Chase v. Stockett

• Decision Date: 19 March 1890
• Citation: 19 A. 761,72 Md. 235
• Parties: CHASE ET AL. v. STOCKETT ET AL.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

19 A. 761

72 Md. 235

CHASE ET AL. v. STOCKETT ET AL.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 19, 1890

Appeal from circuit court, Anne Arundel county.

A devise of a house, "together with the furniture therein," excepting family portraits and silver ware will pass the china and plated ware found in the house. The following is the opinion of the lower court:

"Miller, J. By the bill and proceedings in this case, several questions of interest and importance are presented, arising out of the construction and effect of the will of Mrs. Hester Ann Ridout. The will was executed on the 24th of May, 1886, and the testatrix died on the 13th of December, 1888. By the will, which was admitted to probate on the 18th of December, 1888, the testatrix makes several devises of real estate, and gives a legacy of $10,000 to her cousin Mrs. Harwood, about which there is no dispute. The clauses of the will which give rise to controversy are the ninth and eleventh, and these will be considered in their order:

(1) By the ninth clause, the testatrix, after expressing her desire to 'establish a home for destitute, aged, and infirm women, where they may find a retreat from the vicissitudes of life, and to endow the same, as far as my means will allow, to be called and known as the "Chase Home," ' devises to eight named persons, and to their heirs, successors, and assigns, 'all that lot of ground on Maryland avenue, in the city of Annapolis, together with all the buildings and improvements thereon, where I now reside, (not including any of the lots, parts of said property, which have been heretofore leased or sold,) together with the furniture which may be in said house at the time of my death, not including, however, family portraits and silver-ware, in trust, to be held by them and their successors for the objects and purposes of such home.' She then devised to the same trustees certain real estate in the city of Baltimore, to be held by them 'as an endowment or fund to be used and applied, as to the rents, issues, and profits thereof, for the support and maintenance of the before-mentioned Chase Home, in such manner as may seem best to them, or a majority of them.' This is all of the clause--a very long one--which, according to my view of the case, it is necessary to quote at present. But for the recent action of the legislature, I should be compelled to declare this devise for the establishment of a most admirable charity invalid, by reason of the uncertainty as to the beneficiaries entitled to enjoy it. According to a long line of decisions by the court of appeals, a devise for the benefit of 'destitute, aged, and infirm women' is void for uncertainty. Happily, however, the legislature has at last intervened, and by the passage of the act of 1888, c. 249, § 2, has declared that 'no devise or bequest of real or personal property, for any charitable uses, shall be deemed or held to be void by reason of any uncertainty with respect to the donees thereof: provided, the will or codicil making the same shall also contain directions for the formation of a corporation to take the same, and within the period of twelve calendar months from the grant of probate of such will or codicil a corporation shall be formed in correspondence with such directions, capable and willing to receive and administer such devise or bequest.' This law went into effect on the 4th of April, 1888, and of course operates upon this will, the testatrix having died on the 13th of December following. To my mind it is perfectly clear that it was the purpose of the legislature in passing this act to abolish, under certain conditions, the rule as to uncertainty, in obedience to which so many devises to charitable uses have been stricken down by the courts.

"The question, then, is, have the conditions prescribed by the statute been complied with in this case? As to this I have no doubt. In the same clause the testatrix says: 'And I hereby will and direct, and fully authorize and empower, the said trustees, if in their judgment they may think best, to become a body corporate, either under a special charter from the legislature of this state, or under the general incorporation laws of this state, and, whether as trustees under this will or by incorporation, to make, ordain, and declare whatever rules, regulations, ordinances, or by-laws as they may deem best for the better government and advancement of the home: provided, always, that nothing in such charter or incorporation, rules or by-laws, shall conflict with the provisions of such trust as declared by this will.' This, as it seems to me, is a substantial, if not a literal, compliance with the conditions of the statute. The law cannot mean that the corporation provided for shall be created only by special act of the legislature, for this would nullify its operation as to all wills which might be admitted to probate after an adjournment of the legislature, and more than twelve months before its next session. Nor do I think there is any force in the objection that this corporation, under the general law, is limited in duration to the period of 40 years. It is capable and willing to take now; and what may become of this property in case its charter is not extended and made perpetual by the legislature, it will be time enough to decide when such an improbable event occurs. I am therefore clearly of opinion that the devise of this real estate under this clause of the will, for the benefit of this charity, is valid.

Another question arising under this clause is, does the china and plated ware, found in the house in which the testatrix resided, pass under the terms, 'together with the furniture which may be in said house at the time of my decease, not including, however, family portraits and silver-ware?' As to this, also, I have no doubt. The china and plated ware clearly passed. The terms 'furniture' or 'household furniture,' when not associated with less comprehensive words, embrace everything in the house that has usually been enjoyed therewith, and in this case would have passed the portraits and silver-ware, had they not been expressly excepted. 2 Jarm. Wills, 352, note C; Kelly v. Powlet, 2 Amb. 605; Nicholls v. Osborn, 2 P. Wms. 419; Carnagy v. Woodcock, 2 Munf. 234; Richardson v. Hall, 124 Mass. 237; Dayton v. Tillou, 1 Rob. (N. Y.) 21.

The remaining question under this clause is, does what is called the 'Ringgold Lot' pass under the devise of 'all that lot of ground on Maryland avenue, in the city of Annapolis, together with all the buildings and improvements thereon, where I now reside, (not including any of the lots parts of said property, which have been heretofore leased or sold?)' In my opinion, it does not, because it is clearly embraced in the exception. The property here mentioned, whereon the house in which the testatrix resided stands, fronts on Maryland avenue, and extends from King George street to Prince George street, with a uniform depth of about 180 feet. The house spoken of is near the King George street end of the property, and from the Prince George street end the testatrix, prior to the execution of her will, had, in conjunction with other then joint owners of the same, leased under perpetual leases, and sold off, several lots to different parties, on some of which houses have been built. Among the lots so leased is the one in question to Mr. Ringgold. It has a front of 40 feet on Maryland avenue, and extends back about 180 feet. The lease is for 99 years, renewable forever, reserving a ground-rent; was executed on the 15th of March, 1883; and was a valid subsisting lease at the time the will was executed. This lot, therefore, comes within the express terms of the exception. But parol proof has been introduced to show that, before she executed her will, the testatrix had been negotiating with Mr. Ringgold for the purchase of his leasehold interest, had expressed her determination to repurchase the lot at any price, and had declared her intention that it should go to the Chase Home. This testimony has been excepted to, and I cannot think it admissible. Parol proof is always admissible to apply the language of a will to its subject-matter, but, when this is done, such proof is never admissible to show that the testator intended to do somethíng different from what the language of his will plainly expresses. In Walston v. White, 5 Md. 297, a testator devised all his land called 'Parson's Outlet,' lying on the south side of a certain road, 'except so much of said land as lies south of Beaver Dam branch,' and the court held that extrinsic evidence was admissible to show the location of the land, but not to show what was the intention of the testator in the use of the words 'Beaver Dam branch.' 'The rule,' says the court, 'is this: Where the language of the testator is plain and unambiguous, such language must govern, and therefore extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that he meant something different from what his language imports; but any evidence is admissible which in its nature and effect simply explains what the testator has written. In other words, the question in expounding a will is not what the testator meant, as distinguished from what his words express, but simply what is the meaning of his words; and extrinsic evidence, in aid of the exposition of his will, must be admissible or inadmissible with reference to its bearing upon the issue which this question raises.' Now, to apply this rule to this case. I think it quite impossible for any one to contend that there is any ambiguity in the language of this exception. It seems to me that, if any language can be plain and unambiguous, it is the language here used. It excepts and excludes, from the operation of this devise to the trustees, 'any of the lots, parts...