Charles v. Stehlik

• Decision Date: 19 January 2000
• Citation: 744 A.2d 1255,560 Pa. 334
• Parties: Randall A. CHARLES, Appellee, v. Richard STEHLIK, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

744 A.2d 1255

560 Pa. 334

Randall A. CHARLES, Appellee, v. Richard STEHLIK, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued September 14, 1999.

Decided January 19, 2000.

Melaine Shannon Rothey, Pittsburgh, for Richard Stehlik.

Karen Hassinger, Washington, for Randall A. Charles.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

CAPPY, Justice.

This is a custody matter. The question at issue is whether the lower courts properly determined that Randall Charles ("Appellee"), who is the step-parent of the child in question, should have primary custody rather than Richard Stehlik ("Appellant"), who is the child's biological father. After careful review of this matter, we affirm.

Appellant and Linda Bauer ("Mother") were married on December 6, 1986. A son, who was named Matthew, was born to Appellant and Mother on March 3, 1989; this was the only child resulting from this marriage. In August of 1989, a few months after Matthew was born, Appellant and Mother separated. At that juncture, Mother moved from the marital residence in New Jersey to reside with her parents in Pittsburgh. Mother took with her Matthew and her two children from her first marriage, Kimberly and Kevin Bauer (referred to as "Kimberly" and "Kevin").

Mother subsequently met Appellee in Pittsburgh and married him on July 21, 1990. Mother and Appellee set up house with their new blended family consisting of the then one year old Matthew, Kimberly, Kevin, and Appellee's daughter, Jennifer. During Mother's marriage to Appellee, Mother had primary physical custody of Matthew. Appellee was very active in Matthew's life; so close was the relationship between the two that Matthew has always called Appellee "daddy".

In November of 1993, Mother was diagnosed with cancer. She ultimately succumbed to this disease, dying on September 4, 1995.

After Mother's death, Kimberly and Kevin moved to Virginia to live with their father without incident. Custody of Matthew, however, became a contested issue. On September 15, 1995, Appellee filed a complaint seeking primary custody of Matthew. This matter was assigned to the Honorable Ronald W. Folino. Extensive evidence was presented by several witnesses, including Appellant, Appellee, Jennifer, a few character witnesses, the therapist who treated Matthew following the death of Mother, and from William F. Fischer, Ph.D. ("Dr.Fischer"), a court-appointed psychologist.

The trial court relied heavily on the testimony of Dr. Fischer, whom the trial court found both credible and persuasive. Tr. ct. slip op. at 6-7. In formulating his opinion in this matter, Dr. Fischer conducted interviews and tests with the parties, Matthew, and Jennifer, Matthew's stepsister. Dr. Fischer also conducted telephone interviews with the therapist who helped Matthew cope with the death of Mother as well as a counselor who had been working with Appellant. After gathering all of this data, Dr. Fischer opined that it was "in Matthew's best interest to remain in the primary custody of [Appellee], at least for the present time." Tr. ct. slip op. at 7.

The trial court summarized the many factors on which Dr. Fischer based this opinion. First, Dr. Fischer pointed to the fact that on two separate occasions, Matthew spontaneously indicated¹ that "he wanted to stay with his dad here in Pittsburgh (i.e.[Appellee])." Tr. ct. slip op. at 7 (emphasis in the original); see also tr. ct. slip op. at 9. Dr. Fischer also testified that Matthew was more cheerful and relaxed when he accompanied Appellee to the sessions with Dr. Fischer than when Matthew accompanied Appellant. Tr. ct. slip op. at 7. Also, the pictures that Matthew drew while in the company of Appellant showed chaotic and sad scenes, tr. ct. slip op. at 7-8, while the ones he drew in the company of Appellee were "much more cheerful...." N.T., 08/15/1996, at 25. Finally, Dr. Fischer testified that Matthew's loss of his mother would make it "extremely difficult, if not traumatic, for Matthew to move to New Jersey at this time." Tr. ct. slip op. at 8.

The trial court also relied on the testimony provided by Jennifer LaRosa ("Ms.LaRosa"), the therapist who treated Matthew after Mother's death. Ms. LaRosa testified that Matthew felt a strong sense of abandonment whenever he would visit Appellant in New Jersey, and that he worried that he would not be brought back to Pittsburgh. Tr. ct. slip op. at 11-12.

Appellant and Appellee both testified. As to Appellant, the trial court found that he loves Matthew very much. Although the trial court was concerned about displays of "questionable judgment" and of anger on the part of Appellant, it noted that its "overall impression of [Appellant]... was that he is a good man and truly wants to be a loving (and loved) father." Tr. ct. slip op. at 14-15. The trial court, however, expressed concerns over Appellant's "capacity to withdraw and isolate himself from others," a trait which was clearly not in Matthew's best interests. Tr. ct. slip op. at 15.

The trial court found that Matthew's life centers on his home in Pittsburgh. The trial court referred to Appellee, who has lived with Matthew since Matthew was a year old, as Matthew's "day-to-day father". Tr. ct. slip op. at 4. The trial court found Appellee credible when he testified "that Matthew calls him dad or daddy[, and that Appellee] ... treats Matthew like his son...." Tr. ct. slip op. at 9. The trial court further noted that Pittsburgh is the only home that Matthew had ever known in his eight years of life. The court stated that "Matthew's school is here, his stepsister (Jennifer) is here, his maternal grandparents are here and his school friends are here." Tr. ct. slip op. at 9-10.

The trial court, therefore, concluded that as "Matthew has had such serious and traumatic changes and losses in his life recently, it would not be healthy for him to suffer the additional loss of his day-to-day home and father and be required to move to a new home in New Jersey." Tr. ct. slip op. at 15-16. The trial court noted that it made this determination by applying the standard which states that a biological parent has a prima facie right to custody as against a third party, and that the scales are thus tipped hard in favor of the biological parent at the outset of the analysis.² The trial court found that this presumption in favor of the biological parent had been overcome in this matter as "the instant case offers compelling and convincing reasons why [Appellee] should... retain primary custody of Matthew at the present time." Tr. ct. slip op. at 17. The trial court, however, stressed that "Matthew's relationship with his biological father should continue and should be expanded." Tr. ct. slip op. at 16. The trial court's order thus provided that Appellant would have partial custody of Matthew, and the length of the summertime visits Matthew would spend with Appellant in New Jersey would gradually increase over the next several years.

The Superior Court affirmed on appeal. It determined that the trial court's conclusion to award primary custody to Appellee was supported by the record. The court also noted with approval the trial court's decision to order increasing visitation between Matthew and Appellant as it would be in the best interests of the child to maintain and strengthen his relationship with his biological father.

Appellant then filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this court and we granted allocatur.

In reviewing custody matters, this court has stated that our scope of review "is very broad. Nonetheless, a broad scope of review should not be construed as providing the reviewing tribunal with a license to nullify the factfinding functions of the court of the first instance." Albright v. Commonwealth, ex rel. Fetters, 491 Pa. 320, 421 A.2d 157, 158-59 (1980) (citations omitted). We have stated that an appellate court may not reverse a trial court's custody order absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. See Robinson v. Robinson, 538 Pa. 52, 645 A.2d 836 (1994)

.

It is axiomatic that in custody disputes, "the fundamental issue is the best interest of the child." Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363, 416 A.2d 512, 513 (1980). In a custody contest between two biological parents, "the burden of proof is shared equally by the contestants...." Id. Yet, where the custody dispute is between a biological parent and a third party, the burden of proof is not evenly balanced. In such instances, "the parents have a `prima facie right to custody,' which will be forfeited only if `convincing reasons' appear that the child's best interest will be served by an award to the third party. Thus, even before the proceedings start, the evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the [biological] parents' side." Id. at 514 (quoting In re Hernandez, 249 Pa.Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648, 654 (1977)).³

In the matter sub judice, the trial court properly noted that "the evidentiary scales were tipped hard in [Appellant's] favor." Tr. ct. slip op. at 17. Yet, even with Appellant having this presumption in his favor, the trial court nonetheless found that there were convincing reasons which compelled it to award primary custody of Matthew to Appellee. As noted supra, the trial court gave extensive reasons to support this conclusion. The most important factors to the trial court were that Matthew felt most at home in Pittsburgh with Appellee, the man he has known as "dad or daddy," tr. ct. slip op. at 9, since he was a baby. Furthermore, the trial court noted that considering the recent loss of his mother and his half-siblings, uprooting Matthew from his home, school, and the man he considers his "dad" could prove devastating to Matthew's present mental condition. In light of the circumstances of this case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Matthew to remain in the custody of Appellee.

Appellant takes issue with the trial...