Charles Wilson v. United States No 168 Catharine Wilson v. United States No 169

Citation58 L.Ed. 728,34 S.Ct. 347,232 U.S. 563
Decision Date24 February 1914
Docket NumberNos. 168 and 169,s. 168 and 169
PartiesCHARLES WILSON, alias Charles Willard, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES. NO 168. CATHARINE WILSON, alias Zoe Willard, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES. NO 169
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Mr. Elijah N. Zoline for plaintiffs in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 564 intentionally omitted] Assistant Attorney General Denison for the United States.

Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes here upon two separate writs of error allowed upon the same record, to review judgments of the district court imposing fine and imprisonment upon each of the plaintiffs in error, upon their conviction on an indictment founded upon the act of Congress of June 25, 1910, commonly known as the white slave act (36 Stat. at L. 825, chap. 395, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1343).

The case was brought directly to this court, because the constitutionality of the statute was drawn in question. This question has since been settled adversely to plaintiffs in error. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 57 L. ed. 523, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 906, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 905. Nevertheless, we must retain jurisdiction for the purpose of passing upon the other questions in the record. Horner v. United States, 143 U. S. 570, 576, 36 L. ed. 266, 268, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295, 49 L. ed. 482, 485, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243; Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 432, 52 L. ed. 278, 284, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163.

There were numerous counts in the indictment and a general verdict of guilty. The substance of the charge was that defendants caused and procured two gils to be transported in interstate commerce from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of prostitution. There was also a count charging a conspiracy to commit the same offense. The theory of the government, sufficiently stated in the indictment and supported by evidence at the trial, was that, in pursuance of an understanding between defendants and a man named Corder, they gave him $11 in money, with instructions to proceed from Chicago to Milwaukee, induce one or both of the girls to return with him to Chicago, paying their transportation and other expenses out of the $11, and bring them to a house of prostitution in the latter city, kept by the defendants; and that Corder carried out these instructions to the letter, bringing both girls over an interstate electric railway line and escorting them to the defendants' house for the purpose of prostitution.

Of the questions of law that are raised, only the following seem to require mention:

1. It is insisted that the offense was not fully proved because there was nothing to show that defendants either directed or knew how the girls were to come from Milwaukee to Chicago, whether in a private vehicle or through the instrumentality of a common carrier. But, in our opinion, in order to constitute an offense under the act it is not essential that the transportation be by common carrier. The statute reads: 'That any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, . . . any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, . . . or who shall knowingly procure or obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained, or aid or assist in procuring or obtaining, any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, . . . in going to any place for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, . . . whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony,' etc.

The prohibition is not in terms confined to transportation by common carrier, nor need such a limitation be implied in order to sustain the constitutionality of the enactment. As has already been decided, it has the quality of a police regulation, although enacted in the exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce (Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 323, 57 L. ed. 523, 527, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 906, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 905; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 215, 29 L. ed. 158, 166, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826); and since this power is complete in itself, it was discretionary with Congress whether the prohibition should be extended to transportation by others than common carriers.

The contention that defendants were not within the prohibition of the act because they did not control or instruct Corder in the choice of means of conveyance is not worthy of serious consideration. According to the government's evidence, Corder was employed by defendants as their agent, and furnished by them with money sufficient for the expenses of the transportation, but without definite instructions as to what mode should be employed. A natural inference was that he should decide upon the mode and select the route; and that such selection was within the scope of his agency.

2. The female defendant offered herself as a witness, and in the course of her cross-examination was asked whether she was addicted to the use of morphine. Having admitted this, and stated that she had last used it before coming into the court room that morning at 10 o'clock, she was asked how often she used it, and whether she had with her the 'implements' with which to 'take the dose.' She replied in the affirmative. This line of examination was excepted to, and is assigned for error on the ground that she had not put her character at issue. But as we read the record, the evidence was not offered or admitted for its bearing upon her character, but rather to show that she was so much addicted to the use of the drug that the question whether, at the moment of testifying, she was under its influence, or had recovered from the effects of its last administration, had a material bearing upon her reliability as a witness. It seems to us that in this aspect the evidence was admissible. People v. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73, 87, 34 N. E....

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