Chass v. United States

• Decision Date: 26 June 1919
• Docket Number: 2476.
• Citation: 258 F. 911
• Parties: CHASS v. UNITED STATES. [1]
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

258 F. 911

CHASS v. UNITED STATES. ^[1]

No. 2476.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

June 26, 1919

H. P Lindabury, of Newark, N.J., for plaintiff in error.

Samuel I. Kessler, of Newark, N.J., for the United States.

Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLY, and HAIGHT, Circuit Judges.

HAIGHT Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff in error, Philip Chass, and one Louis Rubin were convicted under an indictment which charged them with having violated an act approved on February 13, 1913 (37 Stat.L 670, c. 50 (Comp. St. Secs. 8603, 8604)), in that they feloniously had in their possession certain rolls or bolts of plush, which had theretofore been stolen while constituting a part of an interstate shipment of freight, knowing the same to have been stolen. Upon motion, the learned trial judge set aside the conviction of Rubin and granted a new trial to him but declined to accord like treatment to Chass. It is not questioned that the goods were in the actual possession of the latter at the time alleged in the indictment, nor was any attempt made during the trial to controvert that part of the evidence produced by the government which clearly warranted the inference that the goods, while in the possession of the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company, and constituting a part of an interstate shipment of freight, were stolen from a railway car. The only alleged error now relied upon is the refusal of the court below to direct a verdict of acquittal as to Chass at the close of the whole case, upon the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to justify a finding that he had knowledge, when the goods came into his possession, that they had been stolen. There was, it is true no direct evidence that he had such knowledge. But after a careful examination of the record, and bearing in mind the rule that to justify a conviction of crime on circumstantial evidence, the latter must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt (Hart v. United States, 84 F. 799, 808, 28 C.C.A. 612 (C.C.A.3d Cir.)); Glass v. U.S., 231 F. 65, 68, 145 C.C.A. 253 (C.C.A.3d Cir)), we think that the inference could be legitimately drawn, from all the facts and circumstances which the testimony discloses, that he did have the requisite knowledge. Without even attempting to summarize all of the evidence or to point out the conflicts and contradictions therein, or attempted explanations of some incriminating facts, and lack of explanation of others, we are of the opinion that it was permissible for the jury to find therefrom the following salient facts: On March 6, 1918 Baxter, Kelly & Faust, manufacturers of plush in the city of Philadelphia, delivered 12 rolls or bolts of embossed plush, designed to be used for lining coffins, and aggregating something over 750 yards, to the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company, at one of its stations in that city, to be delivered by freight to the National Casket Company at East Cambridge, Mass. During the same day, and while the car in which the goods were loaded was lying at one of the freightyards of the railway company in Philadelphia, it was broken into, and these rolls of plush stolen. About two months later they were found in the possession of the plaintiff in error (hereafter referred to as the defendant), under the circumstances to be hereinafter mentioned. The defendant had come to this country from Russia about five years before that time, and at first had 'worked at pants,' then had peddled paper bags and twine among retail grocers and small merchants. Subsequently he had been employed for about two years by his brother-in-law Rubin, when the latter was engaged in the dress business, and for about two months preceding the robbery he had been engaged in the same business on his own account. About the 1st of March, 1918, he embarked on what he termed the business of ...