Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Chafee

• Decision Date: 16 January 1967
• Docket Number: No. 17,17
• Citation: Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Chafee, 101 R.I. 544, 225 A.2d 766 (R.I. 1967)
• Parties: , 20 A.F.T.R.2d 6004 CHARTIER REAL ESTATE COMPANY, Inc., et al. v. John H. CHAFEE, Governor, et al. Appeal
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 766

225 A.2d 766

101 R.I. 544, 20 A.F.T.R.2d 6004

CHARTIER REAL ESTATE COMPANY, Inc., et al. v. John H. CHAFEE, Governor, et al.

Appeal No. 17.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 16, 1967.

Moore, Virgadamo, Boyle & Lynch, Salvatore L. Virgadamo, Newport, for plaintiffs.

J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., Paul J. Choquette, Jr., Executive Counsel, F. Monroe Allen, Providence, for Frederick C. Lees, Director of Natural Resources, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

PAOLINO, Justice.

The plaintiffs brought this complaint to permanently enjoin the defendants from proceeding to take by eminent domain certain real estate owned by them. In addition they sought a judgment declaring P.L.1964, chap. 169, ¹ invalid on constitutional grounds. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint failed to state a claim against them upon which relief could be granted. After a hearing in the superior court on the complaint, as amended, and the motion to dismiss, the trial justice entered a judgment denying the plaintiffs' prayers and granting the defendants' motion. The cause is before us on the plaintiffs' appeal from such judgment.

We note at the outset that defendants have not questioned the propriety or necessity of including the governor as a party defendant and therefore we do not pass on the question. However this is not to be considered precedential.

The complaint contains the following pertinent allegations. The defendants, in their official capacities, made it known to plaintiffs that they intend to take certain land owned by them on behalf of the state under the provisions of P.L.1964, chap. 174, which enacts chap. 4 of title 32 of G.L.1956, known as the 'Green acres land acquisition act of 1964,' and P.L.1965, chap. 137, which establishes the department of natural resources. The defendants intend to use for the payment of said land the proceeds of the sale of bonds in the amount of $5,000,000 purportedly authorized under the provisions of chap. 169, and purportedly approved by vote of the people at the general election held in November 1964. Chapter 169 provided for the submission at such election of the following proposition to the people for their approval or rejection:

'Shall the act passed by the general assembly at the January session, 1964, entitled 'An act authorizing the issuance of bonds and notes for the acquisition and development of lands for recreation and conservation purposes and governing the expenditure of money for such purposes ($5,000,000)' be approved?'

In paragraph 4 of the complaint plaintiffs allege that the vote purporting to approve the issuance of the bonds, and the issuance of such bonds, are invalid, and in paragraphs 5 and 6 they challenge the validity of chaps. 169 and 174 on constitutional grounds. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 contain the specific grounds on which plaintiffs rely and which they have incorporated in their briefs.

The defendants base their motion to dismiss on specific grounds which we shall discuss together with plaintiffs' contentions. Before doing so we refer briefly to the pertinent statutes.

Chapter 169 was passed by the general assembly at the January session, 1964. The proposition provided for therein was approved by the people at the general election held in November 1964. If valid, the act will provide the funds to complement chap. 174, which provides for the acquisition of lands for recreation and conservation purposes. Public Laws 1965, chap. 137, establishes a department of natural resources and defines its function.

The parties have briefed and argued their respective contentions under three main points and for convenience we shall treat them in like manner. The plaintiffs contend that either or both of the statutes in question, namely, chaps. 169 and 174, are invalid.

Under point I they raise the issue whether the proposition as stated on the ballot sufficiently informs the people of the nature and extent of the state borrowing authorized by chap. 169 so as to conform with the provisions of art. XXXI, sec. 1, of the amendments to the Rhode Island constitution, which reads as follows:

'The general assembly shall have no powers, hereafter, without the express consent of the people, to incur state debts to an amount exceeding fifty thousand dollars, except in time of war, or in case of insurrection or invasion; nor shall they in any case, without such consent, pledge the faith of the state for the payment of the obligations of others. This section shall not be construed to refer to any money that may be deposited with this state by the government of the United States.'

Before considering the specific questions raised by plaintiffs, it may be well to point out that since they challenge the validity of the statutes in question on constitutional grounds, they have the burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt, Gomes v. Bristol Mfg. Corp., 95 R.I. 126, 131, 184 A.2d 787, and State v. Kofines, 33 R.I. 211, 218, 80 A. 432, and they must overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the acts, State v. Kofines, supra, at 218, 80 A. 432. See also annotation in 16 A.L.R.2d, pages 515 to 579, on the question of presumptions and burden of proof.

There is no dispute between the parties with respect to the standards applicable in determining whether the mandate of art. XXXI, sec. 1, has been satisfied. In recent years the justices of this court have stated the rule in a series of advisory opinions which they were requested to give under the provisions of sec. 2 of art. XII of amendments to the constitution of this state.

In Opinion to the Governor, 88 R.I. 202, at 206, 145 A.2d 87, at 89, in discussing the intendment of art. XXXI, sec. 1, they stated: 'This consent must of course be an intelligent consent. That is, the people must be clearly informed of the nature and extent of the pledge which the general assembly proposes to authorize.' In referring to the statute under consideration in that opinion they said:

'We think the question to be propounded to the people in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of the act is sufficiently informative to meet such requirement and is a substantial compliance with the constitutional prohibition of article XXXI, section 1, of amendments.'

And in Opinion to the Governor, R.I., 212 A.2d 64, at 67, the justices said:

'* * * to meet the constitutional requirement, the submission must clearly disclose to the ordinary voter that an approval will empower the Authority to pledge the credit of the state and the extent to which that credit may be pledged.'

See also Opinion to the Governor, R.I., 223 A.2d 76, 78. We agree with the rule as stated by the plaintiffs, namely, that a proposition submitted on referendum must be couched in language which will clearly apprise the ordinary voter of the questions involved. Our only concern here is with the application of this established principle to the proposition involved in this case.

The thrust of plaintiffs' first contention under point I is that the proposition is vague and uncertain in its language and does not clearly disclose to the electorate whether or not the bonds to be issued are limited to $5,000,000; and whether or not the expenditures to be made are limited to such amount. They argue in substance that the proposition, as stated, was not clear enough to inform the people of the nature and extent of the pledge which the general assembly proposed to authorize, that is, of the purpose for which their approval was sought by chap. 169 and the limit of state borrowing to accomplish that purpose. We do not agree with plaintiffs' contention.

There is no merit in plaintiffs' contention that the proposition is bare of any statement as to the amount of the bonds to be sold. We agree with the conclusion of the trial justice with reference to the last part of the proposition which reads "* * * and governing the expenditure of money for such purposes ($5,000,000.00)' be approved? ' He said: 'Since this is the only amount mentioned, there can be no question but that this would be clearly understood by the electorate as the limit of the amount that would be authorized and to which they gave an intelligent consent.'

Nor is there any merit in their contention that the phrase 'for such purposes' is not clear. The purposes of the act are expressly set forth in the proposition. The plain and unambiguous language therein states that the legislature is asking the people to approve its proposal to commit the state to borrow up to $5,000,000 'for the acquisition and development of lands for recreation and conservation purposes * * *.' The inclusion of the figure $5,000,000 within the parentheses is a clear indication that this amount represents the extent of the borrowing, from whatever source, for which the approval of the people is being sought. There being no ambiguity in the language of the proposition, there is no necessity for invoking rules of judicial construction. Allen v. Rhode Island State Board of Veterinarians, 72 R.I. 372, 378, 52 A.2d 131. In our judgment the ordinary voter looking at the proposition could easily understand the nature of the matter being voted upon and the limit of the borrowing proposed by the act and could therefore give an intelligent consent thereto.

Board of Education of City of Hackensack v. City of Hackensack, 63 N.J.Super. 560, 165 A.2d 33, cited by plaintiffs, is of no help to them. The proposition in that case did not relate to the question whether the electorate was informed as to that limit of the borrowing or expenditures authorized by any act. The proposition there asked the people to approve an expenditure of funds for the conversion of a school, when in fact the Board of Education intended to use a substantial amount of the funds authorized to construct an addition to an existing school.

Cases entitled Opinion to the Governor, R.I., 208 A.2d 105 (the Turnpike opinion), and ...