Charlton v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1921
• Docket Number: 2 Div. 729
• Citation: 206 Ala. 341,89 So. 710
• Parties: CHARLTON v. ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R. CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

89 So. 710

206 Ala. 341

CHARLTON v. ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R. CO.

2 Div. 729

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1921

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sumter County; R.I. Jones, Judge.

Action by Wiley Charlton against the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company for damages suffered in a collision at a crossing with a train of cars of the defendant. Judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Frank S. White & Son, of Birmingham, P.F. Elmore, of Demopolis, and Thomas F. Seale, of Livingston, for appellant.

Smith Wilkinson & Smith, of Birmingham for appellee.

SOMERVILLE J.

In the case of Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. et al. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 41 Sup.Ct. 593, 65 L.Ed. 1087, recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United States (June 1, 1921) that court has decided that railroad corporations cannot be sued or held liable for the wrongful acts or omissions of the railroad administrator in the operation of their several transportation systems during the period of governmental control. That decision rests upon the proposition that the authority given by section 10 of the Federal Control Act (U.S.Comp.St.1918, U.S.Comp.St.Ann.Supp.1919, § 3115 3/4j) to bring actions at law or suits inequity against "carriers" while under federal control cannot be construed as authorizing suits against the several railroad corporations, who had nothing to do with the operation of their lines, but must be construed as authorizing suits against the government or its agency, as the only responsible operator of the several transportation systems. The conclusion is thus stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the court:

"As the Federal Control Act did not impose any liability upon the companies on any cause of action arising out of the operation of their systems of transportation by the government, the provision in Order No. 50 authorizing the substitution of the Director General as defendant in suits then pending within his power, the application of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company that it be dismissed from this action should have been granted; and the judgment against it should therefore be reversed."

That decision must control here, and we therefore hold that defendant's motion for the substitution of the Director General should have been granted, and that defendant should have been dismissed from the suit. As a matter of law the defendant corporation was not liable on the cause of action exhibited, and it is not now material to consider whether error was committed by the trial court in any of the rulings complained of, since, in any event,...