Chase v. Sec'y, Case No. 3:15-cv-571-J-34PDB

• Decision Date: 04 December 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:15-cv-571-J-34PDB
• Parties: LEONARD GRADY CHASE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

LEONARD GRADY CHASE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:15-cv-571-J-34PDB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

December 4, 2018

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Leonard Chase, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on April 24, 2015,¹ by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1). In the Petition, Chase challenges a 2008 state court (Putnam County, Florida) judgment of conviction for battery and two counts of lewd or lascivious battery. Chase raises one ground for relief. See Doc. 1 at 5.² Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Response to Petition (Resp.; Doc. 11) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). Chase submitted a brief in reply on January 25, 2017. See Response to Doc 11 (Reply; Doc. 27). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On July 20, 2006, the State of Florida (State) charged Chase, by way of a second amended Information, with two counts of sexual battery on a person less than twelveyears of age (counts one and two) and two counts of lewd or lascivious battery (counts three and four). Resp. Ex. A at 31-32. The State filed a notice of similar fact evidence on January 24, 2008, in which the State sought to introduce the testimony of a male, J.P., who Chase had sexually abused when J.P. was five years old, and testimony of sexual abuse from the victim in the instant case that was not charged in the Information. Id. at 41-44. Following a hearing, the circuit court concluded the similar fact evidence could be introduced at trial over Chase's objection. Resp. Exs. A at 72-75, B; C at 3-35. Chase proceeded to a jury trial, at the conclusion of which the jury acquitted Chase as to count one, found Chase guilty of battery, a lesser-included offense of count two, and guilty as charged as to counts three and four. Resp. Ex. D. On March 18, 2008, the circuit court adjudicated Chase to be a habitual felony offender as to counts three and four and sentenced him to a term of incarceration of thirty years in prison. Resp. Exs. E at 15-16; F. The circuit court further adjudicated Chase to be a prison releasee reoffender and imposed a fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentence as to count three. Id. As to count two, the circuit court sentenced Chase to time served. Id.

On direct appeal, Chase raised a single issue in his initial brief - that the circuit court erred when it admitted similar fact evidence involving a different victim. Resp. Ex. G at 15-25. The State filed an answer brief. Resp. Ex. H. On August 11, 2009, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal (Fifth DCA) per curiam affirmed the judgment and sentences. Resp. Ex. I. Chase filed a motion for rehearing and for a written opinion, Resp. Ex. J, which the Fifth DCA denied. Resp. Ex. K. The court issued its Mandate on September 21, 2009. Resp. Ex. L. On June 10, 2010, Chase filed a pro se petition for belated appeal with the Fifth DCA in which he raised the following three allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: (1) failure to supplement the record with the depositions of Shana Marshall and K.M.; (2) failure to raise a fundamental error argument that the similar acts evidence was not sufficiently similar to the charged offenses; and (3) failure to properly certify as an issue of great public importance the circuit court's application of the clear and convincing evidence standard when reviewing the similar acts evidence. Resp. Ex. M. The State filed a response in opposition. Resp. Ex. N. The Fifth DCA denied the petition on February 14, 2011. Resp. Ex. P. Chase filed a motion for rehearing, Resp. Ex. Q, which the Fifth DCA denied on April 26, 2011. Resp. Ex. R.

On October 26, 2010, Chase filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which he raised four grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Resp. S. On December 28, 2010, Chase amended his Rule 3.850 Motion to include an additional three claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Resp. Ex. U. Following an evidentiary hearing, Resp. Ex. Z, the circuit court denied both motions. Resp. Ex. AA. The Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the circuit court's order on March 3, 2009, and issued its Mandate on March 27, 2015. Resp. Ex. DD

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action is timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can "adequately assess [Chase's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court recently stated:

[T]he federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct.1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a "contrary to" clause and an "unreasonable application" clause. The "contrary to" clause allows for relief only "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The "unreasonable application" clause allows for relief only "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous factual determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal courts to grant relief only if the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined § 2254(d)(2)'s "precise relationship" to § 2254(e)(1), which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the state court's factual findings "by clear and convincing evidence." SeeBurt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accordBrumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that "precise relationship" may be, "'a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would

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