certifying this case as a class action because there is no evidence to support the maintenance of a class action. Under Rule 42(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, an action can be "maintained" as a class action if: the prerequisites of Rule 42(a) are satisfied, and in addition:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of:

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual memebers of the class which would establish imcompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

(3) where the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or

(4) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.

Appellants allege in their fourth point of error that the trial court abused its discretion in certifying this case as a class action because there was no evidence to support a determination by the court whether to maintain this action as a class action.

Rule 42(c) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure for securing a determination of whether an action may be maintained as a class action. The rule requires both a hearing and a determination by the court. The relevant language of Rule 42(c) states:

42(c)(1) As soon as practicable after the communcement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall, after hearing, determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. This determination may be altered, amended or withdrawn at any time before final judgment. The court may order the naming of additional parties in order to insure the...

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6 cases
  • Petitt v. Laware
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 5, 1986
    ...is presented on appeal, which preserves the error upon which he relies. Otherwise, the allegation of error is waived. Chappell Hills, Inc. v. Boatwright, 702 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); Irrigation Construction Co. v. Motheral Contractors, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 336 ......
  • Fiesta Mart, Inc. v. Hall, 01-93-01154-CV
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • September 22, 1994
    ...of facts from the hearing, the appellate courts indulge all presumptions in favor of the trial court's ruling. Chappel Hills, Inc. v. Boatwright, 702 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (appeal from order after hearing on motion to certify a class action); see, e.......
  • Angeles/Quinoco Securities Corp. v. Collison
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 5, 1992
    ...determinations of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal unless there exists a clear abuse of discretion. Chappell Hills, Inc. v. Boatwright, 702 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ). An abuse of discretion may be found only in cases where, after searchi......
  • J-IV Investments v. David Lynn Mach., Inc., J-IV
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • January 15, 1990
    ...by the trial court. Petitt v. Laware, 715 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Chappell Hills, Inc. v. Boatwright, 702 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no In points of error one, two, and three, J-IV seeks review of evidentiary matter......
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