Charles Heike v. United States, No. 520
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | Holmes |
| Citation | 33 S.Ct. 226,57 L.Ed. 450,227 U.S. 131 |
| Parties | CHARLES R. HEIKE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES |
| Docket Number | No. 520 |
| Decision Date | 27 January 1913 |
v.
UNITED STATES.
Messrs. John B. Stanchfield, George S. Graham, and Frederick Allis for petitioner.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 131-137 intentionally omitted]
Page 137
Assistant Attorney General Denison and Messrs. Henry L. Stimson and Felix Frankfurter for respondent.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 137-139 intentionally omitted]
Page 139
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
The petitioner was indicted for frauds on the revenue; and, in the sixth court, under Rev. Stat. § 5440 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676), for a conspiracy to commit such frauds by effecting entries of raw sugars at less than their true weights by means of false written statements as to the same. Rev. Stat. § 5445. Act of June 10, 1890, chap. 407, § 9, 26 Stat. at L. 131, 135, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 1886, 1895. He pleaded in bar that, in 1909 and 1910, answering the government's subpoena, he had testified and produced documentary evidence before a Federal grand jury investigating alleged breaches of the Sherman anti-trust act [26 Stat. at L. 209, chap. 647, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3200], that the testimony and documents concerned thesubject-
U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3678.
Page 140
matter of the present indictment, and that therefore he was exempted from liability by the act of February 25, 1903, chap. 755, 32 Stat. at L. 854, 904, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1313, as amended June 30, 1906, chap. 3920, 34 Stat. at L. 798, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1319. There was a replication; issue was joined; a trial was had upon the plea, in which the court directed a verdict for the government (175 Fed. 852); leave was given to plead over; a premature attempt was made to bring the case before this court (217 U. S. 423, 54 L. ed. 821, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539), and then there was a trial on the merits in which the petitioner was found guilty on the sixth count. The circuit court of appeals affirmed the judgment (112 C. C. A. 615, 192 Fed. 83). Whereupon a writ of certiorari was granted by this court.
The investigation in which the petitioner testified concerned transactions of the American Sugar Refining Company. See Pennsylvania Sugar Ref. Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co. 92 C. C. A. 318, 166 Fed. 254. The petitioner was summoned to produce records of the American Sugar Refining Company and to testify. He appeared, produced the records, and testified that he was the person to whom the subpoenas were addressed, secretary of the New York corporation, and secretary and treasurer of the New Jersey corporation of the same name. He summed up what the books produced showed as to the formation of the New York company. He identified his signature to four checks of the company in a transaction not in question here,—the Kissel-Segal loan mentioned in United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 608, 54 L. ed. 1168, 1178, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124. These checks were not used in the present case. He testified as to the ownership of the Havemeyer and Elder Refinery in Brooklyn. Finally he produced a table showing how many pounds of sugar were melted each year, from 1887 to 1907, in each refinery; this table, of course, not purporting to represent the petitioner's personal knowledge, but being a summary of reports furnished by the company's different employees, and, the government contends, volunteered by him.
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The act of February 25, 1903, chap. 755, 32 Stat. at L. 904, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1314, appropriates $500,000 for the enforcement of the interstate commerce and anti-trust act, 'Provided, that no person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said acts; Provided further, that no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.' (This last proviso was added only from superfluous caution and throws no light on the construction. Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139, 143, 144, 56 L. ed. 128, 130, 131, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 71.) By the amendment of June 30, 1906, chap. 3920, 34 Stat. at L. 798, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1319, immunity under the foregoing and other provisions 'shall extend only to a natural person who, in obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony under oath, or produces evidence, documentary or otherwise, under oath.'
The petitioner contended that, as soon as he had testified upon a matter under the Sherman act, he had an amnesty by the statute from liability for any and every offense that was connected with that matter in any degree; or, at least, every offense towards the discovery of which his testimony led up, even if it had no actual effect in bringing the discovery about. At times the argument seemed to suggest that any testimony, although not incriminating, if relevant to the later charge, brought the amnesty into play. In favor of the broadest construction of the immunity act, it is argued that when it was...
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