Charles Belfore v. Vermont State Highway Department

• Decision Date: 04 November 1936
• Parties: CHARLES BELFORE v. VERMONT STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT ET AL
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

187 A. 797

108 Vt. 396

CHARLES BELFORE v. VERMONT STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT ET AL

Supreme Court of Vermont

November 4, 1936

October Term, 1936.

Workmen's Compensation Act---P. L. 6511, Rights of Employer with Respect to Compensable Injuries Where Third Person Also Liable---Construction of Statutes in Case of Conflict---Two Sections of Workmen's Compensation Act to Be Construed Together---Liberal Construction of the Act---Interpretation of Judicial Decisions---Construction Nullifying Purpose of Statute---P. L. 6511 and 6536, Effect of Action by Employee Against Third Party Brought Through Mistake---Employer's Right of Subrogation under P. L. 6511---Admissibility in Compensation Proceedings of Record of Action Showing Finding as to Mistake of Fact---Finding as Res Inter Alios Actos---Admissibility of Record to Explain Facts Shown by Writ and Docket Entries---P. L. 6490 Relaxing Rules of Evidence in Compensation Proceedings Construed---Rejection of Finding Predicated upon Inadmissible Evidence---Remand of Cause to Prevent Failure of Justice.

1. Under P. L. 6511, relating to rights of an employee with respect to injuries compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act and also sustained under circumstances creating liability in some person other than the employer, an injured employee to whom the two remedies are open may pursue either, but cannot have the benefit of both.

2. If there is any conflict between two statutes, the later controls, except that if one is general and one is special to the extent of any repugnancy between them the special will prevail regardless of their order or dates, though they are to be read together and harmonized if possible to give effect to a consistent legislative policy.

3. P L. 6511, relating to rights of an employee with respect to compensable injuries sustained under circumstances creating liability in some person other than the employer, and P. L 6536, extending time for giving notice of claim where action has been brought through mistake of fact or law and final judgment is against the employee, being both part of Ch. 264 dealing with workmen's compensation, are sufficiently cognate to be in pari materia and are to be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system to ascertain the legislative intent.

4. The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are to receive a liberal construction.

5. The language of a judicial decision must be read in accordance with its context and the point at issue.

6. A construction of a statute which would nullify its express provision and defeat its purpose is always to be avoided if possible.

7. Where an action has been brought through a mistake of law or fact by an employee against a person other than his employer in which final judgment is rendered against the employee, there has been no election by him, and he is not precluded under P. L. 6511 from making a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act against his employer, if the required notice has been given as provided in P. L. 6536 within six months after such final judgment.

8. In such circumstances, the employer has not been deprived of his right of subrogation under P. L. 6511, since the entry of final judgment against the employee is a determination that he has no rights to which the employer can be subrogated.

9. On appeal from award of compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act, certified copy of record of action brought by claimant against a person other than his employer, showing that court in directing verdict for defendant in such action said that plaintiff had made a mistake of fact by believing and claiming he had a right of action against defendant, held inadmissible and not to constitute either an estoppel nor res adjudicata, because neither of defendants in proceedings under the act was in privity with the defendant in the action at law.

10. In such circumstances, held that the judgment against the claimant was properly received to show the outcome of the action at law, but that the finding as to the factual situation was res inter alios acta, and had no effect upon the rights of the defendants in the compensation proceedings.

11. In such circumstances, held that admission of certified copies of the writ and docket entries in the action did not justify admission of the record, since it was not competent evidence to explain the material facts already appearing, the commencement and final disposition of the action.

12. P. L. 6490, providing that the commissioner of industries, in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act, shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence, etc., but may conduct the hearing in such manner as to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties, is not to be so construed as to permit the admission in evidence in such proceedings and the use thereof as a basis for a finding against the defendants, of a finding by another court in a cause in which they were not parties, had no interest, and were unable to be heard, when such finding was immaterial to the issue therein involved and there had been no opportunity for cross-examination concerning such evidence.

13. On appeal from award of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, when the deputy commissioner found that an action at law against a person other than the employer had been brought under a mistake of fact, and such finding was predicated upon inadmissible evidence received under exception and was itself excepted to, held that the finding must be rejected and the order based thereon reversed.

14. On such appeal, where it appeared that other evidence than that held inadmissible would be forthcoming on the question at issue, the cause was remanded to prevent a failure of justice.

APPEAL to Supreme Court, Rutland County, from award by deputy commissioner of industries, Leon D. Latham, Jr., Special Deputy Commissioner. The deputy commissioner after hearings and finding of facts awarded compensation. The defendants appealed. The opinion states the case.

Order reversed and cause remanded to the commissioner of industries. To be certified.

Lawrence, Stafford & O'Brien for the defendants.

Novak & Bloomer for the claimant.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON and SHERBURNE, JJ., and JEFFORDS, Supr. J.

OPINION

MOULTON

This is an appeal from an award of compensation made under the provisions of chapter 264, P. L. The claimant suffered an injury which concededly arose out of and during the course of his employment by the Vermont State highway board, when he was run over by an automobile truck owned by Thorne and driven by Forguites. He brought an action at law against Thorne in the District Court of the United States for the District of Vermont to recover for his injury, but it appeared upon trial that the truck, at the time of the accident, was under lease from Thorne to the highway board, and consequently a verdict was directed in Thorne's favor. Within six months after judgment had been entered on the verdict, the claimant gave notice that he would seek compensation from the highway board, the employer, under P. L. 6495.

The defense interposed at the hearing by the employer and the insurance carrier was that by the institution of his action against Thorne the claimant had elected to avail himself of his common law remedy against a third party and was barred from receiving compensation under P. L. Ch. 264. The deputy commissioner of industries found that the action was brought under a mistake of fact and made the award. The questions raised by the appeal relate to the soundness of the ruling of the deputy commissioner that the claimant had not made such an election as would preclude him from seeking compensation; and to the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the deputy commissioner made his finding of a mistake of fact.

By P. L. 6511 it is provided that "when an injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in some person other than the employer a legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the injured employee may, at his option, either claim compensation under the provisions of this chapter or obtain damages from or proceed at law against suc other person to recover damages; and, if compensation is claimed and awarded under the provisions of this chapter, an employer having paid compensation or having become liable therefor shall be subrogated to the rights of the injured employee to recover against that person * * *." By P. L. 6485 (I) the term "employer" includes, under the present circumstances, the insurer. Under P. L. 6511 an injured employee to whom the two remedies are open may pursue either, but cannot have the benefit of both. Davis v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 95 Vt. 180, 183, 113 A. 539.

P. L 6536 provides that "In case, through mistake of law or fact, a suit has been brought [by an employee] to recover damages in any court and final judgment is against the employee, the limitation [of time for giving notice of claim for compensation under P. L. 6535] shall not begin to run until six months...