Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Chase Brass & Copper Workers Union Local 1565

• Decision Date: 24 March 1953
• Citation: 96 A.2d 209,139 Conn. 591
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CHASE BRASS & COPPER CO., Inc. v. CHASE BRASS & COPPER WORKERS UNION LOCAL 1565. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 209

96 A.2d 209

139 Conn. 591

CHASE BRASS & COPPER CO., Inc. v. CHASE BRASS & COPPER WORKERS UNION LOCAL 1565.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 24, 1953.

William J. Secor, Jr., Waterbury, with whom was Kenyon W. Greene, Waterbury, for appellant (plaintiff).

Chester T. Corse, New Haven, with whom was Thomas R. Robinson, New Haven, for appellee (defendant).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

JENNINGS, Associate Justice.

The parties are in dispute over the interpretation and application of a clause in a labor relations contract. The matter was referred to an arbitrator. The question to be decided in this application to vacate his award under General Statutes, § 8161, is whether he exceeded his powers or imperfectly executed them. The allegations of fact in the application, with one exception, are admitted in the answer. The issue is essentially one of law. The finding is not subject to correction as to facts as distinguished from conclusions. A full presentation of the theory and facts underlying this controversy would require several pages of this opinion, as it did of the record on appeal. An attempt will be made to present the bore essentials necessary to a decision, as they appear in the finding.

The plaintiff company and defendant union are parties to a labor relations contract. This provides for the arbitration of disputes and reads in part as follows: 'Article XXIV. * * * 5. The arbitrator may interpret this Contract and apply it to the particular case submitted to him, but he shall, however, have no power to add to, subtract from, or in any way modify the terms of this Contract. * * * 7. The parties agree to accept the arbitrator's award as final and binding, providing it is not contrary to law.' On October 18, 1950, the company received a grievance from the union which read: 'The Union claims that the Company has violated Article X, Section H(3) of the contract on the No. 72 slitter. * * *' When the grievance procedure failed, the parties selected an arbitrator and submitted the grievance to him in the following form, under the rules of the American Arbitration Association: 'Did the Company violate Article X, Section H(3) of the contract on the No. 72 slitter on October 18, 1950?' The article reads: 'Article X--Incentive System at the Chase Metal Works Plant. * * * Sec. H. Under the following circumstances the Company will pay to the employee involved his average straight-time hourly earnings: * * * 3. On bonus jobs where no new Standards have been set and old Standards do not apply.' The arbitrator's award, as corrected by the trial court, reads: 'On the No. 72 slitter, on October 18, 1950, the Company violated Article X, Section H(3) of the contract by not paying the inspector average earnings.' The arbitrator also wrote a memorandum of decision, although he was not required to do so. This contained the only reasons given by him for his award.

The operation on the No. 72 slitter was a bonus job. This meant that the company would pay a bonus in addition to base pay for all production over a predetermined amount. In ascertaining this amount, the company first determined the method to be used, that is, the equipment, its speed, size of the crew, etc. The production obtainable from this equipment and method was then estimated by using as a measure the amount which a mythical, average qualified operative, working at normal pace and fully utilizing his time, would be able to produce. This standard was obtained by 'time study' and represented the minimum amount of work a man must do before he could earn more than his base pay. Specific qualifications of any individual are never built into standards.

The operation on the No. 72 slitter required a crew of three. On October 18, 1950, one of the crew failed to appear. After a short delay a substitute, not familiar with the operation, was furnished by the company. While he was working the team failed to exceed standard production. One of the team, the inspector, did not, for the period in question, receive average earnings, that is, the current base rate plus the average bonus per hour earned during the preceding calendar quarter. The practical effect of the arbitration award was to give average earnings to all three operatives. While the difference between average earnings and base pay was only 53 cents for the period, the company claims that the adoption of the principle established by the award would be 'revolutionary in the field of Industrial Engineering and Labor Relations.'

On these facts, the trial court came to forty-seven conclusions, one of which was that the arbitrator's award and memorandum did not disclose any mistake of law or fact. The plaintiff claims that the standard was not rendered inapplicable by the introduction of an inexperienced operative into the crew because the qualification of employees is not a condition of the standard. It would follow that the standard would apply and that only base pay was due since no bonus was earned. The defendant claims that the introduction of the inexperienced operative so changed the conditions of operation as to make the standard inapplicable. If this was so, Article X, § H(3), in terms required the payment of average earnings.

The basic test of the validity of the award lies in its conformity to the submission. Goff v. Goff, 78 W.Va. 423, 428, 89 S.E. 9. The trial court concluded, in effect, that the arbitrator was not bound by rules of law in coming to his conclusion, and that, had he been, his decision could still be sustained.

The essential terms of the agreement of arbitration have been quoted above. The arbitrator is given the power to interpret and apply the contract, and '[t]he parties agree to accept the arbitrator's award as final and binding, providing it is not contrary to law.' If the parties enter into an unrestricted submission, arbitrators are not required to decide according to law. Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations & Awards, p. 500. If the arbitrators are required by the agreement to decide according to law, the cases are in conflict. Id., pp. 502, 793-796. Acme Cut Stone Co. v. New Center Development Corporation, 281 Mich. 32, 49, 274 N.W. 700, 112 A.L.R. 865, holds that they are bound by the rules of law. See also note, 112 A.L.R. 873, 886. On the other hand, an award has been held to be beyond the reach of the courts although the submission was 'to determine all questions according to the rules of law and equity, the same as though the matter was to be tried in a court of law or equity.' Mickles v. Thayer, 14 Allen (96 Mass.) 114, 119; see also Bigelow v. Newell, 10 Pick. (27 Mass.) 348; ...