Charles E. Doubleday v. Town of Stockbridge

• Decision Date: 05 October 1937
• Parties: CHARLES E. DOUBLEDAY v. TOWN OF STOCKBRIDGE
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

194 A. 462

109 Vt. 167

CHARLES E. DOUBLEDAY v. TOWN OF STOCKBRIDGE

Supreme Court of Vermont

October 5, 1937

May Term, 1937.

Inadequate Briefing---Inconsistent Defenses---Defenses Held Not Inconsistent---P. L. 603, 636 and 685, Construed Together---Construction of Statutes---Ascertaining Legislative Intent---Construction Apparently Contrary to Letter of Statute---Provisions Inconsistent---Repeals by Implication---Leaving Statute Unchanged in Revisions as Evidence of Legislative Intent---P. L. 603 Construed as Controlling P. L. 636 and 685 as to Listing Taxable Real Estate to Possessor---Taxes Held Legally Assessed to Lessee---Recovery of Taxes Not Involuntarily Paid.

1. In ACTION OF CONTRACT to recover sums paid for taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed, where defendant pleaded nil debet, non assumpsit and statute of limitations and plaintiff excepted to overruling of motion that defendant be required to elect defense upon which it proposed to rely, mere naked assertion in plaintiff's brief that defenses set up were inconsistent, without any supporting argument or authority, held inadequate briefing and to merit no consideration.

2. Defenses are inconsistent only when they cannot both be true and proof of one necessarily proves falsity of the other.

3. In ACTION OF CONTRACT to recover sums paid for taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed, defendant was entitled to go to trial upon all its pleas, of nil debet, non assumpsit and statute of limitations, and was not required on plaintiff's motion to elect upon which of these defenses it would rely, since proof of any one of these defenses does not prove falsity of any other.

4. P L. 603, 636 and 685 being sufficiently cognate to be in pari materia, since they all relate to taxation of real estate are to be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system, and the legislative intent, thus ascertained must be given effect.

5. The fundamental rule for construction of statutes is to ascertain intent of Legislature.

6. In construction of statute, intent of Legislature must be ascertained from act itself, if language is plain, but when it is doubtful in meaning, true meaning may be ascertained by considering it in light of all of its provisions, object to be accomplished by its passage, its title, pre-existing legislation on same subject and other relevant circumstances.

7. Statute is to be construed to carry out intent of Legislature, though such construction may seem contrary to letter of statute.

8. When provisions of a law are inconsistent, effect must be given to those which harmonize with context and apparent intent of Legislature.

9. Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.

10. Intent of Legislature to continue policy of enabling listers to set real estate either to owner or possessor as provided in sec. 1, No. 7, Acts of 1884, is clearly evidenced by fact that this section has been carried forward unchanged through revisions of 1917 and 1933, though P. L. 636 and 685 relating to quadrennial appraisal and completed grand list, as sections corresponding thereto were amended in 1910, provide for listing in name of owner only.

11. Provisions of P. L. 603 that "Taxable real estate shall be set in the list to the last owner or possessor thereof, on April 1 in each year," govern and control those of P. L 636 and 685, respectively, that quadrennial appraisal shall contain "the name of each person owning real estate," and that completed grand list shall contain a brief description, etc., of each separate parcel "of taxable real estate, owned by each taxpayer."

12. In ACTION OF CONTRACT to recover sums paid for taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed, where land on which taxes were assessed was held by plaintiff under assignment of 999-year lease from town and did not belong to class of public lands exempt from taxation, held that plaintiff was possessor of land to whom taxes could lawfully be assessed under provisions of P. L. 603.

13. In such action, tried by court, plaintiff was not entitled to recover in absence of finding that payment of taxes by plaintiff was involuntary in the legal sense.

ACTION OF CONTRACT to recover sums paid over a period of years for taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed. Pleas, nil debet, non assumpsit and the statute of limitations. Trial by court at the June Term, 1935, Windsor County, Cleary, J., presiding. Judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Judgment affirmed.

Roland E. Stevens for the plaintiff.

Raymond Trainor and Henry F. Black for the defendant.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, SHERBURNE and BUTTLES, JJ.

OPINION

SHERBURNE

This is an action of contract to recover sums paid over a period of years for taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed. Trial was by court and judgment was for the defendant.

The defendant pleaded nil debet, non assumpsit and the statute of limitations. At the trial the plaintiff seasonably moved that the defendant be required to elect upon which of its defenses it proposed to rely. To the overruling of this motion the plaintiff excepted. The plaintiff's brief calls attention to P. L. 1574, subd. II, and the construction placed upon it in Coates v. Eastern States Farmers Exchange, 99 Vt. 170, 175, 130 A. 709, to the effect that inconsistent defenses are permissible and only subject the defendant, on motion before or during the trial, to an election of the defense on which he intends to rely, and then makes the naked assertion that the defenses here set up are inconsistent, without any supporting argument or citation of authority, and that therefore the court erred. This is inadequate briefing and merits no consideration.

Defenses are inconsistent only when they cannot both be true, and the proof of one necessarily proves the falsity of the other. Bradley v. Blandin and Somerset Land Co., 92 Vt. 313, 315, 104 A. 11; McKinstry v. Collins, 74 Vt. 147, 156, 52 A. 438. The substance of the pleas is, that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff anything; that it did not assume and promise as alleged by the plaintiff; and that plaintiff's supposed causes of action did not accrue within six years prior to the date suit was commenced. The proof of any one of these defenses does not prove the falsity of any other, although by implication of law the last defense admits that a cause of action once existed. It has long been the practice in this State to plead the general issue and the statute of limitations together, and it is generally held in other jurisdictions that such defenses are not inconsistent. 49 C. J. 220; annotations in L.R.A. 1917C, 71. The defendant was properly allowed to go to trial upon all its pleas.

The only other exception necessary to consider is to the finding that the taxes were lawfully assessed. It appeared that on January 22, 1853, the selectmen of defendant town leased to the plaintiff's predecessor in title 68 3/4 acres of land in said town for the term of 999 years at the annual rental of $ 4.12 1/2, and that the original lessee deposited with said selectmen $ 68.75 to remain in the hands and under the control of them and their successors in office, upon trust that they apply the annual interest at six percent, viz., $ 4.12 1/2, in payment of the rent as it should fall due. The lease also contained a provision that the lessee should annually pay all taxes that may be assessed on or on account of the land leased during the term of the lease. The lease was duly recorded in the land records of said town, and several assignments and transfers were made, the last being in 1878, when it was transferred to the plaintiff. In these assignments and transfers no mention was made of the money deposited to take care of the rent.

The findings show that this land was listed to the plaintiff in the grand list book for taxes from 1893 to 1932; and that he received tax notices for taxes on this land each year, at least from 1922 to 1933, and for several of these years, at least, he received a receipt when he paid his taxes, showing that the bill was for taxes raised on the list of those years. In 1932 the plaintiff refused to pay anything more, and he has not since been required to pay anything, and his name was stricken from the grand list.

The court found that the taxes were lawfully assessed under the terms of the original lease, and that all payments sought to be recovered, except for the years 1929, 1930 and 1931, were made more than six years prior to the bringing of this suit.

The sum of money deposited with the selectmen amounted to a commuted rent for the entire term of the lease at the rate of one dollar per acre of land. It is clear that the land leased did not belong to that class of public lands which are exempted from taxation, and that it was understood and agreed that the lessee should pay taxes thereon. So under this exception the only question is...