Chasse v. Commisioner, Civil No. 01-92-B-S (D. Me. 10/11/2001), Civil No. 01-92-B-S.
| Decision Date | 11 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 01-92-B-S. |
| Parties | MICHAEL L. CHASSE, Petitioner, v. CORRECTIONS, STATE OF MAINE COMMISSIONER, Respondent. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Court (Maine) |
Michael L. Chasse filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this court on May 14, 2001. (Docket No. 1.) He raised two grounds in his motion. The State filed its response on June 25, 2001. (Docket No. 3.) I now recommend that the court DENY the petition.
The events giving rise to Chasse's criminal charges merit little discussion in the context of Chasse's current challenge. In February of 1997 the police responded to a call from a residence in Brewer, Maine. Upon arrival, the police found the homeowner on the lawn holding a gun and Chasse inside the house lying on the floor with a knife nearby. From that scenario the charges against Chasse for robbery, assault, and burglary emerged.
The crucial facts for purposes of this petition arose during Chasse's trial in November of 1998, in Dover-Foxcroft, Maine. These facts are taken from the Maine Supreme Court's recitation of the facts, from the trial transcripts, and from an original videotape filed with this court. On the fourth day of his jury trial Chasse escaped from custody during his walk between the jail and the courthouse. A local television station captured the escape on video. Defense counsel sought a continuance and a new trial based on Chasse's absence and his resulting inability to testify. (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 18, 31 & 34.) After viewing the videotape, the court determined that Chasse voluntarily escaped and voluntarily absented himself from the trial proceedings. (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 17 & 30.) The prosecutor and defense counsel discussed with the court the possible duration of Chasse's absence given the police search in a heavily wooded area and Chasse's potential access to a vehicle. (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 19 & 33.) Although the trial judge delayed proceedings for a couple of hours, he ultimately denied the motions for continuance and a mistrial after conducting a voir dire of the jury and satisfying himself that they were not aware of the escape. (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 30, 34-37.)
The judge informed the jury that Chasse had elected not to be present during the ensuing proceedings and instructed the jury to accord no weight to this fact. (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 37.) The trial proceeded, the State having rested the day before this incident. Chasse's attorney called his last remaining witness who, during the course of his testimony, mentioned that Chasse had "run away." (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 53.) The trial judge denied a second defense motion for a mistrial. (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 55.) Both sides rested. (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 58.)
Later that day, during a conference of counsel with the court, word reached the courthouse that Chasse had been recaptured. Chasse's attorney moved to reopen the evidence (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 63), but the court denied the motion, again finding that Chasse had waived his right to testify by his voluntary absence. (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 64.) Further, the court expressed concern that if the trial were recessed over the weekend the jury could potentially become tainted by exposure to the videotaped escape. (See id.) The trial reconvened in the late afternoon for closing arguments, with Chasse back in attendance. The jury was again instructed to draw no inference from the defendant's presence or absence in the courtroom. (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 67.)
On November 6, 1998, the jury found Chasse guilty of robbery (Class A) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 651(1)(D)(West 1983), conspiracy to commit robbery (Class B) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 151, 651(1)(B)(1) (West 1983), aggravated assault (Class B) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208(1)(B)(West 1983),1 and burglary (Class B) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 401(1) (West 1983). (T. Tr. Vol. IV at 106.) On November 16, 1998, Chasse filed a timely motion for new trial that the trial court denied. On April 2, 1999, the court sentenced Chasse to twelve years on the robbery conviction, imposing lesser concurrent sentences on the three other offenses. Following his sentencing, Chasse filed an application to allow an appeal of the sentences imposed pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2151 (West Supp. 1998) and Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 40(b). Leave to appeal from sentence was denied.
In 1998 Chasse pursued a direct appeal from the criminal judgments to the Maine upreme Court sitting as the Law Court, arguing that (1) the court denied him his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf, (2) he was unduly prejudiced by his appearance in prisoner garb before the jury following his escape and capture during the trial, (3) he was placed in double jeopardy by being convicted of both robbery and aggravated assault based on the same facts, (4) the court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion for a mistrial, and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of Class A robbery. State v. Chasse, 2000 ME 90, ¶ 1, 750 A.2d 586, 588. On May 17, 2000, the Maine Law Court rejected Chasse's contentions and denied his direct appeal. See id. ¶¶ 8-14, 750 A.2d at 589-91.
Chasse filed this petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 14, 2001. He raises two of the grounds previously considered by the Law Court: (1) he was denied his right to testify on his own behalf at trial and (2) his robbery and assault convictions violate the Double Jeopardy prohibition. After Chasse filed this petition, he filed a "Petition for Post-Conviction Review" in the state court pursuant to Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 66 and 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 2121 et seq. (West Supp. 2000), asserting some twelve different grounds, including the two claims he asserts here. The state court summarily dismissed all of his claims except three that allege ineffective assistance of counsel and failure of the State to provide discovery. (Post-Conviction Assignment Order, CR-2001-00023, June 5, 2001). Chasse's petition for post-conviction review is pending on three issues in the state court. Chasse is currently in custody in actual execution of the four concurrent terms of imprisonment.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and § 2244(d)(1) a federal writ of habeas corpus can only be granted if a petitioner has exhausted the available state court remedies and has filed the federal habeas petition within the statute of limitations. Chasse appealed his conviction to the highest state court in 1998 and has since filed a petition for state post-conviction review. The two claims Chasse asserts in support of his petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus were considered and rejected by the Maine Law Court on appeal and summarily dismissed by the state court during post-conviction review. Chasse, 2000 ME 90, 750 A.2d 586; (Post-Conviction Assignment Order, CR-2001-00023, June 5, 2001). The State generally concedes that Chasse has fairly presented both of his constitutional claims to the Maine trial and appellate courts before seeking relief from this court and that the two claims have been exhausted. (Resp. at 13 — 14.) Thus, in this instance, § 2254(b)(1) does not prohibit Chasse from proceeding in this court on these two claims.
Chasse could have elected to avail himself of federal habeas review after all of his post-conviction review claims are exhausted.2 Had Chasse waited to file this petition, the statute of limitations would have been tolled by § 2244(d)(2) during the pendency of his state collateral attack. If he later attempts to file a second or successive petition in this court, he will be restrained by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(4). Although the State raised this concern in its answer, Chasse has never responded to the issue by moving to stay this action or requesting that it be voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. The claims Chasse raises are before the court for decision and this court should not sua sponte decline to act on Chasse's fully exhausted first petition.
Chasse's petition is timely. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), Chasse had to file this petition within one year of the date his criminal judgment became final. "Finality" within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1) means final disposition of any direct appeal to the state court of last resort and the conclusion of certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court, or the running of the time within which to seek the same. Nichols v. Bowersox, 172 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 1999). Although Chasse did not seek certiorari review to the United States Supreme Court, the 90-day period for seeking that review expired on August 5, 2000. Therefore, Chasse's petition filed May 14, 2001, was well within the statute of limitations.
According to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) habeas corpus relief can only be granted when the state court's decision (1) is contrary to federal law or involves an unreasonable application of federal law; or (2) is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The applicable "federal law" is that law which is "clearly established" by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Under the "contrary to" clause, a writ may be granted "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000) ( 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Chasse's petition does not attack his convictions on the ground that the Maine Court incorrectly decided a question of law. The state court's decision to deny Chasse's motion to reopen his case is not contrary to...
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