Chas. H. Steffey, Inc. v. Am. Bank Stationery Co.

• Decision Date: 11 June 1931
• Docket Number: No. 32.,32.
• Parties: CHAS. H. STEFFEY, Inc. v. AMERICAN BANK STATIONERY CO.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

155 A. 306

CHAS. H. STEFFEY, Inc.

v. AMERICAN BANK STATIONERY CO.

No. 32.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 11, 1931.

Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; Samuel K. Dennis, Judge.

Bill of interpleader by the American Bank Stationery Company against Charles H. Steffey, Inc., and others. From an order overruling its demurrer to the bill, Charles H. Steffey, Inc., appeals.

Decree reversed, and bill dismissed.

Argued before BOND, C. J., and PATTISON, DRNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, DIGGES, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

Walter C. Mylander, of Baltimore (Nathan Patz, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Laurie U. Riggs, of Baltimore, for appellee.

SLOAN, J.

This appeal is from an order overruling a demurrer to a bill of interpleader filed by a vendor of real property in which it asks that three real estate agents be required to contest amongst themselves the merits of their respective claims for the commission, and leave the vendor out of it. One of them, however, the appellant, questions by demurrer, the right of the appellee to join it in the proceeding, on the ground that the appellee is not a disinterested party in the distribution of the commission; it having, at the consummation of the sale, agreed with the vendee of the property to pay the appellant the usual real estate commission, it having acknowledged its obligation to pay the appellant, and it having made a payment on account, all of which appears on the face of the bill.

The first and second paragraphs of the bill of complaint contain all of the facts alleged upon which the appellant bases its contention that no bill of interpleader can be maintained by the appellee as to it (the appellant), and are as follows:

"First: That it is a corporation incorporated under the Laws of the State of Maryland, and engaged in the printing and lithographing business in Baltimore City, Maryland. That since 1920 and until February 6, 1931, your Orator was the owner of the premises on the northeast corner of Pratt and Commerce Streets, Baltimore City, Maryland. That for the past several years your Orator has advertised said property for sale, and in order to sell said property, offered to pay to any person who was the efficient procuring cause in the sale of said property to a purchaser and at a price satisfactory to your Orator, the regular real estate broker's commission as established by the Real Estate Board of Baltimore City. That your Orator, to protect itself from paying a double commission for the sale of the said property, steadfastly refused to give to any person or persons the exclusive agency to sell said property, although the same was requested by many persons, including one or more of the Defendants in this case.

"Second: That on January G, 1931, your Orator entered into a written contract to sell said property to the Baltimore Post for the sum of ninety thousand dollars ($90,000.00). That ?n the same contract, believing that the Defendant, Chas. H. Steffey, Inc., was the ellicient procuring cause of said sale, and having no knowledge of anyone else being entitled to or claiming said commission, your Orator agreed to pay to said Chas. H. Steffey, Inc., the full commission for the said sale, amounting to twenty-three hundred and sixty-two dollars and fifty cents ($2,362.50), and it actually paid to the said Chas. H. Steffey, Inc., the sum of live hundred dollars ($500.00) on account of said commission."

The bill then goes on to say that on January 19, 1931, B. K. Brendle, and on January 27, 1931, Thomas W. Burke, the other defendants, had respectively demanded the entire commission on the sale as the efficient procuring cause of sale; that the defendant, Chas. H. Steffey, Inc., appellant here, "has demanded and claims that the balance of said commission, amounting to $1,862.50, shall be paid to it, and on February 7, 1931, instituted suit for the recovery of the same" against the appellee and "is apprehensive that the other claimants will sue it for said commission"; that the appellee "is willing to pay one commission for the sale of said property, but does not want to be put to a double or triple liability for the same," and because it is unable to decide the controversy (which the bill sets up) "or to make any payment thereof in such manner as would protect it against the claims or suits of other claimants"; that the appellee has no charge or interest whatsoever in said sum of $2,302.50, and oilers to pay the money into court, and prays that the defendants be required to interplead, and the appellant, Steffey, Inc., be restrained from prosecuting its suit at law, whereupon an order was passed granting the writ of injunction against the appellant as prayed upon the payment into court of $2.302.50, and that process be issued against all of the alleged claimants. It is apparent that the fear of the appellee is that it shall be "put to a double or triple liability" for the commissions as much as the annoyance and defense of the various claims. The right to the remedy by interpleader is founded, not on the consideration that one may be subjected to double liability, but on the fact that he is threatened with double vexation in respect to one liability, Pfister v. Wade, 50 Cal. 43.

The essential elements of the right to an interpleader, are:

"1. The same thing, debt or duty must be claimed by both or all the parties against whom the relief is demanded; 2. All their adverse titles or claims must be dependent, or be derived from a common source; 3. The person asking the relief—the plaintiff—must not have nor claim any interest in the subject matter; 4. lie must have incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants; that is he must stand perfectly indifferent between them, in the position merely as a stakeholder." 1 Pomeroy, Equitable Remedies, § 43 (5 Eq. Jur. p. 70), and in section 52, it is stated that one "may have expressly acknowledged" the title of one of the claimants, "or may have bound himself by contract, so as to render himself liable upon such independent undertaking, without reference to his possible liability to the rival claimant upon the general nature of the entire transaction. Under these circumstances, as the plaintiff is liable at all events to one of the defendants, whatever may be their own respective...