Chase v. State

• Decision Date: 27 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 82S00-8608-CR-751,82S00-8608-CR-751
• Parties: Charles CHASE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 784

528 N.E.2d 784

Charles CHASE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 82S00-8608-CR-751.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Sept. 27, 1988.

James L. Kiely, Evansville, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

This is a direct appeal following conviction, in a trial by jury, of the offenses of Dealing in a Schedule II Controlled Substance, a class B felony, and Conspiracy to Deal in a Schedule II Controlled Substance, a class B felony. Appellant received twenty year concurrent sentences for each offense.

There are two issues presented for review: (1) whether appellant's incriminating statements to two law enforcement officers were improperly admitted into evidence; and (2) whether reversible error resulted from exclusion of utility bill records.

These are the facts pertinent to this appeal: In May of 1985 two undercover police officers arranged to purchase methamphetamine, commonly called crank, from Tammy Riley. Cynthia Colleen Roth brought the methamphetamine to Riley's house and was introduced as Riley's source's "old lady". Roth was living with appellant and driving his car at the time. The two women were arrested shortly thereafter. Following Roth's arrest, appellant separately contacted a police officer and a federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officer. He informed them that Roth had acted for him in selling the methamphetamine and offered to give his biggest drug connection in exchange for Roth's release. Appellant was later charged with these offenses based upon his own statements to the law enforcement officers and Tammy Riley's statements indicating she arranged the drug deal with appellant and that Roth, appellant's girlfriend, just delivered the methamphetamine. Roth denied appellant's involvement in the drug transaction.

I.

Police officer Wilkins and federal DEA officer McGivney were permitted to testify concerning their conversations with appellant wherein he informed them Roth was acting as a courier for him and offered his biggest drug connection in exchange for her release. Appellant urges that admission of his statements to the officers amounted to impermissible admission of protected plea negotiations, citing I.C. Sec. 35-35-3-4. Appellant describes the conversations which took place as attempts to negotiate a plea agreement for himself and Roth.

I.C. Sec. 35-35-3-4 provides:

"A plea agreement, or a verbal or written communication concerning the plea agreement, may not be admitted into evidence at the trial of the case, should the plea agreement not culminate in approval by the court."

The principle expressed by the statute cited by appellant has been recognized by case law as well. In general, the law in Indiana is that statements made by the defendant as part of plea negotiations are not admissible in the trial of the charge following a plea of not guilty. Wright v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 327, 363 N.E.2d 1221. Hineman v. State (1973), 155 Ind.App. 292 N.E.2d 618. Moulder v. State (1972), 154 Ind.App. 248, 289 N.E.2d 522. However, statements made by a person prior to the existence of any charge against him to a police officer who has no authority to enter into a binding agreement are not part of the plea bargaining process.

The plea bargaining process does not start until persons having the authority to make a binding agreement have agreed to negotiate. There must be an agreement, a meeting of the minds, after the leveling of a felony or misdemeanor charge, to enter into plea negotiations. A unilateral offer of evidence to induce a party to negotiate is not protected.

The purpose of I.C. Sec. 35-35-3-4 and the foundation of the case law is not to facilitate the solution of unsolved crimes. It is not a beckoning to the public to come forward and confess. Rather, the purpose is to facilitate final disposition of felony and misdemeanor charges and such charges must exist at the time of the communications for the cloak of the rule to apply. The purpose is to free the process of negotiation from legal consequences.

In the case before us, there was no felony or misdemeanor charge lodged against app...