Chase v. Cowart
| Decision Date | 18 April 1958 |
| Citation | 102 So.2d 147 |
| Parties | C. W. CHASE, Jr., et al., as Members of and Constituting the Dade County Budget Commission, Appellants, v. Faris COWART et al., as Members of and Constituting the Board of CountyCommissioners of Dade County, Florida, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Ward & Ward, Miami, for appellants.
Darrey A. Davis and Sibley, Grusmark, Barkdull & King, Miami Beach, for appellees.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Howard S. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for intervenor.
Thomas H. Anderson, Edward L. Semple and George S. Okell, Sr., Miami, amici curiae.
Chase et al., as and constituting the Dade County Budget Commission, filed a complaint for declaratory decree against Cowart et al., as and constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, wherein the chancellor was asked to determine:
(1) whether the Budget Commission had been abolished by the home rule charter adopted by the people of Dade County;
(2) if held to be abolished, what if any duties did the Budget Commission have as to other public bodies not covered in the home rule charter; and
(3) if not held to be abolished, what were its duties and obligations with respect to conflicting duties fixed on it by law, as against like duties imposed by the home rule charter on the County Commissioners.
In granting a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by the County Comissioners the chancellor determined that although it was doubtful that the provision of the home rule charter abolishing the Budget Commission was authorized (under the Home Rule Amendment to the Florida Constitution, Article VIII, Section 11, adopted November 6, 1956, F.S.A.), nevertheless the passage of Chapter 57-912, by the 1957 Session of the Legislature 'compels the conclusion that the Dade County Budget Commission has been abolished legally at least so far as its functions over the metropolitan government of Dade County are concerned.' The chancellor further said that as to other public bodies not parties to the proceedings '* * * the court finds no reason to hold that the duties of the Dade County Budget Commission as to any public official or public body not covered by the metropolitan government are impaired.'
A petition for rehearing questioning the validity and effect of said Chapter 57-912 was filed and by stipulation of the parties was treated as an amendment to the complaint with the motion to dismiss being considered as directed to the complaint as so amended.
The Attorney General of the State of Florida, by stipulation, was made a party defendant. A memorandum or brief was filed in this Court on behalf of Dade County League of Municipalities and Amicus Curiae, Thomas H. Anderson, George S. Okell, Sr., and Edward L. Semple. It has been considered along with the briefs and arguments of the parties.
We will first consider the validity of Chapter 57-912, supra, for should we find it to have the effect given it by the chancellor such will be dispositive of this cause.
The Legislature by Chapter 31420, Laws of 1956, provided for the appointment of the Metropolitan Charter Board. The members of this body were appointed and prepared a home rule charter which was submitted to and approved by the electors of Dade County on May 21, 1957. Contained in the charter, as approved, was the following specific provision: 'The Budget Commission created by Chapter 21874, Laws of Fla., 1943, is hereby abolished and Chapter 21874 shall no longer be of any effect.' There-after the Legislature enacted Chapter 57-912, Laws of 1957.
Chapter 57-912 purported to ratify, validate and confirm, (1) Chapter 31420, Laws of 1956, above mentioned; (2) the actions of the Metropolitan Charter Board including any charters drawn by the board; and (3) all elections held pursuant to said Chapter 31420.
It should be noted here that no attack was made before the chancellor and none is made here on the validity of Chapter 31420, supra, or on the organization or actions of the Charter Board in preparing the home rule charter. Nor is the method by which the charter was submitted to the electors of Dade County, or their ratification thereof, questioned in any way.
Subsection (3), Section 11, gave the Legislature the power and duty to create the Metropolitan Charter Board and to provide the method by which the home rule charter as prepared by the Charter Board, would be presented to the elecors of Dade County. Having the power to act initially in these matters, the Legislature then had the power to validate and confirm Chapter 31420, Laws of 1956, the organization of the Charter Board and to confirm the actions of the Charter Board in submitting the home rule charter to the voters.
But this is the extent of the power given the Legislature regarding the adoption of the home rule charter for it is clear that the provisions of subsection (1) and (3) placed the power to adopt, amend, or revise the home rule charter in the electors of Dade County and in them alone. It is fundamental that the Legislature could not ratify nor confirm that which it initially had no power to control or perform.
It is true that subsections (5), (6) and (9) of Section 11 retain in the Legislature the power to enact general laws, which as provided in those sections, shall be effective in Dade County. However, Chapter 57-912 is obviously a special act applicable only to Dade County and seeks only to validate and confirm the matters set forth above.
When the Legislature enacted Chapter 31420, Laws of 1956, creating the metropolitan charter and providing the method of presenting the home rule charter to the voters of Dade County, and more specifically when the electors of Dade County adopted the home rule charter on May 21, 1957, the authority of the Legislature in affairs of local government in Dade County ceased to exist. Thereafter, the Legislature may lawfully exercise this power only through passage of general acts applicable to Dade County and any other one or more counties, or a municipality in Dade County and any other one or more municipalities in the State.
Therefore, we hold that Chapter 57-912, supra, is of no force or effect insofar as it attempts to ratify, affirm and validate the home rule charter.
The chancellor in his final decree expressed doubt that Section 11 gave the electors of Dade County the power to abolish the Budget Commission by the subject provision in the home rule charter, but having determined that the provisions of Chapter 57-912, supra, had the effect of validating the abolition thereof he found it innecessary to answer this question.
In its brief on petition for rehearing, the Budget Commission protests that it raised only the issue of the validity of Chapter 57-912, supra, and that therefore we should not go beyond that question in deciding this case. It objects to the fact that in our previous opinion herein, as we do in this one, we affirmed the chancellor, in part, by holding that the Budget Commission was abolished, but did so on a different ground than that relied on by the chancellor.
This is easily explained. Decrees and judgments in cases which come to an appellate court for review are presumed to be correct and free from error. We are required to uphold the lower court if valid grounds exist therefor. While the grounds or reasoning used by the trial court or chancellor are frequently helpful to an appellate court on review, they are not controlling. The decision of the appellate court must be made, not on the basis of whether the trial court or chancellor traveled the proper route, used proper reasoning, or laid his conclusion on proper grounds, but rather on whether his conclusion is correct or incorrect. We have followed these principles in deciding this case.
Further, we point out that the appellees, in their reply brief, urged the very question on which we decided this case herein.
We consider the basic question in this cause to be whether or not the electors of Dade County had given to them in Section 11 the authority and power to abolish the Dade County Budget Commission. We are of the opinion that they had the authority to do so under the provisions of subsection (1) (c), Section 11, and that by adoption of the home rule charter they have done so.
In its main brief the Budget Commission contends that since it was created under an act of general application, affecting more than one county, it cannot be abolished by the adoption of the home rule charter. In support of this position in its petition for rehearing it argues that subsections (5), (6), (7), and (9), of Section 11 ar limitations of the home rule power and when construed with subsection (1) (c) prohibit the electors of Dade County from abolishing any board, authority or governmental unit created by any general act applicable to Dade, and any other one or more counties.
The Constitutional Amendment authorizing home rule for Dade County, Article VIII, Section 11, Fla.Const., is composed of nine (9) subsections. In the Senate Joint Resolution which proposed the amendment these subsections there were designated alphabetically (a) through (i). In Florida Statutes, 1957, and Florida Statutes Annotated the designation has been changed so that they are now designated by numerals (1) through (9).
In the Joint Senate Resolution the first subsection, i. e. subsection (a), was further divided into nine (9) subsections designated by small Roman numerals (i) through (ix). In the publications of the statutes above mentioned the designation of the subsections has been changed so that they are now designated alphabetically (a) through (i). This explanation will be helpful to the reader in comparing this opinion with that in Gray v. Golden, Fla.1956, 89 So.2d 785, where the wubsections are referred to as designated in the Senate Joint Resolution.
Subsection (1) in each of its nine subsections grants certain powers to the electors of Dade County. Subsections (5), (6), (7),...
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