Charron v. State

• Decision Date: 17 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. WD 69016.,WD 69016.
• Citation: Charron v. State, 257 S.W.3d 147 (Mo. App. 2008)
• Parties: Kenneth G. CHARRON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, City of St. Louis County and Platte County Circuit Court(s), Jay Nixon and Any Other Necessary and Indispensable Person(s) Unknown or Unnamed Here, Respondents.
• Writing for the Court: Joseph M. Ellis
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

257 S.W.3d 147

Kenneth G. CHARRON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, City of St. Louis County and Platte County Circuit Court(s), Jay Nixon and Any Other Necessary and Indispensable Person(s) Unknown or Unnamed Here, Respondents.

No. WD 69016.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

June 17, 2008.

Kenneth G. Charron, appellant acting pro-se.

Ronald Salvatore Ribaudo, Jefferson City, MO, for respondents State of Missouri, St. Louis County Circuit Court, Platte County Circuit Court, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen.

Before: JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Presiding Judge, LISA WHITE HARDWICK, Judge and JOSEPH P. DANDURAND, Judge.

JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge.

Kenneth Charron, on behalf of himself and others, appeals a judgment dismissing his petition against the State of Missouri and other institutional parties for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we affirm as modified.

Appellant, an inmate at the Missouri Department of Corrections located in Bonne Terre, filed a pro se declaratory judgment action on behalf of himself and other allegedly similarly situated inmates¹ against the State of Missouri and others. As summarized by Appellant, the petition "ask[ed] that the court answer certain question(s) of statutory construction between certain enhancement statutes and specific sentencing statutes." Specifically, the petition challenged the application of two statutes concerning enhancement of sentences, §§ 588.016 and 557.036.4,² to unclassified and non-code felonies. Appellant later filed a "Supplemental Claim and Challenge to the Constitutionality of Section 558.016 RSMo., as Amendment to Original Petition." The trial court accurately summarized Appellant's claims (and those on behalf of other allegedly similarly situated inmates) as follows:

Petitioners — who purport to have been convicted of rape in violation of Mo.Rev. Stat. § 566.030, sodomy in violation of Mo.Rev.Stat. § 566.060, armed criminal action in violation of Mo.Rev.Stat. § 571.015, or murder in violation of Mo. Rev.Stat. § 565.004 and who purport to have requested jury sentencing, — seek a declaration that it is both contrary to state statute and a violation of the Due Process Clause for Missouri circuit courts to sentence prior offenders without first allowing a jury to render an advisory sentence (or perhaps, to allow any judge, as opposed to jury, sentencing). According to petitioners, the crimes of which they were convicted were non-code and unclassified offenses, and the statutes creating theses [sic] offenses provide their own sentencing regimes. Hence, they insist, jury sentencing — or, at a minimum, advisory sentencing by the jury — was (and is) mandated for them and other prisoners in their positions.

(Internal footnote omitted.) Respondents filed a timely motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After a hearing, the trial court entered its judgment granting the motion and dismissing the case with prejudice. This appeal follows.

In his first point, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in determining that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over his petition. He argues that Respondents' motion to dismiss was improper because it "was based on legal arguments concerning standing and how a particular litigant might be attacking a sentence" and does not show that a court is "not authorized under Section 527.010 et seq., RSMo., to preside over the class of cases known as declaratory judgment actions." He contends that the court does have subject matter jurisdiction over his declaratory judgment action because he is seeking a judicial determination of the validity of state statutes. These arguments reflect a misunderstanding of the interplay between subject matter jurisdiction and declaratory judgment actions.

"Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns the nature of the cause of action or the relief sought and exists only when the court has the right to proceed to determine the controversy or question in issue between the parties, or grant the relief prayed." Missouri Soybean Ass'n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 21 (Mo. banc 2003) (internal quotation omitted). "`Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is proper whenever it appears, by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court is without jurisdiction.'" Arnwine v. Trebel, 195 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Mo.App. W.D.2006) (quoting Missouri Soybean, 102 S.W.3d at 22, and citing Rule 55.27(g)(3)). "`As the term "appears" [in Rule 55.27(g)(3) ] suggests, the quantum of proof is not high; it must appear by the preponderance of the evidence that the court is without jurisdiction.'" Arnwine, 195 S.W.3d at 471 (quoting James v. Poppa, 85 S.W.3d 8, 9 (Mo. banc 2002)).

Generally, the decision to dismiss for lack for subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of fact left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and it will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. However, where, as here, the facts are uncontested, a question as to the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court is purely a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. This Court is primarily concerned with the correctness of the result, not the route taken by the trial court to reach it; the trial court's judgment will be affirmed if it is correct on any ground supported by the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on that ground.

Missouri Soybean, 102 S.W.3d at 22 (internal citations omitted).

"Under § 527.010 of the Declaratory Judgment Act, circuit courts have the `power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.'" Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vulgamott, 96 S.W.3d 96, 101 (Mo.App. W.D.2003) (internal quotation omitted). The Declaratory Judgment Act "specifically provides that declaratory judgments are a proper vehicle for testing the validity of statutes or ordinances." Northgate Apartments, L.P. v. City of North Kansas City, 45 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Mo.App. W.D.2001) (citing § 527.020).³

Nonetheless, in order to maintain a declaratory judgment action, a petitioner must satisfy four requirements. First, the petitioner must demonstrate a justiciable controversy exists which presents a real, substantial, presently-existing controversy as to which specific relief is sought, as distinguished from an advisory decree offered upon a purely hypothetical situation. Second, the petitioner must demonstrate a legally protected interest consisting of a pecuniary or personal interest directly at issue and subject to immediate or prospective consequential relief. Third, the question presented by the petition must be ripe for judicial determination. A petitioner who satisfies all three of these elements must also demonstrate that he or she does not have an adequate remedy at law.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

In the case at bar, the trial court concluded that Appellant's petition must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the court found that it had no authority to hear declaratory judgment actions attacking sentences. The court reasoned that Appellant was attempting to collaterally attack the sentences of himself and other inmates, that Appellant was improperly attempting to circumvent the post-conviction rules to challenge the sentences, and that a declaratory judgment action was not the proper avenue for such an attack. Second, the court found that, to the extent that he claimed he was not challenging his own sentence, Appellant lacked standing to attack the sentences of other inmates or future sentences that may be imposed. The court reasoned that Appellant had "no personal interest in the outcome of the litigation" to the extent that it concerned the legitimacy or validity of sentences other than his own current sentence. Appellant's arguments to this Court pertain only to the first ground for dismissal.

Appellant first asserts that the court failed to mention the "separate claim" presented by an intervenor which specifically challenged the validity of § 588.016. He does not explain why this would render the court's analysis erroneous. Regardless, the court specifically referred to Appellant's challenge to the constitutional validity of the state statutes, which was only asserted in the supplemental or amended claim.

Next, Appellant contends that the court erroneously concluded that the allegations in the petition constitute a collateral attack on the sentences. He cites no authority to support this contention, but several Missouri cases are instructive.

In Plant v. Haynes, 568 S.W.2d 585 (Mo.App. W.D.1978), an inmate had received three sentences that were to run consecutively. Id. at 586. He filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that "under the law, all of said sentences were concurrent and that defendants were violating his constitutional rights by computing the same as consecutive." Id. at 586-87. He sought a declaration that the sentences were to run concurrently and an order that the defendants re-compute his term of imprisonment accordingly. Id. at 587. This Court found:

Plaintiff has made it clear by his petition that he seeks an order of the court declaring his rights, status and legal relations as affected by the sentences imposed against him. He has specifically denominated his petition as one for a declaratory judgment and he claims that an order upon his petition will terminate a controversy between him and the defendants and remove an uncertainty regarding the term of his imprisonment. It is equally clear that the allegations of plaintiff's petition constitute a collateral attack upon the sentences imposed against him. The object of his petition is to have vacated or set aside that part of each sentence which states that it is to run consecutively. In this manner, plaintiff seeks to have his sentences corrected and as thus corrected, his sentences would run concurrently.

Id. (emphasis added). We stated that "...