Chardonnay-Singleton v. Brooks
| Decision Date | 25 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:21-CV-20069 (KMW-SAK) |
| Parties | JOAN MARIE CHARDONNAY-SINGLETON, Plaintiff, v. TERRI DENISE BROOKS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Joan Marie Chardonnay-Singleton Plaintiff, Pro Se
Ben Kuruvilla, Esquire Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey Counsel for Defendant U.S. Department of the Navy
Jeffrey A. Malatesta, Esquire Mattleman Weinroth & Miller PC Counsel for Defendants Terri Denise Brooks and Tianna B Singleton
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant U.S. Department of the Navy's (the “Navy”) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of plaintiff Joan Marie Chardonnay-Singleton (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ECF No. 11). As is set forth fully below, the Navy's Motion is denied.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed her Complaint on November 18, 2021, in which she named as defendants Terri Denise Brooks (“Defendant Brooks”), Tianna B. Singleton (“Defendant Singleton”), and the Navy (ECF No. 1). Defendant Brooks and Defendant Singleton jointly filed an Answer to the Complaint on December 10, 2021 (ECF No. 3). Thereafter, on February 11, 2022, the Navy filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (ECF No. 11). Alternatively, the Navy's Motion seeks dismissal of the Complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim (id.).
The underlying action arises from a dispute over the proceeds of a Navy-sponsored life insurance policy. Plaintiff is the widow of Kevin Singleton (the “Insured”), a former U.S. Navy servicemember. See Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff and the Insured were married in 1987, and subsequently had their first and only child together in 1990. See id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 20. In 1992, Plaintiff allegedly discovered that the Insured was having an extramarital affair with Defendant Brooks. See id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff and the Insured subsequently separated, but continued to remain legally married. See Id. ¶¶ 26-28. Further, and in spite of their permanent separation, the Insured remained in contact with Plaintiff and their child, and supported them both financially until his death in 2014. See id. ¶¶ 2830.
Following the separation in 1992, it is alleged that the Insured continued to remain in contact with Defendant Brooks, but that the two had never dated or lived together. See id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff alleges that, at some unidentified time, Defendant Brooks gave birth to her daughter, Defendant Singleton, but that the Insured was not her biological father. See id. ¶ 36. It is further alleged that the Insured neither acknowledged that he was Defendant Singleton's father, nor was he ever judicially ordered to provide child support or other similar financial assistance. See id. ¶¶ 37-38. In or around 2005, Plaintiff alleges that the Insured disclosed to her that, following some unspecified event, the Insured no longer wished to associate with Defendant Brooks, which subsequently led him to end his “platonic relationship” with Defendant Brooks; the two allegedly never saw each other again. See id. ¶¶ 39-40.
After the Plaintiff's own diagnosis of multiple sclerosis in 2007, the Insured was diagnosed with multiple myeloma, a type of cancer affecting certain blood cells. See id. ¶¶ 42, 44. The Insured's illness left him functionally debilitated, so much so that his treating oncologist allegedly recommended against the Insured making any legal or financial decisions on his own. See id. ¶ 45. During this time, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brooks and Defendant Singleton discovered the Insured's failing health and sought to fraudulently substitute Defendant Singleton as the beneficiary of the Insured's Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Policy (the “SGLI Policy”)-a low-cost life insurance offered to certain qualifying servicemembers through the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”). See id. ¶¶ 13-14; 46-47. However, Plaintiff alleges that she has been the designated, primary beneficiary of the SGLI Policy since it was first obtained in 1993. See id. ¶¶ 17-19. Until his death in 2014, the Insured purportedly continued to represent to Plaintiff that she was the SGLI Policy's primary beneficiary. See id.
Though the SGLI Policy was purchased through the VA, the Navy was statutorily charged with the collection and maintenance of certain SGLI-related documents and other records pursuant to the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act (the “SGLIA”). See 38 U.S.C. § 1965, et seq. On April 26, 2014, and while the Insured was functionally debilitated from cancer, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brooks and Defendant Singleton submitted to the Navy a forged SGLI Election and Certification form (“Form SGLV 8286”), redesignating Defendant Singleton as the sole beneficiary of the SGLI Policy. See Compl. ¶¶ 48-50. Plaintiff claims that the Form SGLV 8286 was not written in the Insured's handwriting and that it was not, nor could it have been, authorized by the Insured given his functional disabilities. See id. ¶¶ 52-53.
The Insured ultimately died on December 26, 2014. See id. ¶ 64. As part of her scheme to defraud Plaintiff of the SGLI Policy proceeds, Defendant Singleton allegedly signed the Insured's death certificate, in which she identified herself as the Insured's daughter, but omitted Plaintiff from the “surviving spouse's name” field. Id. ¶ 65. On April 30, 2015, and unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Defendant Singleton was issued the proceeds of the SGLI Policy, which amounted to $400,541.11. See id. ¶ 67.
As it relates to the Navy, Plaintiff asserts that the Navy, as the manager of the SGLI Policy, failed to provide Plaintiff with written notice of the change in the SGLI Policy's beneficiary designation, as required under the SGLIA. Because of the Navy's alleged failure, Plaintiff maintains that she was not aware of the change in beneficiary designation such that she could have challenged the legitimacy of the fraudulent Form SGLV 8286, or otherwise could have ensured her rightful receipt of the SGLI Policy proceeds. See id. ¶¶ 63, 68. Thus, Plaintiff seeks to hold the Navy liable for damages equal to the full amount of the SGLI Policy proceeds for its failure to notify her of the April 26, 2014 beneficiary redesignation.
Plaintiff claims that the Navy violated § 1975 of the SGLIA, which required the Navy to provide Plaintiff with written notice when “any person other than the spouse or child” of the Insured was assigned a beneficiary designation under an SGLI policy. 38 U.S.C. § 1967(f)(3). The Navy moves for dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), arguing that it is sovereignly immune from suit under the SGLIA, which consequently divests this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
It is well established that the United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit. See FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290-91 (2012). However, Congress may waive that immunity by enacting a statute that authorizes suit against the government for damages or other relief. See Doe 1 v. United States, 37 F.4th 84, 86-88 (3d Cir. 2022). Statutory waivers of federal sovereign immunity implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction, and are thus properly analyzed under Rule 12(b)(1). See CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2008). Once a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge is raised, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006). A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) must be granted if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. See In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may treat a party's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) as either a “facial attack” or a “factual attack.” Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357-58 (3d Cir. 2014). A facial attack is an argument that “considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court” because some jurisdictional defect is present (e.g., federal law, diversity of citizenship). Id. at 358. On the other hand, a factual attack is an argument that “there is no subject matter jurisdiction because the facts of the case . . . do not support the asserted jurisdiction.” Id. Factual attacks permit district courts to “look beyond the pleadings to ascertain the facts” supporting jurisdiction. Id.; see also see United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2007).
Factual attacks differ greatly from facial attacks insofar as the former renders the district court free to “weigh and consider evidence outside of the pleadings.” Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations.”).
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the Navy's jurisdictional challenge rests entirely on the pleadings. Thus, the Navy's Motion presents a facial attack constraining the Court to “only consider the allegations of the complaint and the documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs. Inc. v....
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