CHARLES COUNTY DEPT. OF SOC. SERV. v. Vann

• Decision Date: 29 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 87,87
• Citation: CHARLES COUNTY DEPT. OF SOC. SERV. v. Vann, 855 A.2d 313, 382 Md. 286 (Md. 2004)
• Parties: CHARLES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. Charles VANN.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

855 A.2d 313

382 Md. 286

CHARLES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. Charles VANN.

No. 87, Sept. Term, 2003.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 29, 2004.

Sandra Barnes, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for petitioner.

James Brewster Hopewell (Ann M. Gaegler, on brief), Riverdale, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

RAKER, J.

In this case, we must decide whether the Court of Special Appeals, on judicial review of an administrative agency decision, erred when it held that a parent could not be responsible for indicated child abuse when, in the course of administering corporal punishment, the parent inadvertently injured his son because the child attempted to escape the punishment. The Charles County Department of Social Services found Charles Vann responsible for "indicated child abuse" pursuant to Maryland Code (1999 Repl.Vol., 2003 Cum.Supp.), § 5-701 of the Family Law Article.¹ An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Department's finding and Vann filed a petition for judicial review of the agency decision in the Circuit Court for Charles County. We shall hold that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment by the Court of Special Appeals.

I.

On May 6, 1999, Charles Vann, respondent, and his wife each received a phone call from the administrators of the daycare center of their six-year-old son. The daycare providers had called to advise them that their son had brutally punched and kicked a teacher in the stomach. Because the teacher was thought to be pregnant² and had suffered serious injuries, the daycare providers sent her to the hospital and demanded that respondent and his wife immediately retrieve their son from the daycare center.

That evening, respondent and his wife discussed the situation. This was not the first time their son had misbehaved violently at the daycare center. Prior to this incident, he had been involved in multiple bouts of fighting with the other students, prompting the providers to transfer him from his original classroom to a new one and, on occasion, to send him home early. Ultimately, the difficulties with the child became so severe that the daycare providers threatened to, and eventually did, expel him permanently from the center.

Respondent and his wife were consternated by their six-year-old's repeated and unrelenting behavioral issues. Previous attempts to modify the child's conduct using a graduated discipline regimen — which included sitting him in a corner for fifteen minutes, banning him from access to his video games, prohibiting him from going outside to play with his friends, and restricting his movements to his bedroom — had resulted only in more clashes with the students and teachers, culminating in the punching incident on May 6. Both parents agreed that corporal punishment was the appropriate discipline for their son's misbehavior that day. Using his personal belt, respondent, while verbally chastising his son for the incident at the daycare center, struck at his son. But the six-year-old attempted to avoid the blows by running away, hiding under the bed, and grabbing the belt from his father. In the course of the tussle and respondent's attempts to land the blows, respondent struck him in his lower back with the belt buckle, causing a reddish, moon-shaped bruise about an inch in length. In all, respondent struck his son two or three times with the belt.

The following day, respondent's son complained to his teacher of back pain. The daycare providers observed the injuries on the child and reported the matter to Child Protective Services. Eventually, an investigator employed by the local Department of Social Services was called to look into the matter. On May 10, 1999, the investigator interviewed respondent and his wife. On January 13, 2000, the local department advised respondent that he had been charged with indicated child abuse, see FL §§ 5-701(b)(1) and 5-701(m); that his name would be submitted to a state centralized registry used for the recording of such findings, see FL § 5-714(e); and that he had a right to contest the charge before an administrative court, see FL § 5-706.1. See also Montgomery County v. L.D., 349 Md. 239, 707 A.2d 1331 (1998); C.S. v. Prince George's County Dept. of Social Services, 343 Md. 14, 680 A.2d 470 (1996).

Respondent exercised his right to the hearing before an administrative law judge under FL § 5-706.1(b), and the hearing took place on July 18, 2000. On August 30, 2000, the ALJ issued her decision, stating as follows:

"The evidence establishes that [respondent] loves his son... fiercely and wants to raise well-behaved responsible children, which is admirable. The evidence also establishes that [respondent's] actions in swinging a belt with a large metal buckle at a young child who is twisting, hopping, and trying to run away puts the child in danger of sustaining unintended serious injuries. Although [respondent] testified that he was aiming for [his son's] buttocks, he missed the mark and hit [the] lower-mid back area, leaving marks."

"... Wielding a cowhide belt with a 2-3" metal buckle at a six-year-old child who is frantically trying to get away and out of reach by twisting, turning, and grabbing at the belt is not [justified]. [Respondent's] action injured [the child]. Striking him and causing a half-moon red/purplish mark on his back ... harmed his health and placed him at substantial risk of harm. The substantial risk and potential for such harm was imminent in that if the child had ducked to avoid the belt, the buckle could have struck his eye or teeth, and could have resulted in more serious, even permanent, injuries. Once an intended target becomes a moving one, it cannot be predicted with certainty where the blows will land."

Based on these findings, the ALJ affirmed the decision of the local department to charge respondent with indicated child abuse.

Respondent filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Charles County. The Circuit Court affirmed the findings of the Department of Social Services. In an unreported opinion, a divided panel of the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court's decision, holding that respondent could not be held responsible for indicated child abuse when, in the course of administering corporal punishment, he injured his son inadvertently as the child attempted to escape the punishment.

The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that, as a matter of law, respondent's exercise of corporal punishment could not be "transformed" from lawful corporal punishment into unlawful indicated child abuse simply by virtue of the child's disobedience to his parent's order to stand still and accept the punishment. But for the child's independent decision to disobey, the court stated, the punishment would have been lawful, and a parent cannot be held responsible for the injury if the child's action is the "independent intervening cause" of the injury. Dissenting, Judge Deborah Eyler argued that the majority's reasoning was circular, because it determined the corporal punishment lawful without considering the objective reasonableness of the punishment under the totality of circumstances, including factors such as the child's age, size, ability to understand the punishment, and ability to comply. The local Department sought review of the intermediate appellate court's holding, and we granted its petition for writ of certiorari. 378 Md. 613, 837 A.2d 925 (2003).

Petitioner contends that the Court of Special Appeals's holding was tantamount to an exception to "indicated child abuse" for parents who unintentionally injure their child in the course of administering corporal punishment. Petitioner argues the statutory definition of indicated child abuse, found in FL §§ 5-701(b) and (m),³ does not contain the exception carved out by the intermediate appellate court. The court, suggests petitioner, confused the definition of indicated child abuse in FL § 5-701 with either that of criminal child abuse, Md.Code (2002, 2003 Cum.Supp.), § 3-601 of the Criminal Law Article,⁴ or that of "protective order" child abuse (that is, child abuse sufficient to require a legal protective order for the child, see FL § 4-501(b) (defining abuse for Title 4, Subtitle 5 of the Family Law Article, including abuse requiring a protective order); see also FL §§ 4-504 to 4-506). Protective order child abuse expressly excludes reasonable corporal punishment, FL § 4-501(b)(2), and criminal child abuse has been held not to encompass reasonable corporal punishment, see Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 126-27, 389 A.2d 341, 348-49 (1978), whereas child abuse as defined by FL § 5-701 contains no such disclaimer. Petitioner sees this distinction as crucial, evincing an intent by the Legislature to disregard corporal punishment in the context of FL § 5-701. The Court of Special Appeals, contends petitioner, applied the wrong definition of child abuse and erred as a matter of law because it took into account the fact that respondent was implementing corporal punishment on his recalcitrant son.

Respondent counters that the definition of abuse in FL § 5-701 does not foreclose the reasonable use of corporal punishment. Because reasonable corporal punishment is permitted and because respondent's use of force was reasonable, respondent could not be held responsible for child abuse. As evidence of legislative intent, respondent also refers to FL § 4-501, defining child abuse in the context of protective orders, which expressly precludes reasonable corporal punishment from its purview. He argues that the definitions of child abuse in FL §§ 4-501 and 5-701 must be harmonized. Citing the legislative bill file, respondent also argues that the legislative history of FL § 5-701 clearly indicates that parental intent must be considered a factor in determining...