Charette v. State
| Decision Date | 14 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | A20-1476 |
| Parties | Mi-in-gun Justin Charette a/k/a Justin Marshall Critt, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Affirmed
Clay County District Court
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
Appellant challenges the denial of postconviction relief, arguing that the district court (1) erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to police, and (2) abused its discretion by denying his motion to strike a juror for cause. We affirm.
On June 28, 2016, around 2:30 p.m., Moorhead police responded to a call about a disturbance at a home where M.W. was staying while the owners were away. M.W. had been arguing with appellant Mi-in-gun Justin Charette a/k/a Justin Marshall Critt, and she was "distraught." The officers told Critt to leave and watched him walk away. But about an hour later, M.W. called a friend and said, "He's back; he's here; he's outside of the windows and he's taunting me." Shortly thereafter, the fire department responded to a fire at the home and found M.W. dead from head trauma.
Around 9:40 p.m., officers investigating at the home saw Critt approaching. They had been instructed to detain him as a person of interest regarding the fire and as a possible suspect in a robbery and assault that occurred in Fargo, North Dakota the prior evening. The officers detained Critt and transported him to the law-enforcement center.
The officers decided not to question Critt that evening because he exhibited signs of impairment from alcohol or controlled substances, but they placed him in an interview room while they awaited word whether to arrest him related to the Fargo incident. As an officer secured him in the room, Critt demanded his phone. When the officer told him he could not have it, he said, The officer replied that he was "not under arrest right now." Critt said, "I know," then demanded his phone again and stomped his feet. The officer left him alone in the room. Critt continued to yell for his phone. When two officers entered the room, he repeatedly shouted at them about his phone, stomped his feet, and spat at them. They left Critt alone again. He stood there for a couple minutes muttering to himself. At one point, he said, "Let me get my phone.I'll call [the homeowners] right now." Then he tried to move his cuffed hands from behind his back. Officers restrained him and told him to keep his hands behind him. He replied, "I'm not arrested." An officer told him he was "being detained for the moment." He said, An officer responded, "We haven't asked you any questions yet." After several minutes, the officers received word to arrest Critt in connection with the Fargo incident, and they took him to jail. Critt was in the interview room a total of 10 to 15 minutes.
Around 4:30 p.m. the next day, the officers brought Critt back to the interview room. Critt said that he felt "good," had slept the whole time he was in jail, and had eaten lunch. The officers explained that M.W. was dead and they hoped Critt would help them figure out what happened. They provided a Miranda warning. Critt said he understood his rights and agreed to speak with them. During their conversation, Critt stated that he did not remember every place he went between 2:00 and 9:00 p.m. the previous day, but he did recall going to a friend's house where he drank beer with L.L. After approximately 30 minutes, Critt said,
Police subsequently interviewed L.L., who confirmed that he saw Critt on the afternoon of June 28. Critt told L.L., "I just killed someone." And he said L.L. should "watch the news" if he did not believe him and "it wouldn't be the first time [he] killed someone." L.L.'s neighbor was also present and recalled Critt saying "something along the lines of 'you'll hear about me in the news for this' or 'for what I've done.'"
Critt was charged with second-degree intentional murder and first-degree arson. He moved to suppress the statements he made to police, arguing that he did not validly waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). The district court denied the motion, concluding that Critt yelling "Where's my lawyer?" on June 28 "was not an invocation of his Miranda rights" and that he validly waived these rights the next day before speaking with police. During jury selection, one prospective juror expressed his view that an innocent person would want to testify but stated that he could follow an instruction not to draw an inference from the defendant's decision not to testify. Critt moved to strike the juror for cause, which the district court denied. After a two-week trial, the jury found Critt guilty of both charges. Critt did not appeal.
Critt filed a timely postconviction petition, arguing that (1) his statements to police on June 29 were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because he invoked his right to counsel the night before, and (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to strike the biased juror. The district court denied relief, reasoning that Critt could not invoke his right to counsel on June 28 and that the challenged juror was rehabilitated.1 Critt appeals.
We review the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). A district court abuses its discretion when itbases its decision on "an erroneous view of the law," or makes clearly erroneous factual findings. Rhodes v. State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Under the Fifth Amendment, no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V; see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493-94 (1964) (). To protect this right against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court has mandated certain procedural safeguards when police subject a suspect to custodial interrogation—among them, a right to consult with counsel before questioning and to have counsel present during questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70, 86 S. Ct. at 1625-26. If a suspect invokes his right to counsel, police cannot question him unless he first initiates contact. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885 (1981). Evidence obtained in violation of these principles may be excluded. State v. Doughty, 472 N.W.2d 299, 305 (Minn. 1991).
Critt argues that he invoked his right to counsel on June 28, and the police violated his right against self-incrimination by initiating contact with and questioning him the following day without obtaining a valid waiver of his earlier request. He contends the district court therefore erred by not suppressing his statements to police and the information police obtained from L.L. and his neighbor. This argument is unavailing.
"The applicability of the rigid prophylactic rule of Edwards requires courts to determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel." Davis v. UnitedStates, 512 U.S. 452, 458, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994) (quotation omitted). To invoke this right, a suspect must "do more than make reference to an attorney." State v. Ortega, 798 N.W.2d 59, 71 (Minn. 2011). He must "unambiguously request the assistance of or access to counsel." State v. Borg, 806 N.W.2d 535, 546 (Minn. 2011). We apply an objective "reasonable police officer" standard to determine whether a suspect invoked his right to counsel. State v. Chavarria-Cruz, 784 N.W.2d 355, 362 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59, 114 S. Ct. at 2355). Under this standard, we consider whether the suspect "articulate[d] his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct. at 2355. Where, as here, the factual circumstances are undisputed, we review application of this standard de novo. Ortega, 798 N.W.2d at 70.
Our careful review of Critt's June 28 statements convinces us that he did not actually invoke his right to counsel. During the 10- to 15-minute period he spent in the interview room, he was often alone and fixated on his phone. He repeatedly demanded the phone. When the officers refused to give it to him, he shouted profanities at them and stomped his feet. He also tried to step over his cuffed hands to move them to the front of his body. And he spat at the officers. In the midst of this belligerent and agitated behavior, Critt twice yelled, "Where's my lawyer?"
These references to counsel were not responsive to interrogation or a Miranda warning but mere outbursts. See State v. Hale, 453 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Minn. 1990) (); cf. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 139 (Minn. 1999) (). They were phrased as questions, not requests. See Ortega, 798...
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