Charles Gagnon v. United States

• Decision Date: 21 March 1904
• Docket Number: No. 163,163
• Citation: 24 S.Ct. 510,48 L.Ed. 745,193 U.S. 451
• Parties: CHARLES GAGNON, Appt. , v. UNITED STATES and the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

193 U.S. 451

24 S.Ct. 510

48 L.Ed. 745

CHARLES GAGNON, Appt.,

v UNITED STATES and the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians.

No. 163.

Argued February 29, 1904.

Decided March 21, 1904.

This was a petition filed in the court of claims in 1894 and amended in 1902, to recover the value of one half of certain property taken in 1866 from the firm of which the petitioner was a member by Indians then in amity with the United States.

The facts found in the case were substantially as follows: Charles Gagnon was a British subject. In March, 1858, he declared before the district court of Woodbury county, Iowa, his intention to become a citizen of the United States. He alleged that in 1863 he was admitted by the district court of Richardson county, in the territory of Nebraska, as a citizen of the United States, but no entry of this fact appeared in the records of that court for the year 1863.

It appeared Hosford & Gagnon, under which firm name they traded, owned horses and cattle of the aggregate value of $15,500 and in 1866, without just cause or provocation on their part, Indians belonging to the defendant tribes, then in amity with the United States, took them away. Hosford filed his claim for one half of the amount and obtained judgment, which has been satisfied. Gagnon's claim was for the remaining half.

It further appeared that in the prosecution of his claim Gagnon failed to produce his certificate of naturalization, or a duly authenticated copy thereof. To meet the requirements of the law, providing that only citizens of the United States can recover under the Indian depredation act, Gagnon relied exclusively on a record of the district court for the first judicial district of the state of Nebraska (successor of the district court of the territory), purporting to enter nunc pro tunc a judgment of naturalization of the territorial court as of the date of September 25, 1863.

No paper, memorandum, or entry of any kind was found in the records of the court tending to show that a certificate of naturalization had been issued to Gagnon in that year. It also appeared that the persons who held the offices of judge and clerk of the territorial court in 1863 were both dead.

The record of the state court recited that it had been made to appear 'by competent evidence' that the alleged application for naturalization had been granted by the territorial court, but that the 'judgment of naturalization was never recorded, and if recorded, the record is lost and cannot be found in the records of this court, and it being legal and proper that said record should be supplied, and this court being willing that said error and omission be corrected, it is ordered and adjudged that said judgment so rendered by this court at its September term, 1863, be entered at large on the journal of this court as of the date when it should have been entered, to wit, on the 25th day of September, 1863, and that the clerk issue to the said Charles Gagnon the proper certificate of naturalization,' etc.

It further appeared that on March 19, 1897, Gagnon's attorneys wrote the Attorney General that application would be made to the district court of Richardson county, Nebraska, on March 29, 1897, 'for restoration of certain lost records relative to the naturalization of said Gagnon.'

Upon the facts thus found the court of claims decided that Gagnon was not a citizen of the United States at the time the depredation was committed, and the petition was dismissed. 38 Ct. Cl. 10. Thereupon an appeal was taken to this court.

Messrs. William E. Harvey, George A. King, and William B. King for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 453-456 intentionally omitted] Assistant Attorney General Thompson and Mr. Harry Peyton for appellees.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brown:

Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:

This case raises the simple question whether thirty-three years after a judgment naturalizing an alien is alleged to have been rendered but not recorded, or, if recorded, the record lost, a common-law court has jurisdiction to enter such judgment of naturalization nunc pro tunc, when no entry or memorandum appeared upon the record or files at the time the original judgment is supposed to have been rendered. If there be no jurisdiction to enter such judgment, it may be attacked collaterally.

The power to amend its records, to correct mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court, inadvertencies of counsel, or to supply defects or omissions in the record, even after the lapse of the term, is inherent in courts of justice, and was recognized by this court in Re Wight, 134 U. S. 136, 33 L. ed. 865, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487; Gonzales v. Cunningham, 164 U. S. 612, 623, 41 L. ed. 572, 576, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182, and United States v. Vigil, 10 Wall. 423, 19 L. ed. 954. It is also conferred upon courts of the United States by Rev. Stat. §§ 899, 900, and 901 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 675). This power, however, must be distinguished from that discussed by the court in Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 26 L. ed. 797, wherein we held that the authority of the court to set aside or modify an exist- ing judgment or order ceased with the expiration of the term, and from that time all final judgments and decrees passed beyond its control, and that if such errors existed they could only be corrected by writ of error or appeal to a superior tribunal. An exception was there made of certain mistakes of fact not put in issue or passed upon, such as that a party died before judgment, or was a married woman, or was an infant and no guardian appeared or was appointed, or that there was error in the process through the default of the clerk. In the Federal courts the power to amend is given in general language in the final clause of Rev. Stat. § 954 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 696), which declares that such courts 'may at any time permit either of the parties to amend any defect in the process or pleadings, upon such conditions...