Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42

• Decision Date: 16 June 1970
• Docket Number: D,No. 420,No. 606,420,606
• Citation: 8 Cal.App.3d 830,86 Cal.Rptr. 825
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2198, 63 Lab.Cas. P 11,034 CHARLES J. ROUNDS CO., a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JOINT COUNCIL OF TEAMSTERS NO. 42, Teamsters Local Union, and Teamsters Local Unionefendants and Respondents. Civ. 34977.

Page 825

86 Cal.Rptr. 825

8 Cal.App.3d 830, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2198, 63 Lab.Cas. P 11,034

CHARLES J. ROUNDS CO., a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JOINT COUNCIL OF TEAMSTERS NO. 42, Teamsters Local Union No. 420, and Teamsters Local Union No. 606, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 34977.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

June 16, 1970.

Rehearing Denied July 7, 1970.

For Opinion on Hearing, see 95 Cal. Rptr. 53, 454 P.2d 4397.

Findlay A. Carter, and Robert P. Schifferman, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

Brundage, Neyhart, Miller, Ross & Reich, and Julius Reich, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

JEFFERSON, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff employer filed a complaint against the defendant unions seeking compensatory damages for breach of a no-strike clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement (hereafter referred to as the 'Agreement'). Defendants filed an answer which contained a general denial and set up the affirmative defense that the dispute was covered by an arbitration clause in the Agreement; that plaintiff's failure to utilize the grievance procedure provided therein, precluded any action for damages allegedly arising out of the dispute. By agreement of the parties, the special defense was tried first. Following a court ruling favorable to defendants, a judgment of dismissal was entered, from which plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.

No dispute exists as to the following facts: Plaintiff was an employer in the construction industry who was engaged in interstate commerce. Plaintiff was a member of the employer organization known as the Southern California Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America. The latter, acting as plaintiff's authorized agent, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the defendant unions. Article IV of the Agreement contains both 'no-strike' and 'no-lockout' clauses. The same srticle further provides that, 'all grievances or disputes arising between them [the parties] over the interpretation or application of the terms of this Agreement shall be settled by the procedure set forth in Article V hereof. * * *' Article V, which then sets up grievance and arbitration procedures, provides that, 'All grievances, other than jurisdictional disputes, arising out of the interpretation or application of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement shall be submitted for determination and shall be determined by the procedure set forth in this Article, * * *.' The procedures set forth include the establishment of a Joint Adjustment Board composed of equal numbers of labor and management representatives. Both the Union and the Employer are required to refer grievances or disputes to this Board. If the Board is unable to decide a matter, or if either party disagrees with its decision, the Board selects an Impartial Chairman from a list supplied by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Decisions of the Impartial Chairman, or nonappealed decisions of the Joint Adjustment Board, are 'final and binding.'

As to the specific grievance and arbitration machinery for iniating grievances, the agreement in Article V(C) provides: 'A Contractor shall refer a grievance or dispute to the Joint Adjustment Board through the appropriate employer Association. The Association shall then refer the grievance or dispute to the Joint Adjustment Board by sending written notice to the Contractor and the Union Chairmen of the Joint Adjustment Board. The Union shall refer a grievance or dispute to the Joint Adjustment Board by sending written notice to the Union Chairman of the Joint Adjustment Board. Upon receipt of such written notice, the Union Chairman of the Joint Adjustmen Board shall, by mutual agreemen with the appropriate employer Association, establish a time and place for the Joint Adjustment Board to convene. The written notice of referral required by this paragraph shall contain the name of the Contractor and the Union directly involved, the date and place of occurrence of the grievance or dispute and a brief description of the nature of the grievance or dispute.'

The complaint alleges that, in violation of the no-strike pledge in the labor agreement, the defendant unions called a strike which caused a work stoppage on the job site on July 2, 3 and 5, 1963. It was stipulated that plaintiff never filed a grievance under the labor agreement concerning the matters alleged in the complaint. In dismissing the action, the trial court found that the work stoppage dispute was subject to the arbitration provision of the agreement and that the action was barred by plaintiff's failure to utilize such provision.

Since plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce, the issue of the arbitrability of the dispute in question must be resolved by the application of the substantive federal law fashioned by the federal courts under the mandate of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).) (Local 174, Teamsters etc. Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-103, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593; Butchers Union Local 229 v. Cudahy Packing Co., 66 Cal.2d 925, 930-931, 59 Cal.Rptr. 713, 428 P.2d 849; Leon Handbag Co. v. Local 213, etc., 276 A.C.A. 285, 287, 81 Cal.Rptr. 63.) Federal law '* * * commands a state court to order arbitration unless, after resolving all doubts in favor of that procedure, it can determine 'with positive assurance' that the dispute is not covered by the arbitration clause.' (Butchers Union Local 229 v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 927, 59 Cal.Rptr. at p. 714, 428 P.2d at p. 850.) Applying this test or standard, it cannot be seriously doubted that the dispute based upon defendant's alleged violation of the no-strike clause, was a matter which was arbitrable under the labor agreement.

As above indicated in the statement of the facts, the agreement provides (in Article IV) for settlement through arbitration of 'all grievances or disputes arising between * * * [the parties] over the interpretation or application of the terms of this agreement.' Thereafter, in Article V, which sets out the arbitration procedure, is contained the provision that, 'all grievances, other than jurisdictional disputes, arising out of the interpretation or application of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement shall be submitted for determination and shall be determined by the procedure set forth in this Article, * * *' It goes without saying that a dispute concerning the no-strike clause is one involving 'the interpretation' of a term of the agreement. Article V(C) expressly provides the machinery for employer-initiated grievances. Only 'jurisdictional disputes' are grievances which the agreement specifically provides are not subject to arbitration.

Plaintiff finds support for the position that it was not required to use the grievance machinery provided in the agreement, from language at the end of Article XII, which reads, 'A parry to this Agreement shall not * * *...