Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.

Decision Date21 January 1975
Docket NumberNo. CC891,CC891
Citation211 S.E.2d 273,158 W.Va. 382
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesEugene F. CHASE, Executor, etc., v. GREYHOUND LINES, INC., a corporation, et al. HENDERSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a corporation, v. BROADWAY ELKHART COMPANY, etc.

Syllabus by the Court

1. 'The standard of jurisdictional due process is that a foreign corporation must have such minimum contacts with the state of the forum that the maintenance of an action in the forum does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' Hodge v. The Sands Manufacturing Company, 151 W.Va. 133 (150 S.E.2d 793) (1966).

2. The amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by a foreign corporation in the state of the forum so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to an In personam judgment of a court in that state must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.

Frank V. Sansalone, Fairmont, for plaintiff (Eugene F. Chase).

Furbee, Amos, Webb & Critchfield, Bill B. Atkins, Fairmont, for third-party defendant (Broadway Elkhart Company).

CAPLAN, Justice:

Eugene F. Chase, on July 2, 1971, purchased from defendant, Ridge Runner Industries, Inc., a 1968 Ford truck upon which was mounted a camper box. Ridge Runner Industries, Inc. purchased said camper box from Henderson Manufacturing Company, a corporation, the manufacturer and designer of said box. Ridge Runner was the distributor for Henderson in this state.

On July 19, 1971, while plaintiff's decedent, Rosalie R. Chase, was riding in the camper box, the Ford truck on which it was mounted collided with a Greyhound bus and Rosalie R. Chase suffered a fatal injury. The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that defendant Henderson Manufacturing Company and defendant Ridge Runner Industries, Inc. knew at the time of the sale that the camper box was not suitable and reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was intended to be used; that they knew that Eugene F. Chase and the members of his household, including the plaintiff's decedent, would rely upon the skill and judgment of said defendants and upon their warranty in purchasing said camper box and that the plaintiff's decedent did rely upon the defendants' warrant. It is further alleged in said complaint that the collision and death of the plaintiff's decedent was caused by the negligence of each of the drivers of the vehicles and by reason of the faulty design of the door to the camper box from which Rosalie R. Chase fell to her death. Basically, it was charged in the complaint that the defendant, Henderson Manufacturing Company, negligently designed, constructed and manufactured said camper box making it unsafe for its intended use; that the design and structure of the door, door lock and door frame were defective and inadequately designed to withstand an impact with a reasonable degree of safety; that the plaintiff's decedent was unaware of the defects in the camper box which made it unsafe for its intended use; and that the plaintiff's decedent was fatally injured as a direct and foreseeable result of the negligent, defective and inadequately designed construction and manufacture of said camper box. As aforesaid, the complaint further charges that the collision and fatal injury to the plaintiff's decedent was caused by the negligence of Stephen E. Chase, driver of the vehicle in which the deceased was riding, and the negligence of Samuel S. Nazzareno, the driver of the defendant Greyhound bus.

Subsequent to the filing of the aforesaid complaint defendant Henderson Manufacturing Company filed a third-party complaint against Broadway Elkhart Company, a division of Elixir Industries, Inc. In the third-party complaint Henderson noted that Chase, the plaintiff, complained that the door, door lock and door frame of the camper were defective; that Henderson had purchased the door, door lock and door frame from Broadway Elkhart Company and had installed them in accordance with the instructions of Broadway. Henderson therein further alleges that Broadway, the third-party defendant, negligently designed, constructed and manufactured said door, door lock and door frame thereby causing the injury to and death of the plaintiff's decedent. Therefore, says Henderson in its third-party complaint, any damages sustained by the plaintiff were the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the third-party defendant, Broadway Elkhart Company.

Upon the filing of the third-party complaint the third-party defendant Broadway Elkhart, appeared specially by counsel and moved that the third-party complaint be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) the complaint does not allege any liability between Broadway Elkhart Company and the third-party plaintiff; (2) the third-party complaint wholly fails to allege sufficient facts showing that the court had In personam jurisdiction over the said third-party defendant, Bradway, which is a subsidiary of a foreign corporation not authorized or licensed to do business in the State of West Virginia; that the court lacks jurisdiction because at the time the alleged cause of action arose Broadway was not incorporated under the laws of the State of West Virginia; was not licensed to do business in this state; and, was not subject to service of process or acceptance of service by the Auditor of the State of West Virginia as the summons and third-party complaint were attempted to be served. Further showing a lack of jurisdiction by the trial court was the fact that the third-party defendant, Broadway, did not commit any tort in whole or in part in the State of West Virginia or make any contract to be performed in whole or in part by any party thereto in the State of West Virginia as would subject a foreign corporation to service of process under W.Va.Code, 1931, 31--1--71, as amended.

The trial court upon consideration of the matters raised denied the motion of Broadway and upon the joint motion of the parties certified the following question in this Court:

Did the Circuit Court of Marion County, West Virginia, obtain jurisdiction of the third-party defendant, Broadway Elkhart Company, by service of process on the Auditor of the State of West Virginia, if the said corporation was not licensed to do business and was not doing business in the State; had made no contracts to be performed in whole or in part in the State; had committed no tort in whole or in part in the State; had no servants, agents, or employees in the State; owned no property in the State; had appointed no one as its attorney in fact for acceptance of process in the State; had not manufactured, sold, offered for sale or supplied a product which caused injury to any person or property, in the State; and which corporation's only contact, if any, with the State was that its product came into the State of West Virginia as a component part of the third-party plaintiff's product.

By its order entered on December 20, 1973 the court overruled the motion to dismiss...

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5 cases
  • S. R. v. City of Fairmont
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • July 29, 1981
    ...of an action in the forum does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 4 See also Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., W.Va., 211 S.E.2d 273 (1975); State ex rel. Coral Pools, Inc. v. Knapp, 147 W.Va. 704, 131 S.E.2d 81 (1963); Gavenda Brothers, Inc. v. Elkins Limes......
  • Harman v. Pauley
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
    • September 24, 1981
    ...light of the traditional due process requirements." S. R. v. The City of Fairmont, 280 S.E.2d 712 (W.Va.1981). See Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 273 (W.Va.1975); Hodge v. Sands Manufacturing Company, 151 W.Va. 133, 150 S.E.2d 793 (1966); State ex rel Coral Pools, Inc. v. Knapp,......
  • Hill by Hill v. Showa Denko, K.K.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • December 17, 1992
    ...own property within the State, and had not appointed anyone to accept process within the State. Similarly, in Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 158 W.Va. 382, 211 S.E.2d 273 (1975), the Court ruled that a West Virginia court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defend......
  • Brent v. Board of Trustees of Davis and Elkins College.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • July 10, 1979
    ...of venue standards. We do not find the later cases of Crawford v. Carson, 138 W.Va. 852, 78 S.E.2d 268 (1953) and Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., W.Va., 211 S.E.2d 273 (1975) any more enlightening. Crawford involved proper venue of an action arising from an automobile accident when service ......
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