Chase v. State
| Decision Date | 07 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-DP-00750-SCT,96-DP-00750-SCT |
| Citation | 699 So.2d 521 |
| Parties | Ricky CHASE v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Cynthia A. Stewart, Thomas E. Royals & Associates, Jackson, for Appellant.
Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Jackson, Leslie S. Lee and Marvin L. White, Jr., Special Asst. Attys. Gen., Jackson, for Appellee.
En Banc.
SMITH, Justice, for the Court:
¶1 Ricky Chase was convicted in February 1990 of capital murder for the robbery and murder of Elmer Hart outside Hazelhurst in Copiah County. His conviction and death sentence were affirmed by this Court in Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, Chase v. Mississippi, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995). Chase filed his Application for Leave to File Motion to Vacate Judgment and Death Sentence in this Court on July 15, 1996. Chase's Application raises the following issues:
I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO PRESENT MITIGATION EVIDENCE CONCERNING CHASE'S MENTAL RETARDATION.
II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF RETARDATION AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING OR AT TRIAL TO EXPLAIN CHASE'S PARTICULAR VULNERABILITY TO POLICE COERCION.
III. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO REQUEST FUNDS FOR A BLOOD SPLATTER EXPERT.
IV. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO SUBPOENA LESLIE BROWN FOR THE HEARING ON THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO ASK FOR A CONTINUANCE OF THE HEARING.
V. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL STRIKES AGAINST FEMALES.
VI. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE EXCUSAL OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY.
VII. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN NOT ONLY FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, BUT IN ELICITING EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES.
VIII. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO OBJECT TO IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE VICTIM AND ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE JURY'S DUTY TO RETURN A DEATH SENTENCE.
IX. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ARGUING THAT HIS CLIENT WAS GUILTY.
X. TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE SUBMISSION OF THE "AVOIDING ARREST" AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
XI. TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE SUBMISSION OF THE "PECUNIARY GAIN" AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OR THE LACK OF AN INSTRUCTION DEFINING "CAPITAL MURDER FOR PECUNIARY GAIN" AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL.
XII. TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE LACK OF AN INSTRUCTION DEFINING "CAPITAL MURDER FOR PECUNIARY GAIN" AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL.
XIII. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR SUBMISSION OF AN INSTRUCTION ON MITIGATING EVIDENCE.
XIV. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO OBJECT TO LANGUAGE IN THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION WHICH PREVENTED THE JURY FROM GIVING EFFECT TO THAT INSTRUCTION.
XV. THE COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT ITS STATUTORILY REQUIRED SENTENCING REVIEW.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2 Ricky Chase and Robert Washington were involved in the robbery of an elderly couple, Doris and Elmer Hart, at their home outside Hazlehurst on August 14, 1989. It was admitted that the two overpowered Mrs. Hart and then took certain items, mostly guns and money, from the home. Chase and Washington each stated that the other was the mastermind of the robbery and each named the other as the one who actually shot and killed Elmer Hart, who came home during the robbery. Washington pled guilty, received a life sentence and testified against Chase.
¶3 Almost all of Ricky Chase's petition is based on allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Jeffrey Varas and M.A. Bass. The primary authority on this matter is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691-92, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2065, 2065, 2066, 2066-67, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), where the United State Supreme Court provided the following standards:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious ....
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.
These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance. In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances....
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.
....
Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the range of professionally competent assistance. In making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.
....
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.
....
[In order to prove prejudice] [t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable (citations omitted).
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
¶4 In November 1989, defense counsel moved in November 1989 to have the circuit court provide funding for an investigator and a clinical psychiatrist/expert to aid the defense. This motion specifically stated:
In anticipation of a potential sentencing trial in the bifurcated proceedings, Defendant requires the services of a qualified clinical psychiatrist to examine the Defendant, his history and record, in order to be fully prepared to testify at trial as to mitigating factors. Substantial evidence exists that is likely to prove the existence of mitigating factors enumerated in Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-19-101(6) as well as others not statutorily enumerated.
¶5 The circuit court granted the motion as to the psychiatrist. Chase...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Edwards v. State, 97-DP-00566-SCT.
...a reasonable doubt outweigh the mitigating circumstances following the statute. Wiley, 484 So.2d at 352. See also Chase v. State, 699 So.2d 521, 544-45 (Miss.1997). There is no merit to this assignment of 7. s 131. Edwards assigns as error the trial court's instructions to the jury during t......
-
Gray v. State, 96-DP-00241-SCT.
...to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)." Chase v. State, 699 So.2d 521, 537 (Miss. 1997). Further, the State submits the impact of the murder on the victim's family is part of the crime committed by the defendant. The ......
-
Walker v. State
...A claim of ineffectiveness cannot be based on trial counsel's failure to anticipate a future change in the law. See Chase v. State, 699 So.2d 521, 542-43 (Miss.1997). Therefore, Walker cannot demonstrate deficient performance in trial counsel's failure to object. Further, since the granting......
-
Galloway v. State
...who is faced with a rebuttable presumption that trial counsel is competent and his performance was not deficient. Chase v. State, 699 So.2d 521, 526 (Miss.1997). Additionally, Galloway must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the errors of his counsel, the judgment wou......