Charles v. Sullivant
| Decision Date | 18 March 1935 |
| Docket Number | 14874 |
| Citation | 159 So. 756 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
| Parties | CHARLES v. SULLIVANT et al |
Solomon S. Goldman, of New Orleans, for appellant.
Spearing & McClendon, of New Orleans, for appellees.
On November 12, 1931, at about 8 A. M., Lizzie Charles, colored was injured in the intersection of Ursuline and Royal streets by coming in contact with an automobile owned and at the time of the accident driven by Miss Willes Sullivant. She brought this suit against Miss Sullivant and her insurance carrier the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, in solido, claiming damages in the sum of $ 6,025 for physical injuries which she alleged resulted from the accident, which she claimed was caused by the negligent operation of the automobile.
From a judgment dismissing plaintiff's suit, she has appealed.
On the morning of the accident, plaintiff, accompanied by two friends, was walking along Ursuline street on her way to work. Just before she reached the intersection of Royal street she increased her pace, and, leaving her two friends behind, hurriedly started across the intersection. There was a street car on Royal street which had been stopped just short of the intersection. Plaintiff claims that the motorman signaled to her to cross, and that she continued on her way and that, when she had reached the far side of the street car, the Sullivant automobile emerged from a narrow passageway between the street car and the curb, and struck and injured her.
The charges of negligence imputed to Miss Sullivant are "that she passed the standing street car at a rapid rate of speed, in excess of 25 miles an hour," whereas she should have proceeded at a slower speed, in conformity with article 1, section 10, of Ordinance No. 7490, C. C.S., and that she was further negligent in failing to sound her horn before passing the street car, and in failing to have her car under proper control.
Royal street, at the point of the accident, is 22 feet 4 inches wide from curb to curb. It is a one-way street with a street car track in the center, and 81/2 feet clearance on each side of the track. Miss Sullivant had been driving behind the street car, which stopped at Ursuline street. Desiring to get ahead of the street car, she drove to the left and through the narrow space on that side of the car. When she reached the front end of the car the plaintiff appeared directly in her path. There is nothing in the record to justify the conclusion that there was any opportunity for Miss Sullivant to have avoided striking the plaintiff after Miss Sullivant became aware of her presence in front of her car. Consequently, if plaintiff is to recover, it must be upon other grounds.
The provision of the traffic ordinance, which is introduced in evidence, prohibits vehicles passing stationary street cars except on certain enumerated streets and avenues and on all one-way streets, and requires that on the excepted streets "the speed of the vehicle shall be reduced." Miss Sullivant, when asked how fast she was going at the time she struck plaintiff, replied that she could not be going very fast, "I have no idea; possibly seventeen to eighteen miles; I don't know." In our opinion her estimate of her speed was excessive because she had stopped her automobile just behind the street car and had only traversed the length of the car before striking plaintiff. It seems improbable that she could have reached a speed of 17 or 18 miles per hour in that short distance. As a matter of fact, we doubt very much whether the provision of the traffic ordinance, requiring the reduction of speed, would apply to vehicles which pass street cars after having stopped alongside, for the reason that, in order to move, a stationary object must acquire momentum. Starting from a standstill beside a street car, it is obviously necessary for an automobile to get in motion in order to pass beyond it. However, taking Miss Sullivant at her word, and finding, also, that she did not blow her horn to give warning of her approach to pedestrians who might possibly cross from behind the parked street car, perhaps it may...
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Dix v. Spampinato
...124 Cal.App.2d 472, 268 P.2d 748 (1954); Harris v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 132 Kan. 715, 297 P. 718 (1931); Charles v. Sullivant, 159 So. 756 (La.App.1935); Van Jura v. Row, 175 Ohio St. 41, 191 N.E.2d 536 (1963); Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073 The Court of Special App......
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Claxton v. Hutton
...(1954), 124 Cal.App.2d 472, 268 P.2d 748; Harris v. Kansas City Public Serv. Co. (1931), 132 Kan. 715, 297 P. 718; Charles v. Sullivant (1935), La.App., 159 So. 756; Devine v. Cook (1955), 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d We are unpersuaded by the authority cited by Hutton in support of her argument......
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Dix v. Spampinato, 977
...'Under these well-considered precedents, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, * * *.' In Charles v. Sullivant, 159 So. 756 (Ct. of App., La., 1935), a pedestrian crossing a street at an intersection was signalled to pass in front of a standing street car. ......
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Frey v. Woodard, Civ. A. No. 79-1458
...Van Jura v. Row, 175 Ohio St. 41, 191 N.E.2d 536 (1963); Hill v. Wilson, 124 Cal.App.2d 472, 268 P.2d 748 (1954); Charles v. Sullivant, 159 So. 756 (Orl.La.App.1935); Harris v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 132 Kan. 715, 297 P. 718 (1931), this view is not, however, universally accepted. ......