Chapski v. Copley Press
Decision Date | 22 October 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 55884,55884 |
Citation | 65 Ill.Dec. 884,442 N.E.2d 195,92 Ill.2d 344 |
Parties | , 65 Ill.Dec. 884, 8 Media L. Rep. 2403 Robert A. CHAPSKI, Appellant, v. The COPLEY PRESS et al., Appellees. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lambert M. Ochsenschlager, Wayne F. Weiler, Craig S. Mielke, Reid, Ochsenschlager, Murphy & Hupp, Aurora, for appellees.
Geister, Schnell, Richards & Brown, Chartered, Robert A. Chapski, Ltd., Elgin, for appellant; Van R. Richards, Jr., Robert A. Chapski, Elgin, of counsel.
Plaintiff, Robert A. Chapski, an attorney, filed this libel action in the circuit court of Kane County seeking damages against defendants, the Copley Press, the Daily Courier News, Michael Bailey, a reporter, D. Ray Wilson, editor and publisher, and LeRoy Clemens, executive editor. The circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis of the "innocent construction" rule, and the appellate court affirmed (100 Ill.App.3d 1012, 56 Ill.Dec. 443, 427 N.E.2d 638). We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal.
The series of newspaper articles upon which the complaint was based appeared in the Daily Courier News, the local Elgin newspaper, during the period of February 8, 1979, through January 25, 1980. There were 13 articles published on 11 different dates, most of which purported to summarize and clarify the judicial proceedings and events that preceded the death on February 2, 1979, of two-year-old Kristie Hubbard, a victim of child abuse. Plaintiff represented the child's mother, Kathleen Insco Hubbard, in juvenile and divorce proceedings. Norman Platter, Mrs. Hubbard's boyfriend, was subsequently convicted of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment in connection with the child's death. Mrs. Hubbard apparently received a 30-day jail sentence for a less serious offense.
A panel of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, after conducting hearings to determine whether the plaintiff had engaged in conduct which tended to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts and legal profession into disrepute, found that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the filing of a complaint with the hearing board. The panel concluded that plaintiff's actions in representing his client's interests "had absolutely nothing to do with the child's death," which occurred several months after a written order was entered awarding his client custody. The panel determined that when plaintiff appeared ex parte before circuit judge Neil Mahoney of Kane County, he merely obtained a written confirmation of an oral custody order that had been entered the prior week when all interested parties were present.
Plaintiff alleged in his 11-count complaint that defendants wrongfully, maliciously, and with intent to defame and injure him in his reputation and profession published false and defamatory articles and editorials which implied that he was guilty of a violation of law and morals and was not a person of integrity. The allegedly defamatory statements were set forth in plaintiff's complaint, and the full text of the articles was attached as exhibits. Plaintiff alleged that defendants knew or by the exercise of reasonable care could and would have known that the statements concerning him were false, that defendants showed actual malice, spite and ill will toward him, and that defendants published the statements with reckless disregard of the truth. He further alleged that, as a result of the articles, a citizens group was formed and such group aided and abetted defendants' cause to defame plaintiff's character and reputation by writing to various authorities, including the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the State of Illinois. Finally plaintiff asserted that, after the Commission rendered its decision, defendants had an opportunity to retract the false and libelous statements but instead further libeled him.
Both the trial and appellate courts applied the "innocent construction" rule and concluded either that the language itself could be innocently construed or that the articles as a whole could be construed as referring to the legal system rather than the plaintiff. Plaintiff argues here that the appellate court's interpretation of the articles as a criticism of the court system is a strained one and specifically directs our attention to an article entitled in which plaintiff's name is alleged to have appeared in bold black type 20 times. He urges that the decisions below give defendants a broad immunity in libel actions which is unwarranted.
Twenty years ago in John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Ill.2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied (1962), 371 U.S. 877, 83 S.Ct. 148, 9 L.Ed.2d 114, this court affirmed a verdict and judgment for defendant in a libel action, holding that the articles in question were not "of and concerning the plaintiff" because the use of the term "alias" removed the plaintiff as the target of the publications. What has since been known as the innocent-construction rule arose from obiter dictum in that case (Valentine v. North American Co. (1974), 60 Ill.2d 168, 172, 328 N.E.2d 265 (Ward, J., Underwood, C.J., and Schaefer, J., dissenting):
(24 Ill.2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105.)
Since that time the innocent-construction rule has been applied in dozens of appellate court cases, but in something less than a completely uniform fashion (see, e.g., Rasky v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (1981), 103 Ill.App.3d 577, 59 Ill.Dec. 298, 431 N.E.2d 1055; Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 735, 47 Ill.Dec. 429, 415 N.E.2d 434; Garber-Pierre Food Products, Inc. v. Crooks (1979), 78 Ill.App.3d 356, 33 Ill.Dec. 878, 397 N.E.2d 211; Makis v. Area Publications Corp. (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 452, 32 Ill.Dec. 804, 395 N.E.2d 1185; Bruck v. Cincotta (1977), 56 Ill.App.3d 260, 13 Ill.Dec. 782, 371 N.E.2d 874; Moricoli v. Schwartz (1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 481, 5 Ill.Dec. 74, 361 N.E.2d 74; Watson v. Southwest Messenger Press, Inc. (1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 968, 299 N.E.2d 409; Delis v. Sepsis (1972), 9 Ill.App.3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138; Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, Inc. (1965), 65 Ill.App.2d 65, 213 N.E.2d 1; see also Porcella v. Time, Inc. (7th Cir.1962), 300 F.2d 162; Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (N.D.Ill.1981), 529 F.Supp. 746) and often over vigorous objections concerning its application or whether it continues to be a fair statement of the law (e.g., Levinson v. Time, Inc. (1980), 89 Ill.App.3d 338, 343, 44 Ill.Dec. 752, 411 N.E.2d 1118) ("attempts to eliminate the innocent-construction rule have been consistently rejected by the courts of Illinois for many years in the past"); Kakuris v. Klein (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 597, 601, 43 Ill.Dec. 851, 410 N.E.2d 984 (); Vee See Construction Co. v. Jensen & Halstead, Ltd. (1979), 79 Ill.App.3d 1084, 35 Ill.Dec. 444, 399 N.E.2d 278 ( ); Makis v. Area Publications Corp. (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 452, 457, 32 Ill.Dec. 804, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (). It has been applied to the law of slander as well as libel to determine whether the words themselves are defamatory (e.g., Valentine v. North American Co. (1974), 60 Ill.2d 168, 328 N.E.2d 265 (slander); Kirk v. Village of Hillcrest (1975), 31 Ill.App.3d 1063, 335 N.E.2d 1063 (slander); Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. (1968), 41 Ill.2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217 (libel); Wexler v. Chicago Tribune Co. (1979), 69 Ill.App.3d 610, 26 Ill.Dec. 62, 387 N.E.2d 892 (libel)), to the determination of whether the language is actionable per se (e.g., Makis v. Area Publications Corp. (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 452, 32 Ill.Dec. 804, 395 N.E.2d 1185) and to the issue of colloquium (e.g., John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Ill.2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105; Belmonte v. Rubin (1979), 68 Ill.App.3d 700, 25 Ill.Dec. 430, 386 N.E.2d 904). Nor has treatment and application of the rule in our own court been totally consistent. (See Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill.2d 146, 184, 50 Ill.Dec. 242, 419 N.E.2d 350 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied (1981), 451 U.S. 911, 101 S.Ct. 1981, 68 L.Ed.2d 300; compare John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Ill.2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, with Troman v. Wood (1975), 62 Ill.2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292.) It has been the subject of much critical commentary (see, e.g., Polelle, The Guilt of the "Innocent Construction Rule" in Illinois Defamation Law, 1 N.I.U.L.Rev. 181 (1981)); (Symposium, Libel and Slander in Illinois, 43 Chi.Kent L.Rev. 1 (1966)); cf. Comment, The Illinois Doctrine of Innocent Construction: A Minority of One, 30 U.Chi.L.Rev. 524 (1963)); Stonecipher & Trager, The Impact of Gertz on the Law of Libel In Illinois, S.I.U.L.J. 73 (1979)), and considered to be a resurrection of the long-discarded 16th- and 17th-century English rule of mitior sensus (Eldredge, The Law of Defamation sec. 24, at 161 (1978)). The rule or variations thereof remain the law in only a few States. See Monnin v. Wood (1974), 86 N.M. 460, 525 P.2d 387; Walker v. Kansas City Star Co. (Mo.1966), 406 S.W.2d 44; Steffes v. Crawford (1963), 143 Mont. 43, 386 P.2d 842; Becker v. Toulmin (1956), 165 Ohio 549, 138 N.E.2d 391; Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Kight (1935), 174 Okl. 359, 50 P.2d 350; see also England v. Automatic Canteen Co. of America (...
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