Charles v. City of Los Angeles
| Decision Date | 01 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: CV 10–7260 ABC (PLAx). |
| Citation | 757 F.Supp.2d 989 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Wayne CHARLES and Fort Self Storage, Plaintiffs,v.CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a California municipal corporation, Defendant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Matthew C. Klase, Webb Klase and Lemond LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.Kenneth T. Fong, Kim Rodgers Westhoff Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.
Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Los Angeles's (the “City's”) Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Request for Injunctive Relief and Motion for a More Definite Statement, filed on November 11, 2010. (Docket No. 21.) Plaintiffs Wayne Charles and Fort Self Storage, Inc. (“Plaintiffs”) opposed on November 15, 2010 and the City replied on November 22, 2010. This matter is set for hearing on Monday, December 6, 2010 at 10:00 a.m., but the Court finds it appropriate for resolution without oral argument. Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; Local Rule 7–15. The Court also VACATES the Scheduling Conference set for that day. For the reasons below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the motion for a more definite statement is DENIED as MOOT.
This is yet another case in the saga involving the City's attempts to regulate the proliferation of commercial billboards in Los Angeles. This case, however, raises only narrow as-applied claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages based on the City's classification of Plaintiff's proposed signs as commercial, which are prohibited by the City's ordinance regulating signs throughout the City (the “Sign Ordinance”). (Compl. ¶ 26 ().) In denying a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court already concluded on a nearly identical record that the City properly classified Plaintiffs' proposed sign as commercial, which barred Plaintiffs' claims. (Docket No. 25.) The Court reaches the same conclusion here.
Article 4.4 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”), which contains the City's Sign Ordinance, does not prohibit signs bearing “ideological, political, or other noncommercial message[s]” if they are otherwise permitted by that Article. LAMC § 14.4.4(A). It does require a permit for any off-site commercial sign, which is defined as “a sign that displays any message directing attention to a business, product, service, profession, commodity, activity, event, person, institution or any other commercial message, which is generally conducted, sold, manufactured, produced, offered or occurs elsewhere than on the premises where the sign is located.” Id. § 14.4.2. Plaintiffs' proposed sign would be an off-site “temporary” sign under the City's Sign Ordinance, defined as “[a]ny sign that is to be maintained for a limited duration, not to exceed 30 days, including paper signs and other signs that are not permanently affixed to the ground or building.” Id. § 14.4.2. Temporary signs are allowed under the following circumstances:
Sec. 14.4.16. TEMPORARY SIGNS.
A. Permit Required. Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, a building permit shall be required for a temporary sign, pennant, banner, ribbon, streamer or spinner, other than one that contains a political, ideological or other noncommercial message. The permit application shall specify the dates being requested for authorized installation and the proposed location.
B. Area.
1. Temporary signs that require a permit shall be removed within 30 days of installation and shall not be reinstalled for a period of 30 days of the date of removal of the previous sign. The installation of temporary signs shall not exceed a total of 90 days in any calendar year.
2. Temporary signs that do not require a permit shall be removed within 30 days of the date of installation of the sign.
D. Location. Temporary signs, including those that do not require a building permit, may be tacked, pasted or otherwise temporarily affixed to windows and/or on the walls of buildings, barns, sheds or fences.
E. Construction. Temporary signs may contain or consist of posters, pennants, ribbons, streamers or spinners. Temporary signs may be made of paper or any other material. If the temporary sign is made of cloth, it shall be flameproofed when the aggregate area exceeds 100 square feet. Every temporary cloth sign shall be supported and attached with stranded cable of 1/16–inch minimum diameter or by other methods as approved by the Department of Building and Safety.
Two other provisions of the Sign Ordinance prohibit certain signs located near freeways:
Sec. 14.4.5. HAZARD TO TRAFFIC.
A. Prohibition. No sign or sign support structure shall be erected, constructed, painted or maintained, and no permit shall be issued, if the sign or sign support structure, because of its location, size, nature or type, constitutes a hazard to the safe and efficient operation of vehicles upon a street or a freeway, or which creates a condition that endangers the safety of persons or property.
B. Hazard Referral. The Department of Building and Safety shall refer the following to the Department of Transportation for hazard evaluation and determination prior to the issuance of a building permit:
1. All permit applications for signs that will be visible from and are located within 500 feet of the main traveled roadway of a freeway; and
2. All other permit applications and any signs that are determined by the Department of Building and Safety to have a potential for hazard.
C. Hazard Determination. The Department of Transportation shall return to the Department of Building and Safety each application so referred to it together with a statement of its determination. If the Department of Transportation determines that the sign or sign support structure will constitute a hazard, the Department of Building and Safety shall deny the application for permit.
Sec. 14.4.6. FREEWAY EXPOSURE.
A. New Signs. No person shall erect, construct, install, paint, maintain, and no building or electrical permit shall be issued for any sign or sign support structure within 2,000 feet of a freeway unless the Department of Building and Safety has first determined that the sign will not be viewed primarily from a main traveled roadway of a freeway or an on-ramp/off-ramp. However, at the termination of an off-ramp, any wall sign located along the front line may be viewed primarily from the off-ramp.
The phrase “viewed primarily from” shall mean that the message may be seen with reasonable clarity from a greater distance by a person traveling on the main traveled roadway of a freeway or on-ramp/off-ramp than by a person traveling on the street adjacent to the sign.
Id. §§ 14.4.5, 14.4.6. The Sign Ordinance specifically provides that temporary signs are subject to these traffic hazard and freeway exposure provisions. Id. § 14.4.3(D).C. Plaintiffs' Business and Proposed Sign
Plaintiff Wayne Charles is in the business of leasing wall space for posting and operating signs bearing “noncommercial messages.” (Compl. ¶ 1.) Earlier this summer, he traveled to Los Angeles to investigate opportunities to post signs; in doing so, he reviewed the Sign Ordinance and concluded he could post temporary signs for thirty days. (Compl. ¶ 6.) He eventually found a building at 1651 South Central Avenue, leased by Plaintiff Fort Self Storage, Inc. (“Fort”). (Compl. ¶ 8.) Wayne entered an agreement with Fort to lease wall space to post the billboard at issue here. (Compl. ¶ 9.)
Plaintiffs allege that the signs to be posted “will bear content related to motion pictures, theatrical productions, television and radio programming, music, books, newspapers, paintings and other works of art.” (Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs attached to the complaint photographs of the content of only their first proposed sign: an advertisement bearing the logo for the television show on the Entertainment Network and images of the show's two hosts, Ryan Seacrest and Giuliana Rancic. ) Because Plaintiffs allege that this sign is noncommercial, Plaintiffs did not apply for a permit to post this sign, but they have not posted it or any other sign “based on [ ] knowledge that the City has recently jailed and fined individuals who it believes have violated the Sign Regulations,” and Plaintiffs fear that the City would enforce the Sign Ordinance against it. (Compl. ¶ 13.)
Plaintiffs approached the City about posting this sign, claiming it to be noncommercial, and the City eventually sent Plaintiffs a letter indicating that the sign was commercial, would violate the Sign Ordinance, and warned Plaintiffs that criminal fines and other penalties could accrue from posting non-permitted commercial signs. (Compl. ¶ 23; Compl., Ex. B.) The letter referred to the Sign Ordinance's permitting requirements for off-site, supergraphic, and temporary signs, but did not refer specifically to the Traffic Hazard or Freeway Exposure provisions. (Compl., Ex. B.) The letter did note that the “subject signs may additionally violate other provisions of state or local law.” ( Id.)
Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint on September 29, 2010, seeking a declaratory judgment that its proposed signs are all noncommercial and exempt from the City's permitting and other restrictions on commercial billboards (Compl. ¶¶ 25–28) and...
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