Chase v. State

Decision Date31 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. 1394, Sept. Term, 2014.,1394, Sept. Term, 2014.
PartiesIra CHASE v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Mark Colvin (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Jason J. George (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: MEREDITH, BERGER, JAMES A. KENNEY, III (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion

KENNEY, J.

Appellant, Ira Chase, was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland, and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and related offenses. After his motion to suppress was denied, he entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute pursuant to Maryland Rule 4–242(d). He was sentenced to one year, all suspended, and was placed on probation for one year. In his timely appeal, he presents the following question for our review:

Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress?

For the following reasons, we shall affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Suppression Hearing

Detective Andrew Melnyk, and his partner, Detective Young,1 assigned to the Vice/Narcotics Section of the Baltimore County Police Department for the last six months prior to the hearing, were on patrol on September 10, 2013, in the Security Boulevard section of the county, close to Interstates 70 and 695. This area, according to Detective Melnyk, was known for “illicit narcotic activity.”

That evening, the detectives went to the Days Inn hotel, located on Whitehead Court in Baltimore County, Maryland.2 Detective Melnyk knew this particular hotel from working patrol in the area since 2008, and that the hotel was located in a “high area of drug trafficking.” He also testified, with respect to the hotel, that he had “participated in numerous search warrants and apprehensions resulting in the seizure of illicit drugs and U.S. currency, as well as weapons.”

They pulled into the Days Inn parking lot at around 6:45 p.m. and noticed a white Jeep Cherokee backed into a parking spot on the lot. The occupant of the Jeep, later identified as appellant, was talking on his cell phone. About two minutes later, a Lexus backed adjacent to the Jeep, taking up two designated spots, despite the fact that the remainder of the parking lot was virtually empty. The driver of the Lexus exited his vehicle and got into the passenger side of the Jeep.

Detective Melnyk testified, over a general objection, that based on a forty hour narcotics investigator class, as well as a weeklong class at the Academy for drug identification and characteristics of people involved in distribution of narcotics, that individuals will use vehicles “to conceal the transactions from law enforcement,” and will operate from a “hotel to conceal the identity of their home address.” Although not testifying as an expert, Detective Melnyk, based on his experience in the Vice/Narcotics Unit, testified:

So with the Defendant in his vehicle, as well as the Lexus pulling in and the driver of the Lexus getting out of his vehicle into the Defendant's vehicle, as well as the area that they're in, it's a known high drug area, they did not utilize any services of the Days Inn, which is where they were parked. We believed that there was illegal drug activity taking place, or criminal activity at that matter.

Within five minutes after entering the Days Inn lot, at approximately 6:50 p.m., the two detectives decided to approach the Jeep to investigate and “detained both occupants” based on reasonable articulable suspicion that they were involved in illegal activity. Detective Melnyk explained:

We noticed, as we were approaching the vehicle, the driver specifically, as well as the passenger, they were moving, looks like they were moving things around there, reaching under the seat. The passenger immediately put his hands in his pocket. At that point, for the safety of myself and Detective Young, they were requested to exit the vehicle and we put them in handcuffs just to make sure they didn't have any weapons and detaining them. They were not free to leave. The, the reason for the handcuffs were solely based on the safety of everyone involved, based on the furtive movements that we observed inside the vehicle as we were approaching the vehicle.

Appellant and the driver of the Lexus, Michael DeLillo, III, were patted down and read their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The pat down revealed no weapons. DeLillo stated that he was at the hotel to meet some unidentified individual named “Phil” to watch an Orioles game. Appellant indicated that he was going to meet his cousin at the Maryland Live Casino. During this conversation, appellant was “very irate,” and claimed “that he had done nothing wrong.” On cross-examination, Detective Melnyk reaffirmed that both individuals were being detained and were not free to leave at this time.

At this point, approximately 6:52 p.m., Detective Melnyk contacted police dispatch to request that a K–9 unit respond to the scene. The K–9 arrived within minutes, and at 7:00 p.m., the dog alerted on the passenger side door of the Jeep. Appellant was then placed under arrest and was searched incident to the arrest. Police recovered some currency and a Days Inn room key, but no drugs were found on his person or in his Jeep.

DeLillo was also arrested and when he was searched, police recovered fourteen grams of cocaine, valued at around $700 to $900. DeLillo later spoke to police and, in a written statement, confirmed that he was in the parking lot for the sole purpose of obtaining 3.5 grams of cocaine. He brought $345 to make that purchase, but appellant gave him 14 grams of cocaine instead.

Both appellant's and DeLillo's cell phones were also seized incident to their arrest. DeLillo's phone contained text messages indicating that he was obtaining quantities of “girl.” Detective Melnyk testified, based on his training, knowledge and experience, that “girl,” referred to cocaine powder. Some of the text messages were with “Fat Boy,” which police determined was appellant's nickname. Once the police confirmed that the room key found on appellant's person was for a room at the Days Inn, they applied for, and obtained, a search warrant for that room.

After hearing argument, the court denied the motion to suppress, stating:

Okay. It's a very interesting case. I'm familiar with all the cases you've handed up, [Prosecutor]. The Carter case is of particular interest, it's one of Judge Moylan's shorter opinions. The man was stopped or he wasn't stopped, he's already parked under the policeman's observation when the other car pulls in. They're backed in next to each other, it's a high crime area. I'm familiar with the area. I don't know how many cases I've had from that side of town involving drugs. They're in the parking lot of the hotel, nobody gets out of the car, goes into a hotel, don't do anything except meet each other at a car. The furtive acts give me some concern because of the officers ['] safety. They see this going on inside the vehicle as they're approaching. The inconsistent stories, you know, one's watching the ballgame, the other one is going to Maryland Live Casino. I think that's what really triggered the call for the K–9 to come out and it was fairly quick after they were stopped. I believe the K–9 arrived within ten minutes of the police approaching the vehicle to begin with. I think it is a classic Terry case, (inaudible) to the high crime in the area, drugs, we know that guns are involved with drugs. So I can understand the concern for officers' safety. The dog alerts on the side of the vehicle that Mr. DeLillo just got out of and he's the one who later on states, you know, I came to buy an eight ball to get, got fourteen grams, got more than he came for. Certainly, got more than he came for when he got the cuffs on him. I believe I don't have any choice but to deny your Motion, [Defense Counsel]. I think it's a good stop, it's a good search. I was concerned about the cuffs going on when they went on and the comments that were made by the two gentlemen were after they were read Miranda. They were Mirandized right away. I know you disagree with me, Mr. [Chase], you've been sitting there shaking your head sideways since you came in the door today. The Motion to Suppress is denied....
Conditional Guilty Plea

With the consent of the court and the State, Chase entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute pursuant to Maryland Rule 4–242(d). The prosecutor summarized the factual basis for the guilty plea as follows:

Your Honor, the summary of the facts in support of the conditional guilty plea that I provided the court are as, are as follows: On September 10th of 2013, Baltimore County police were on undercover surveillance on Whitehead Court in Baltimore County. They know this to be a high crime, high drug area. When they saw what they believed to be a hand to hand drug transaction, they stopped the parties involved. One of those parties was identified as this Defendant, Ira Chase, to my left and with counsel before you. There was a series of incidents and conversations that eventually led to a search warrant of a room that was associated with Mr. Chase. He was associated to that room by the staff of the Days Inn, as well as by a key that was found on his person. Search of that room yielded a large amount of cocaine, a schedule two, controlled dangerous substance, specifically one hundred and eight grams along with unused sandwich baggies, a digital scale and other indicia that to an expert in the sale of packaging, distribution of street level narcotics would indicate that the items found in a room associated to Mr. Chase and in his possession would be possessed with the intent to distribute.

Based on the statement of facts, the court found Chase guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

DISCUSSION

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