Chase v. General Elec. Co., 2323

• Decision Date: 11 July 1955
• Docket Number: No. 2323,2323
• Citation: 115 A.2d 683,83 R.I. 269
• Parties: Arthur CHASE v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Referred to as Monowatt. Eq.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 683

115 A.2d 683

83 R.I. 269

Arthur CHASE v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Referred to as Monowatt.

Eq. No. 2323.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 11, 1955.

Salvatore L. Virgadamo, Newport, for petitioner.

Worrell & Hodge, Lee A. Worrell, Providence, for respondent.

BAKER, Justice.

This is an original petition brought under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, general laws 1938, chapter 300, to obtain compensation from the respondent, which previously was the petitioner's employer. Following a hearing in the superior court the trial justice entered a final decree denying and dismissing the petition, whereupon the petitioner duly prosecuted his appeal to this court.

It appears from the evidence that he was employed from December 1949 to May 11, 1953, as a stock clerk in the Newport plant of General Electric Company, sometimes referred to as Monowatt--A Department of General Electric Company. His duties as such clerk included lifting, moving, and weighing 'tote pans' containing small electrical appliances and equipment manufactured by respondent. Such tote pans were steel receptacles about two and one-half feet wide and one foot high weighing approximately 15 pounds when empty and between 100 and 150 pounds when full. The petitioner was required to lift the loaded tote pans from the floor near the machines, place four or five of them on top of each other on a hand truck, and pull the truck, to the scales. Thereafter the pans were placed on the skid for shipment.

The petitioner testified in substance that a few days prior to June 27, 1952, while lifting a tote pan from the floor to the scales he felt a pulling sensation in his lower back accompanied by considerable pain. He stopped work for a while and when the pain had subsided he continued with his work. He was treated by the company nurse and on June 27 by its doctor, who prescribed heat treatments and rest. The petitioner, however, continued to work, feeling well at times but on other occasions having considerable pain in his back. In September 1952 he was referred by the company doctor to an orthopedic specialist connected with the Newport Hospital who treated him several times during the next four months and who prescribed the use of a brace for his lower back. The petitioner was examined by this doctor on January 13, 1953. At that time he was working, was feeling well, was 'symptom free' and was advised to return for further examination when necessary. The doctor had previously diagnosed his trouble as a 'ruptured intervertebral disc, lumbar spine,' and advised that a myelogram and probably a disc operation might be necessary.

There is evidence that from about the middle or latter part of January 1953 until the end of February, approximately six weeks, petitioner stopped working for respondent allegedly because of pain in his back. However, he then returned to his job with respondent doing light work, sorting scraps for salvage, which could be done by him while sitting. He continued this work until early in May 1953 when he finally left respondent's employ, complaining of severe pain in his back. He testified that he has not worked since that date. In addition to the medical treatment above described petitioner was at the Lahey Clinic in Boston, Massachusetts, for about two days in June 1953 and also was treated by a chiropractor on several occasions at about that same time.

The final decree appealed from contains the following finding of fact made by the trial justice: 'That the petitioner has failed to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that his present incapacity resulted from an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by the respondent, connected therewith and referable thereto.' The petitioner attacks this finding on several grounds but in particular he alleges that there is no evidence showing any facts contrary to those established by him and that it appears the trial justice ignored certain material evidence introduced by petitioner showing that his incapacity resulted from an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by respondent. We have examined the transcript and the exhibits and we are unable to agree with petitioner on those issues.

The general principles of law governing the respective powers and duties of both the superior and appellate courts in a case of this type are set out clearly in Baccari v. W. T. Grant Co., 73 R.I. 376, 56 A.2d 552. See also Walsh-Kaiser Co. v. Della Morte, 76 R.I. 325, 69 A.2d 689, and Pearl v. Builders Iron Foundry, 73 R.I. 304, 55 A.2d 282. From them it is unquestioned that the power to determine questions of fact is placed solely in the superior court; that the conclusion of a trial justice based directly on legal evidence or by way of reasonable inference therefrom is a finding of fact and is conclusive under the act; and that questions respecting the credibility of witnesses and the weight of legal evidence are questions of fact and not of law.

There was evidence in this case that prior to petitioner's employment by respondent he sustained a back injury on August 12, 1949, while employed as a handy man on an estate in the city of Newport. On that occasion he started to climb a ladder which broke throwing him to the ground. H...