Charlton v. United States

• Decision Date: 02 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 16670.,16670.
• Citation: 412 F.2d 390
• Parties: George N. CHARLTON, Jr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and John W. Macy, Jr., J. Ludwig Andolsek and Robert E. Hampton, Members of the United States Civil Service Commission.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

412 F.2d 390 (1969)

George N. CHARLTON, Jr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and John W. Macy, Jr., J. Ludwig Andolsek and Robert E. Hampton, Members of the United States Civil Service Commission.

No. 16670.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued November 7, 1968.

Decided June 2, 1969.

Harold Gondelman, Baskin, Boreman, Sachs, Gondelman & Craig, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.

Stanley W. Greenfield, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa. (Gustave Diamond, U. S. Atty., First Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Before KALODNER, FORMAN and STAHL, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KALODNER, Circuit Judge.

Is the scope of judicial review of a federal agency's action in dismissing a civil service employee limited to the issue whether "statutory procedural requirements" have been satisfied in the administrative proceedings?

The District Court answered that question in the affirmative in the instant suit by the appellant Charlton against the United States Civil Service Commission¹ which seeks review of its action sustaining his dismissal from his employment as an investigator in the Internal Revenue Service.

It did so in dismissing Charlton's Amended Complaint on its finding that review of the administrative record disclosed that "there has been substantial compliance with all the applicable procedural and statutory requirements", and its determination that for that reason "We cannot inquire further into the matter."

In spelling out in its Opinion² its view of the scope of judicial review of a federal agency's action, the District Court stated:

"It is quite clear that the scope of review permitted in a case involving disciplinary action against government employees, including discharge, is very limited. The court is only `to determine whether there has been substantial compliance with applicable procedures and statutes, and not to review the administrative determination as to the wisdom or good judgment of the agency in exercising discretion.\' Baum v. Zuckert, 342 F.2d 145, 147 (6 Cir. 1965). See also Hargett v. Summerfield, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 243 F.2d 29 (1957); Hofflund v. Seaton, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 171, 265 F.2d 363 (1959), cert. den. 361 U.S. 837, 80 S.Ct. 55, 4 L.Ed.2d 77 (1959); McTiernan v. Gronouski, 337 F.2d 31 (2 Cir. 1964).

"The Court would not be warranted in substituting its own judgment for that of plaintiff\'s superiors, whose action has been sustained by the Civil Service Commission. Studemeyer v. Macy, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 321 F.2d 386 (1963); Eustace v. Day, 114 U.S.App. D.C. 242, 314 F.2d 247 (1962). Thus, where procedural requirements have been complied with, the Court should not inquire into the merits of the employee\'s dismissal. Indiviglio v. United States, 156 Ct.Cl. 241, 299 F.2d 266 (1962), cert. den. 371 U.S. 913, 83 S.Ct. 260, 9 L.Ed.2d 173 (1962); Ellis v. Mueller, 108 U.S.App. D.C. 174, 280 F.2d 722 (1960), cert. den. 364 U.S. 883, 81 S.Ct. 172, 5 L.Ed. 2d 104 (1960); Green v. Baughman, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 243 F.2d 610 (1957), cert. den. 355 U.S. 819, 78 S.Ct. 25, 2 L.Ed.2d 35 (1957); Boylan v. Quarles, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 337, 235 F.2d 834 (1956)." (Emphasis supplied.)

We are of the opinion that the standard of the scope of judicial review of a federal agency's action stated and applied by the District Court is erroneous and that its failure to "inquire further into the matter", after finding that procedural requirements had been satisfied in the administrative proceedings, compels reversal of its dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint.

The instant action was pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act now 5 U.S.C.A. § 702.³

Section 706 spells out the scope of judicial review of a federal agency's action in clear and precise terms and it is controlling and dispositive. It supersedes and makes irrelevant judicially fashioned concepts of the scope of judicial review of a federal agency's action, declared both prior and subsequent to its enactment.

Section 706 is mandatory by its terms and not merely declarative of "guidelines" with respect to the scope of judicial review of a federal agency's action. It imposes on a federal court, inter alia, the mandatory duty to "review the whole record of the administrative proceedings or those parts of it cited by a party", and to determine therefrom whether the agency's action was in accordance with procedures required by law and supported by "substantial evidence", or alternatively, capricious, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

In full sweep Section 706 provides:

"Scope of review

"To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall —

(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be —

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations or short of statutory right;

(D) without observance of procedure required by law;

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or

(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.

"In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. Pub. L. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 393." (Emphasis supplied.)

The District Court here failed to discharge its statutory duty to review the administrative record and to determine whether the Commission's action was supported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its discretion.

The Amended Complaint⁴ squarely challenged the Commission's fact-findings that Charlton had failed (1) "to properly care for official documents"; and (2) to report a proffered bribe.

Thus, the single critical issue presented to the District Court was whether the Commission's factual finding that Charlton was guilty of wrongdoing was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Otherwise stated, the issue was not the severity of the penalty of dismissal but whether the record supported the Commission's guilty verdict.

The circumstance that the Commission had found Charlton guilty of failure to properly care for official documents even though the hearing officer of the Regional Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service had found to the contrary, particularly imposed upon the District Court the duty to review the administrative record. Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 496-497, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); In re United Corporation, 249 F.2d 168, 178-179 (3 Cir. 1957).⁵

This must be said with reference to the cases cited by the District Court in support of its holding that once it is determined that procedural requirements have been satisfied a district court "should not inquire into the merits of the employee's dismissal" and "cannot inquire further into the matter".

It is true that these cases state and apply the narrow and unqualified doctrine that once it is determined that procedural requirements have been met "The Courts will not examine into the merits of the dismissal" of a civil service employee.⁶

It must immediately be noted that cases more recently decided hold that courts after determining whether procedural requirements have been met must further determine, upon review of the administrative record, whether substantial evidence supports the federal agency's action in disciplining a federal employee. Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C.Cir.1968); Halsey v. Nitze, 390 F.2d 142 (4 Cir. 1968), cert. den. 392 U.S. 939, 88 S.Ct. 2316, 20 L.Ed.2d 1399; Taylor v. United States Civil Service Commission, 374 F.2d 466 (9 Cir. 1967);⁷ Dabney v. Freeman, 123 U.S. App.D.C. 166, 358 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scott v. Macy, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 349 F.2d 182 (1965); Pelicone v. Hodges, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 320 F.2d 754 (1963).

The consensus of the cited cases was thus epitomized in Dabney:

"* * * the standard of judicial review is that of whether there is evidence of substance in that administrative record which supports the Commission\'s view of the matter." 358 F.2d 535.

and in Pelicone:

"Our review in this kind of case dismissal of a federal civil service employee is limited to determining whether the statutory and regulatory procedures were observed and whether the challenged action was arbitrary and capricious or was supported by evidence." 320 F.2d at 755.

The judicial scope of review declared and applied by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Dabney and Pelicone cannot be reconciled with that Court's earlier holdings in Hargett v. Summerfield, supra, and Hofflund v. Seaton, supra — which the District Court relied on in the instant case.

In Hargett it was said:

"* * * so long as there was substantial compliance with applicable procedures and statutes, the administrative determination was not reviewable as to the wisdom or good judgment of the department head in exercising his discretion." 243 F.2d 32.

In Ellis v. Mueller, the Court, citing Hargett, said:

"The function of the courts in cases like this is not to review the merits of a dismissal, but to determine whether the employee was accorded his statutory and procedural rights." 280 F.2d 722. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Hofflund v. Seaton, the Court, citing Hargett, said:

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