CHARLESTON COUNTY SCH. v. LAIDLAW TRANSIT
Decision Date | 31 December 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 3429.,3429. |
Citation | 559 S.E.2d 362,348 S.C. 420 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | CHARLESTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent, v. LAIDLAW TRANSIT, INC. and South Carolina Department of Education, Of Whom Laidlaw Transit, Inc. is the, Appellant. |
John A. Massalon, of Wills & Massalon, of Charleston; Jay Williams and Heidi Dalenberg, both of Schiff, Hardin & Waite, of Chicago, IL, for appellant.
Arnold S. Goodstein, Alice F. Paylor, Donald B. Clark and Kevin R. Eberle, all of Rosen, Goodstein & Hagood, of Charleston, for respondent.
In this declaratory judgment action, Laidlaw Transit, Inc. appeals from a circuit court order dismissing its equitable counterclaims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. We affirm.
On January 17, 1997, the Charleston County School District ("the School District") entered into a written contract with Laidlaw and the South Carolina Department of Education ("the Department of Education"), whereby Laidlaw agreed to provide school bus transportation for the School District. Under the terms of the contract, Laidlaw was to use the Department of Education's school buses, and assumed the responsibility to transport students from January 21, 1997 until June 2000. The contract was based upon a traditional 180 day schedule for each school within the School District, and contained the following clauses in anticipation of changing demands or requirements for transportation during the term of the contract:
Finally, Paragraph 9 contains the following provisions:
The School District brought this declaratory judgment action when it discovered alleged overpayments to Laidlaw for bus services during the 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 school years. The School District also anticipated an overcharge would be forthcoming from Laidlaw for the ensuing year.
In its answer, Laidlaw admitted the written contract, but denied receiving any overpayment. Laidlaw asserted that the services it provided had increased because (1) it had to provide the buses used for transportation; (2) routes were extended or originally understated in length, and (3) additional routes and students were added by the School District to accommodate magnet schools, additional riders, and other activities. Laidlaw also asserted counterclaims for set-off and/or payment for the extra services rendered under equitable causes of action, namely, quantum meruit, contract implied in law, and promissory estoppel.
The School District moved to dismiss the equitable counterclaims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, on the grounds that the contract was admitted, and its terms specifically governed any expansion of services or costs, precluding recovery in equity under theories of quantum meruit, implied contract or promissory estoppel. The circuit court agreed, dismissing Laidlaw's counterclaims. Laidlaw appeals.
A motion to dismiss a counterclaim must be based solely on the allegations set forth in the counterclaim. See Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP; Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 527, 511 S.E.2d 69, 73 (1999). "A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may not be sustained if facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom would entitle the [complainant] to any relief on any theory of the case." Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 300, 457 S.E.2d 601, 602-3 (1995). The question is whether in the light most favorable to the complainant, and with every doubt resolved on his behalf, the counterclaim states any valid claim for relief. Toussaint v. Ham, 292 S.C. 415, 416, 357 S.E.2d 8, 9 (1987). The counterclaim should not be dismissed merely because the trial court doubts the complainant will prevail in the action. Id.
Laidlaw contends it was entitled pursuant to Rule 8(e)(2), SCRCP,1 to plead its equitable counterclaims as alternative causes of action.
Initially, we note the circuit court did not require Laidlaw to elect between its causes of actions. Instead, the circuit court dismissed Laidlaw's equitable counterclaims because there was a specific contract between the parties and they were limited to that contract. Consequently, the court concluded the equitable issues were not available to Laidlaw.
"It is well settled that parties are judicially bound by their pleadings unless withdrawn, altered or stricken by amendment or otherwise." Postal v. Mann, 308 S.C. 385, 387, 418 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct.App.1992). Any allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are...
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