Chappell v. Mandeville

• Decision Date: 31 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 09–16251.,09–16251.
• Citation: 706 F.3d 1052
• Parties: Rex CHAPPELL, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. R. MANDEVILLE; T. Rosario, Defendants–Appellants, and J. Case; C. Davis; C. Rasmussen; Rodriguez, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

706 F.3d 1052

Rex CHAPPELL, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.R. MANDEVILLE; T. Rosario, Defendants–Appellants,andJ. Case; C. Davis; C. Rasmussen; Rodriguez, Defendants.

No. 09–16251.

United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 29, 2011.

Filed Jan. 31, 2013.

Megan R. O'Carroll, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants–Appellants.

Caleb E. Mason, Southwestern Law School, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:03–cv–00653–GEB–KJM.

Before: MARSHA S. BERZON and JAY S. BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and JAMES L. GRAHAM, Senior District Judge.^*

Opinion by Judge BYBEE; Concurrence by Judge GRAHAM; Partial Dissent by Judge BERZON.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Rex Chappell brought a § 1983 case against various officials from California State Prison, Sacramento, alleging constitutional violations relating to his six-day placement on contraband watch. The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion on some of the claims, but denied summary judgment with respect to Chappell's Eighth Amendment and due process claims against defendants R. Mandeville and T. Rosario. Mandeville and Rosario appealed. We hold that both Mandeville and Rosario are entitled to qualified immunity because the law at the time Chappell was on contraband watch did not clearly establish that their actions were unconstitutional. We therefore reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rex Chappell was a prisoner in California State Prison, Sacramento when his fianceé, Philissa Richard, came to visit him on April 28, 2002. When Richard entered the prison facilities she was wearing a ponytail hairpiece; the next day the hairpiece was discovered in a trash can near the visiting room. Prison officials then searched the entire visiting area and found spandex undergarments in the women's bathroom. Both the hairpiece and the undergarments tested positive for cocaine residue. Richard admitted that the hairpiece was hers, but an investigation did not conclude whether the undergarments also belonged to Richard. A background check revealed that Richard had a long history of felony offenses, including numerous drug offenses.

Prison staff conducted a search of Chappell and his prison cell, during which they notified Chappell that they believed that someone had introduced drugs through a hairpiece. The officials discovered three unlabelled bottles of what appeared to be eye drops in Chappell's cell. The liquid in the bottles tested positive for methamphetamine.

On April 30, 2002, Chappell was placed on contraband watch. Under prison regulations, an official who is the rank of captain or above can make the decision to place a prisoner on contraband watch if the official has reasonable cause to believe that an inmate has ingested or secreted contraband. F. Schroder was the acting facility captain at the time, but he did not remember any specific details as to how Chappell was placed on contraband watch or who made the decision. R. Mandeville, captain of the Investigative Services Unit, was in charge of the investigation but denies that he was the official who ordered contraband watch. T. Rosario was the acting warden and also would have had authority to order the watch.

Contraband watch, also known as a “body cavity search,” is a temporary confinement during which a prisoner is closely monitored and his bowel movements searched to determine whether he has ingested or secreted contraband in his digestive tract. Under prison procedures, the prisoner is first searched and then dressed so as to prevent him from excreting any contraband and removing it from his clothing. The prisoner is placed in two pairs of underwear, one worn normally and the other backwards, with the underwear taped at the waist and thighs. The prisoner is also placed in two jumpsuits, one worn normally and the other backwards, with the suits taped at the thighs, ankles, waist, and upper arms. The tape on both the underwear and the jump suits is not meant to touch the skin; it is used to close off any openings in the clothing. The prisoner is then placed in waist chain restraints, which are handcuffs that are separated and chained to the side of the prisoner's waist. This prevents the prisoner from being able to reach his rectum. The waist chain restraints are adjustable and can be lengthened if necessary. The prisoner is then placed in a surveillance cell where prison staff watch the prisoner at all times. The lights are kept on in the cell to allow staff to see the prisoner. To prevent the inmate from concealing contraband, the cell does not have any furniture other than a bed without a mattress. The prisoner is given a blanket, and receives three meals a day and beverages. When the prisoner needs to defecate he must notify the prison staff who will bring him a plastic, moveable toilet chair. Once he uses the chair, the staff will search the waste to determine if it contains contraband.

Chappell generally confirmed that these policies were applied to him while he was under contraband watch. In addition to these procedures, Chappell claims that he was also placed in ankle shackles, and chained to the bed. He complains that the waist restraints were not loosened for meals, forcing him to “eat [his] food like a dog”; the temperature in the cell was very high; the cell was unventilated; and the lights were “very bright.” Chappell alleged that the conditions “did in fact torture [him] mentally” and he felt like he “deteriorat[ed] mentally” during contraband watch.

After having three bowel movements that did not reveal contraband, Chappell was released from contraband watch on May 6, 2002.

Chappell brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 naming various prison officials as defendants, including Mandeville and Rosario, and alleging numerous constitutional claims. The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, and the district court, adopting the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, granted the motion on some of the claims, but denied summary judgment with respect to two of Chappell's claims against Mandeville and Rosario: (1) that the contraband watch constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and (2) that Chappell's due process rights were violated since he was not given notice of the charges against him or an opportunity to be heard prior to being placed on contraband watch. Mandeville and Rosario appealed.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1195–96 (9th Cir.2000) (applying qualified immunity to prison officials). Whether qualified immunity applies thus “turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1245, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Officials must have “fair warning” that their actions are unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); Porter v. Bowen, 496 F.3d 1009, 1026–27 (9th Cir.2007). If an official “reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law,” qualified immunity applies. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009); see also Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (noting that qualified immunity will “shield[ ] an officer from trial when the officer reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted, even if the officer's conduct was constitutionally deficient” (internal quotation marks omitted)), overruled on other grounds by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.2012) (en banc).

To determine whether the law was clearly established, we first look to our own binding precedent. See Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir.1996). If none is on point, we may consider other decisional law. Id.;Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (9th Cir.2003). We need not find that the “very action in question has previously been held unlawful,” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (internal citation omitted), but, rather, we consider whether “a reasonable officer would have had fair notice that [the action] was unlawful, and that any mistake to the contrary would have been unreasonable.” Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1060;see also Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.”).

In determining whether a government official should be granted qualified immunity, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the injured party. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), receded from on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233–42, 129 S.Ct. 808;see also Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir.2010).

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mandeville and Rosario argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Chappell's Eighth Amendment and due process claims.¹ We agree. Under Chappell's version of the facts, and assuming that he has stated a claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the law was not clearly established on either of Chappell's claims at the time the contraband watch took place such that Mandeville and Rosario would have had fair notice that their actions were unconstitutional. Thus, Mandeville and Rosario are entitled to...