Chassereau v. Global Sun Pools, Inc., No. 26318.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: Toal
• Citation: 644 S.E.2d 718
• Docket Number: No. 26318.
• Decision Date: 23 April 2007
• Parties: Vicki F. CHASSEREAU, Respondent, v. GLOBAL-SUN POOLS, INC. and Ken Darwin, Petitioners.

644 S.E.2d 718 Vicki F. CHASSEREAU, Respondent,
v.
GLOBAL-SUN POOLS, INC. and Ken Darwin, Petitioners. No. 26318. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard February 13, 2007. Decided April 23, 2007.

[644 S.E.2d 719]

Michael H. Montgomery and Frank S. Potts, both of Montgomery Patterson Potts & Willard, of Columbia, for Petitioners.

John E. Parker and Lee D. Cope, both of Peters Murdaugh Parker Eltzroth & Detrick, of Hampton, for Respondent.

Chief Justice TOAL.

This case involves the interpretation of an arbitration agreement. The trial court denied Petitioners' motion to compel arbitration of several claims Respondent asserted as a result of Petitioners' aggressive debt collection practices, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. We granted certiorari, and we now affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 2003, Respondent Vicki Chassereau ("Chassereau") contracted with Petitioner Global Sun Pools ("Global-Sun") to purchase an above ground pool. Chassereau contends that sometime thereafter, the pool began malfunctioning or was otherwise in need of repair. After Global-Sun allegedly refused to remedy the problems, Chassereau ceased making payments on the pool.

According to Chassereau, Petitioner Ken Darwin ("Darwin"), an employee of Global-Sun, began systematically harassing her as a result of her cessation of payments on the pool. Specifically, Chassereau alleges that Darwin repeatedly phoned her at her workplace; disclosed private information to Chassereau's friends, relatives, and co-workers; and also made false and defamatory statements about Chassereau to these same people. Ultimately, Chassereau sued Darwin and Global-Sun for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-17-430 (2003) (defining the criminal offense of "unlawful communication").

Global-Sun and Darwin moved to compel arbitration of Chassereau's claims, arguing principally that two documents executed during the course of the sale of the pool required that these claims be arbitrated.¹ The trial court disagreed and denied the motion to compel arbitration. Global-Sun and Darwin appealed.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Chassereau v. Global-Sun Pools, Inc., 363 S.C. 628, 611 S.E.2d 305 (2005). In determining whether Chassereau's claims were required to be arbitrated, the court of appeals examined only the arbitration clause contained in the Installation Agreement. Id. at 633 n. 8, 611 S.E.2d at 307 n. 8. The court held that because the trial court's order relied only on the arbitration clause in the Installation Agreement, any argument regarding the arbitration clause contained in the Financing Agreement was not preserved for review. Id. Ultimately, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court's conclusion that Chassereau's claims were "based upon tortious conduct of the employees of [Global-Sun Pools] unrelated to the contract," and that the claims did not arise out of or relate to the contract. Id. at 635, 611 S.E.2d at 308. Accordingly, the court held that the arbitration clause in the Installation

644 S.E.2d 720

Agreement did not require that Chassereau's claims be arbitrated. Id.

Global-Sun and Darwin unsuccessfully petitioned the court of appeals to supplement the record on appeal with the Financing Agreement and to grant rehearing in the matter. This Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision, and Global-Sun and Darwin present the following issue for review:

Did the court of appeals err in determining that the Installation Agreement's arbitration clause did not apply to Chassereau's claims?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Unless the parties provide otherwise, the question of the arbitrability of a claim is an issue for judicial determination. Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001). The determination of whether a claim is subject to arbitration is subject to de novo review. Wellman, Inc. v. Square D Co., 366 S.C. 61, 67, 620 S.E.2d 86, 89 (Ct.App.2005); United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir.2001). Nevertheless, a circuit court's factual findings will not be reversed on appeal if any evidence reasonably supports the findings. Thornton v. Trident Med. Ctr., L.L.C., 357 S.C. 91, 94, 592 S.E.2d 50, 51 (Ct.App.2003).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Global-Sun and Darwin argue that the court of appeals erred in determining that the Installation Agreement's arbitration clause did not apply to Chassereau's claims. We disagree.

Both state and federal policy favor arbitration of disputes. Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 596, 553 S.E.2d at 118. Unless a court can say with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to any interpretation that covers the dispute, arbitration should generally be ordered. Id. at 597, 553 S.E.2d at 118-119. However, arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to arbitrate any dispute which he has not agreed to arbitrate. Id. at 596, 553 S.E.2d at 118.

The resolution of this case is controlled by our recent pronouncement in Aiken v. World Finance Corporation of South Carolina, Op. No. 26313, 644 S.E.2d 705 (S.C. Sup.Ct. filed April 23, 2007). In that case, we refused to interpret an arbitration agreement with similar, though not identical, language to apply to illegal or outrageous acts that no reasonable person would have foreseen at the time the parties executed the agreement to arbitrate. We instructed:

Because even the most broadly-worded arbitration agreements still have limits founded in general principles of contract law, this Court will refuse to interpret any arbitration agreement as applying to...