Charter Tp. of Delta v. Dinolfo, Docket No. 67485

Citation419 Mich. 253,351 N.W.2d 831
Decision Date19 July 1984
Docket NumberNo. 5,Docket No. 67485,5
PartiesCHARTER TOWNSHIP OF DELTA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul C. DINOLFO, Marsha Lynn Dinolfo, John F. Sierawski, and Nancy Sierawski, Defendants-Appellants. Calendar
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

McKay, Murphy & Guerre, P.C. by Vincent P. Spagnuolo and Thomas R. Meagher, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.

Foster, Meade, Magill & Rumsey by Robert F. Magill, Jr. and Katherine E. Ward, Ann Arbor, for defendants-appellants.

Larry Betz, Lansing, Bauckham, Reed, Lang, Schaefer & Travis, P.C. by Robert F. Travis, Kalamazoo, for amicus curiae.

BRICKLEY, Justice.

This case requires us to consider the constitutionality of a township zoning ordinance which limits the occupation of single-family residences to an individual, or a group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, and not more than one other unrelated person. We conclude that this ordinance, which prohibits the defendants from including in their households six unrelated persons, is unreasonable and arbitrary and, accordingly, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution.

In July and September of 1977, the Sierawski and Dinolfo "families" moved into homes in plaintiff township. The defendants' homes are located in an R 3, Moderate Density Residential District, which allows for single-family dwellings, duplexes and quadruplexes. The defendants' homes qualify only as single-family dwellings. Each household consists of a husband and wife, that couple's several children, and six unrelated single adults. All members of these households are members of The Work of Christ Community, a nonprofit and federally tax-exempt organization chartered by the State of Michigan. Each of these households functions as a family in a single housekeeping unit and members intend to reside in their respective households permanently. All of the members of these "families" have adopted their lifestyle as a means of living out the Christian commitment that they stress is an important part of their lives.

Over a year after defendants occupied these residences with their "families", plaintiff's planning department sent violation notices citing them for having more than one unrelated individual residing in their homes in violation of the plaintiff's zoning ordinance. Plaintiff's zoning ordinance limits those groups which can live in single-family dwellings to an individual, or a group of two or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, and not more than one unrelated person, excluding servants. 1 It is undisputed that the space requirements of the township building ordinance were not violated by the number of persons in each of the defendant's households. Indeed, that ordinance would allow for three more persons to live in homes the size of those owned by defendants.

Defendants jointly filed an application for a variance from the family definition section of the plaintiff's zoning ordinance, which was denied by the Zoning Board of Appeals. The minutes of the meeting at which the application was considered reflect no complaints about the defendants or the members of their households by any of their neighbors who attended that meeting. To the contrary, all present found them to be good neighbors. The variance was denied by the board because the defendants did not fall under the four general outlines for the granting of variances in the zoning ordinance.

Defendant Dinolfo then petitioned the Board of Trustees of Delta Township to overrule the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals, and also formally presented a petition, supported by the signatures of twenty-seven neighbors, for a change in the language of the family definition section of the ordinance. Both of these efforts were unsuccessful. Plaintiff set a deadline for defendants to bring their households into compliance with the ordinance definition of a family.

After that time had expired, plaintiff filed separate complaints for injunctive relief against defendants in Eaton Circuit Court. The complaints were consolidated on order of the circuit court upon stipulation of counsel.

The trial court ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiff on cross-motions for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(3). It found that plaintiff had the power under the Township Rural Zoning Act, M.C.L. Sec. 125.271 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 5.2963(1) et seq., to define the word "family", that its definition was reasonable, and that the governmental effort to promote the traditional notion of a family was a legitimate exercise of its authority. The court justified the allowance of one unrelated adult in a household as a way to allow for some flexibility. The court relied on Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974), to state that simply because the Legislature drew the line at one unrelated adult did not mean the ordinance was arbitrary. The court also found that defendants' intended land use was not entirely excluded from the township by the ordinance in violation of M.C.L. Sec. 125.297a; M.S.A. Sec. 5.2963(27a), since they could still request conditional use permits. The court entered an order permanently enjoining defendants from occupying their residences in violation of the ordinance.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, 106 Mich.App. 1, 3, 308 N.W.2d 437 (1981), and this Court granted defendants' application for leave to appeal. 417 Mich. 887 (1983).

The defendants argue here, as below, that the plaintiff has no authority to define the word family and that the word "family", as it appears in the Township Rural Zoning Act, is intended to be interpreted as referring to a functional family rather than a traditional biological family. Defendants contend that they constitute functional families within that broad definition. Defendants also argue that the net effect of plaintiff's enforcement of this ordinance is to totally exclude them from the township in violation of their constitutional rights and their rights under M.C.L. Sec. 125.297a; M.S.A. Sec. 5.2963(27a). Defendants further contend that the definition of family in the ordinance both prohibits and allows property uses in an unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious manner in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Finally, defendants argue that the ordinance, by interfering with their chosen lifestyle and religious needs, is an impairment of their fundamental rights of privacy, association, and free exercise of religion in violation of the United States and Michigan Constitutions.

I

We first consider whether plaintiff had the power to define a family at all. The Township Rural Zoning Act is, on its face, a broad grant of power, 2 providing in part:

"The township board of an organized township in this state may provide by zoning ordinance for the regulation of land development and the establishment of districts in the portions of the township outside the limits of cities and villages which regulate the use of land and structures; to meet the needs of the state's citizens for food, fiber, energy, and other natural resources, places of residence, recreation, industry, trade, service, and other uses of land; to insure that use of the land shall be situated in appropriate locations and relationships; to limit the inappropriate overcrowding of land and congestion of population, transportation systems, and other public facilities * * *. Ordinances regulating land development may also be adopted designating or limiting the location, the height, number of stories, and size of dwellings, buildings, and structures that may be erected or altered, including tents and trailer coaches, and the specific uses for which dwellings, buildings, and structures, including tents and trailer coaches, may be erected or altered; the area of yards, courts, and other open spaces, and the sanitary, safety, and protective measures that shall be required for the dwellings, buildings, and structures, including tents and trailer coaches; and the maximum number of families which may be housed in buildings, dwellings, and structures, including tents and trailer coaches, erected or altered." (Emphasis added.) M.C.L. Sec. 125.271; M.S.A. Sec. 5.2963(1).

As stated above, the defendants urge that the word "family" in the statute should be interpreted broadly to include a group functioning as a family. They urge that the words of the statute, "to limit the inappropriate overcrowding of land and congestion of population, transportation systems, and other public facilities" and the grant of power to regulate the "maximum number of families" in structures relates to only the number of groups, not the composition of those groups. In support of this position, the defendants cite the definition of "family" which was contained in Sec. 12202 of the Public Health Code, M.C.L. Sec. 333.1101 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(1101) et seq., and decisions of this Court interpreting "family", in the context of an insurance policy, Carmichael v. Northwestern Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 51 Mich. 494, 16 N.W. 871 (1883), and in a restrictive covenant, Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Paulist Fathers, Inc., 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847 (1943), all of which, defendants contend, support a broad reading of the word "family". Nevertheless, we find each of these examples inapposite to the meaning of the word "family" in the Township Rural Zoning Act. 3

The Township Rural Zoning Act is a broad grant of authority to townships to zone for the "public health, safety, and welfare". Included within this broad grant is the power to zone for the purpose of density control. We do not suggest that the act delegates to townships the unfettered authority to define the term family because any definition by a political subdivision must be within the intendment of the Legislature. We do find, however, that the...

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    • United States
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    ...and MacLean v. Michigan State Bd. of Control for Vocational Ed., 294 Mich. 45, 50, 292 N.W. 662 (1940); Delta Charter Twp. v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 264 n. 4, 351 N.W.2d 831 (1984). ...
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    • United States
    • Emory University School of Law Emory Law Journal No. 54-3, 2005
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