Chappell v. Stankorb, CASE NO. 1:11-cv-01425-LJO-GBC (PC)
| Decision Date | 23 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:11-cv-01425-LJO-GBC (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | REX CHAPPELL, Plaintiff, v. T. STANKORB, et al., Defendants. |
LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF
MAY BE GRANTED
THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE
On August 25, 2011, Plaintiff Rex Chappell ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
While prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, the pleading standard is now higher, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Under § 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal rights by those acting under color of state law. E.g., Patel v. Kent School Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2011); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. For each defendant named, plaintiff must show a causal link between the violation of his rights and an action or omission of the defendant. Iqbal,129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and each defendant may only be held liable for misconduct directly attributed to him or her. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009).
In Plaintiff's complaint, he names Defendants T. Stankorb, Correctional Counselor; T. Miner, Captain; Haak, Lieutenant; K. Holland, Chief Deputy Warden; K. Sampson, Appeals Coordinator; A. Joaquin, Chief Medical Officer; H. Tate, Medical Doctor; M. Stainer, Warden; who were employed by California Correctional Institution, Tehachapi ("Tehachapi"). Compl. at 1, 3-4, 6-7,Doc. 1.
On February 17, 2011, Plaintiff arrived at Tehachapi from High Desert State Prison ("HDSP"). Id. at 8. On March 1, 2011, Plaintiff met with the institution classification committee. Id. In the hearing, Plaintiff explained to Defendants stated that he was wrongly validated as a member of the Black Guerrilla Family ("BGF"). Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants stated that they did not see anything in Plaintiff's file to warrant the classification but said Plaintiff is now tied to the gang validation. Id. On March 1, 2011, Plaintiff was made single cell status due to his seizure disorder that causes him to hurt himself or a cellmate. Id. at 9. On May 10, 2011, at classification, Stankord told Plaintiff that Stankorb, Hank, and Miner have decided to make Plaintiff double cell status and double cell Plaintiff with a BGF inmate. Id. at 9-10. If Plaintiff refuses, he would lose his television for ninety days and ninety days credit would be added to his sentence. Id. at 10. Plaintiff states that if he is placed in a cell with a BGF inmate that the BGF inmate would kill Plaintiff due to his rape conviction. Id. Plaintiff also states his seizure disorder causes him to hurt himself or a cellmate. Id.
Two days later, officers came to Plaintiff's cell and said that Haak and Holland told them to cell Plaintiff with a BGF inmate. Id. at 12. The inmate in that cell said he was not a BGF either. Id.
Plaintiff stated that he has been to outside neurologists outside of prison, who diagnosed Plaintiff with temporal lobe epilepsy with panic attacks. Id. at 15. Stankorb told Plaintiff that Dr. Tate found that it is impossible to attack anyone while having a seizure. Id. Plaintiff filed a 602 inmate appeal, and Chief Medical Officer Joaquin agreed with Dr. Tate's diagnosis. Id. at 17.
Appeals Coordinator Sampson has deliberately sabotaged Plaintiff's appeals. Id. at 18. Sampson retaliated against Plaintiff by failing to process appeals. Id. at 22.
Plaintiff alleges Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference for classifying Plaintiff as double cell status and failing to remove his gang validation. Id. at 24-25. Plaintiff states that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his seizure disorder, which causes him to hurt himself or a cellmate, and that if Plaintiff was housed with a BGF inmate, the BGF inmate who would kill Plaintiff due to his rape conviction. Id.
Plaintiff alleges due process for inmate appeals and access to courts. Id. at 28.
Plaintiff attached exhibits to his complaint. Id. at 35-99. On March 1, 2011, Plaintiff had an initial SHU classification with committee members Stankorb, Holland, and Miner. Id. at 28. The classification states that on October 26, 2009, Plaintiff was placed in ASU at HDSP, pending investigation for involvement with the BGF. Id. On March 10, 2010, OCS validated Plaintiff as a member of the BGF. Id. The committee elected to retain Plaintiff in SHU (gangs) with walk alone exercise yard, pending annual review. Id. The committee found that Plaintiff meets the criteria for double cell status based on no in-cell misconduct or predatory behavior. Id. Plaintiff had prior single cell status based on his medical condition in which he refuses a cellmate. Id. There was a memo in Plaintiff's file dated February 16, 2007, from a correctional counselor at HDSP, which requested updated medical information for Plaintiff. Id. The committee elected to place Plaintiff on single cell status pending medical review. Id.
On May 10, 2011, Plaintiff had a SHU classification 180 day review. Id. at 63. The committee noted that Plaintiff was on double cell status at HDSP from November 5, 2009 to October 28, 2010. Id. There was a memo in Plaintiff's file dated February 16, 2007, from a correctional counselor at HDSP, which requested updated medical information for Plaintiff, but there is no documentation that this was ever done. Id. Stankorb spoke with Dr. Tate, who stated that it is medically impossible for anyone to become violent while having a seizure. Id. Plaintiff wrote a letter on May 9, 2011, stating that if Classification tries to place Plaintiff with a BGF inmate or anyone else, Plaintiff is going to sue everyone. Id. Plaintiff stated that he cannot be double celled due to his panic attacks and seizures, and that a BGF inmate would kill him due to his "R" suffix. Id. The committee asked Plaintiff if he had any safety concerns based on validation or his "R" suffix. Id. Plaintiff stated that he has never had any safety concerns based on the "R" suffix or his validation. Id. Plaintiff stated his only concern with double cell status is his seizures and panic attacks. Id. Since Dr. Tate medical opinion disputed Plaintiff's claim, the committee changed Plaintiff from single cell to double cell status with validated BGF members or associates. Id. The committee informed Plaintiff that release from SHU is through the debriefing process or a determination as inactive gang member or associate. Id. Committee asked Plaintiff if he wanted to debrief, and Plaintiff said he cannot debrief because he is not a BGF member. Id.
Plaintiff submitted neurology reports dated in 1997, 2000, and 2005. Id. at 45-47, 52.
For relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment; an injunction to prohibit Defendants from housing Plaintiff with a BGF or any other inmate; release from the SHU; expungement of BGF gang association from Plaintiff's central file; compensatory damages; and punitive damages. Id. at 29-31.
"[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate must show 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.'" Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The two part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) "'a serious medical need' by demonstrating that 'failure...
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