Chase v. Peay

• Citation: 286 F.Supp.2d 523
• Decision Date: 30 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. CCB-98-2367.,CIV.A. CCB-98-2367.
• Parties: Warren CHASE v. Phlonda PEAY, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

286 F.Supp.2d 523

Warren CHASE v. Phlonda PEAY, et al.

No. CIV.A. CCB-98-2367.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

September 30, 2003.

J Joseph Curran, Jr, Baltimore, MD, Angela M Eaves, State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore, MD, Sharon Stanley Street, State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General, Environmental Crimes Unit, Baltimore, MD, for defendants.

James Edward Weaver, Venable Baetjer and Howard, LLP, Baltimore, MD, for plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM

BLAKE, District Judge.

The defendants, Phlonda Peay, et al. ("defendants"), have moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff, Warren Chase ("plaintiff" or "Chase").¹ The issues in this motion have been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary.² Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons stated below, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Chase alleges that the defendants, employees of the Maryland Division of Correction, subjected him to cruel and inhuman conditions and used excessive force against him during Chase's confinement at the Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center ("MCAC"), the state's Super-Maximum facility in Baltimore, Maryland. (Am.Compl.) Chase commenced this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants' conduct violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.) Chase sought monetary and punitive damages and costs, naming the various defendants in their individual capacities.³ (Id.)

Chase's allegations focus on two incidents, the first occurring on March 1, 1998, while Chase was housed in cell # 2 of the B-pod housing unit at the MCAC. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Chase Aff., at ¶ 2.) On the morning of March 1, Chase alleges that he was subjected to a strip search and a search of his cell. (Id. at ¶ 5; see also id. at Ex. 2, Thompson Dep., at 16, 251-53.) Chase states that he then was placed in a three-piece restraint, which remained on him for almost eight hours. (Id. at Ex. 1, Chase, Aff., at ¶ 5, 8; see also id. at Ex. 2, Thompson Dep., at 19, 114-15.) The three-piece restraint consisted of a chain around Chase's waist, connected to leg irons and handcuffs via a heavy black box. (Id. Ex. 1, Chase Aff., at ¶ 6; id. at Ex. 2, Thompson Dep., at 19.)

Chase states that he complained to correctional staff that the restraints were too tight and asked that the restraints be removed so that he could go to the bathroom, but the staff did not respond. (Id. at Ex. 1, Chase Aff., at ¶¶6, 10; see also id. at Ex. 2, Thompson Dep., at 16-17, 20, 118-22, 144-45, 150-51, 190, 255-57.) Chase charges that the restraints were so tight that they cut off the circulation in his wrists and ankles, causing numbness, pain, and discomfort in his hands and feet. (Id. at Ex. 1, Chase Aff., at ¶ 10.) Chase states that around 2:00 p.m. he was forced to defecate on himself, and that he remained in the restraints with feces on him for almost four more hours. (Id. at Ex. 1, Chase Aff., at ¶ 13; see also id. at Ex. 2, Thompson Dep., at 187-88.) Chase also states that on this same day the correctional staff on the B-pod refused to give him breakfast, although serving food trays to all of the other prisoners on the unit, on the orders of the officer in charge of the unit. (Id. at Ex. 1, Chase Aff., at ¶¶ 3-4, 9, 11; see also id. at Ex. 2, Thompson Dep., at 15-17, 100-01, 243-44, 250-51, 259-61, 280-84.)

Chase alleges similar conduct by correctional staff during a second incident, covering June 1 through June 8, 1998. Chase attempted to commit suicide on the evening of June 1, by ingesting a large number of pills.⁴ (Id. at Ex. 1, Chase Aff., at ¶ 15.) Official records from the MCAC indicate that Chase expressed suicidal thoughts to several doctors at the prison during this period. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. 1, at 12-14, 47-48, 49-52.) Chase was examined by psychiatrists on June 1 and then taken to the cadre isolation area, where he was stripped, dressed in a full-length gown, and placed in a restraint consisting of handcuffs, a black box, a waist chain, a padlock, and leg irons. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Chase Aff., at ¶¶ 16-17.) Chase remained in the cadre isolation area for eight days, until June 8. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Dr. Joseph S. Fuhrmaneck, a psychologist at the MCAC, testified that placing Chase in the cadre isolation area was a behavioral management strategy to prevent Chase from destroying property or otherwise acting out aggressively. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. 3, Fuhrmaneck Dep., at 61-63.) Dr. Edouard, a psychologist at the MCAC, similarly testified that patients would be placed in restraints in the cadre isolation unit in order to prevent them from harming themselves or others. (Defs. Mem. at Ex. 6, Edouard Dep., at 49.)

During his time in isolation, Chase alleges that he was forced to defecate on himself three times, because correctional staff would not remove the restraints to allow Chase to use the bathroom. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Chase Aff., at ¶¶ 19, 21, 28, 31.) Chase states that on multiple occasions during this eight-day period he was unable to eat his food, because the correctional staff did not bring him a food tray at meal times, or refused to remove his restraints to allow him to eat his food. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-26, 28-32.) Chase also alleges that he was told on several occasions between June 1 and June 8 that he had to remain in full restraints all the time while he was in the cadre isolation unit. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 27.) James Kavangh, formerly the Warden at MCAC, testified that it would be inappropriate to leave a prisoner in restraints all day long, and that restraints generally must be loosened or removed for a prisoner to eat or go to the bathroom. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. 5, Kavanagh Dep., at 35, 36-37, 73-75.)

Official records from the MCAC show that Chase was disciplined for an incident on the morning of March 1, 1998, in which he refused to remove his arm from his feeding slot, and disobeyed an officer's order to remove his arm. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. 1, at 1-5.) These records also show that Chase made several complaints during the period of June 1998 that members of the prison staff were putting things in his food and trying to poison him. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. 1, at 12, 18, 47; see also id. at Ex. 3, Chase Dep., at 42-43; id. at Ex. 5, Kavanagh Dep., at 16.) Notes from the cadre unit for Chase's confinement between June 1 and June 8, 1998 include notations that he was using the bathroom at various times, that his restraints were removed at various times, and daily notations that he was eating his meals. (Id. at Ex. 4, Willis Dep., at Ex. 3.) The notes also indicate that on three occasions Chase refused to have his restraints removed so that he could eat, and that on one occasion he refused to accept his food. (Id. Chase testified that he never refused meals or refused to have restraints removed while he was in isolation. (Id. at Ex. 3, Chase Dep., at 41.) Finally, the cadre unit notes indicate that Chase was visited by medical and psychological staff while in isolation, and that Chase continued to express suicidal thoughts. (Id.)

Chase filed this suit on July 22, 1998, at which time he remained a prisoner at MCAC. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Chase Aff., at ¶ 1.) Chase was released from his term of incarceration on or about July 8, 2002, after completing his ten-year sentence. (Id.)

ANALYSIS

I.

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment

shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean any factual dispute will defeat the motion:

By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original).

"The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 (4th Cir.1988). The court must "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party," Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 813, 115 S.Ct. 67, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994), but it also must abide by its affirmative obligation to ensure that factually unsupported claims and defenses do not proceed to trial. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

II.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") generally requires prisoner plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court has interpreted the language of this provision broadly, holding that the phrase "prison conditions" encompasses "all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Thus, the exhaustion provision plainly extends to Chase's allegations of excessive force and cruel and inhuman conditions.

It is undisputed that Chase was...