Chastain v. State

• Decision Date: 14 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. S90A1190,S90A1190
• Citation: Chastain v. State, 400 S.E.2d 329, 260 Ga. 789 (Ga. 1991)
• Parties: CHASTAIN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 329

400 S.E.2d 329

260 Ga. 789

CHASTAIN v.The STATE.

No. S90A1190.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 14, 1991.

H.B. Edwards, III, Valdosta, for Chastain.

H. Lamar Cole, Dist. Atty., Valdosta, Charles M. Stines, Asst. Dist. Atty., Moultrie, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., C.A. Benjamin Woolf, Atty., State Law Dept., Atlanta, for the State.

FLETCHER, Justice.

James Pierre Chastain was convicted of one count of malice murder and one count of arson in the first degree in connection with the death of his first wife, Teresa Gail Chastain.¹He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder count and to twenty years, to be served consecutively, on the arson count.Chastain appeals and we affirm.

Chastain and the victim lived in a trailer located on a lot adjacent to the dairy where Chastain was employed at the time the crimes occurred.On June 18, 1979, Chastain arrived early for work and shortly thereafter his coworkers noticed that Chastain's trailer was on fire.Witnesses testified at trial that, although Chastain knew that his wife was in the burning trailer, Chastain seemed unconcerned and did not make much of an attempt to get into the trailer to save his wife.Chastain's wife died in the trailer fire.

Nearly a decade after the trailer fire, Chastain became a suspect in a fire that had severely damaged the home of his brother-in-law.While being questioned concerning the fire at his brother-in-law's home, Chastain made several statements in which he admitted to setting a number of fires in the area during the past decade, one of which was the trailer fire which had killed the victim, Teresa Chastain.

1.Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Chastain guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560(1979).

2.In his first enumeration of error, Chastain argues that the trial court erred by improperly admitting his confession and two letters written by him.We find this enumeration to be without merit.Supreme Court Rule 45 provides that enumerations of error will be deemed abandoned if they are not supported by argument or citation of authority.Because Chastain has provided no argument or citation of authority to support his contention that the two letters were improperly admitted, we deem that portion of his first enumeration abandoned.

As to the confession, the trial court conducted a Jackson-Denno hearing at which Chastain and two law enforcement officers testified.The trial court found that Chastain's free will, understanding and knowledge had not been adversely impacted by the delay between his arrest and his first appearance before a magistrate; nor did the delay render his confession involuntary.The trial court found that Chastain had been fully advised of his constitutional rights; that he understood those rights; that his confession was freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made; and that the confession had been made without any hope of benefit or fear of injury.The trial court also found that Chastain had not asked for an attorney at any time prior to or during the interview wherein his confession was made.

"Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal."Berry v. State, 254 Ga. 101, 104, 326 S.E.2d 748(1985).The trial court's ruling was not clearly erroneous.

3.In his second enumeration of error, Chastain contends that the trial court erred by partially denying his motion in limine wherein he sought to exclude all mention of seven similar, independent criminal offenses which the State notified Chastain it intended to proffer as evidence.The motion was granted as to one of the independent crimes but the State was allowed to use the six others and Chastain argues that their use was error.We disagree.

Generally, evidence of other independent crimes or acts committed by the defendant is inadmissible as it tends to put the defendant's character into evidence.State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 272 S.E.2d 321(1980).Exceptions to this rule permit evidence of independent crimes committed by the defendant to be admitted for the limited purposes of showing identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and/or course of conduct.Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 364, 271 S.E.2d 452(1980).

There are two conditions to admissibility.The first condition is that there must be some evidence establishing that the independent crime was committed by the defendant.The evidence may be circumstantial but it must be more than mere speculation.French v. State, 237 Ga. 620, 621, 229 S.E.2d 410(1976).See alsoWilliams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 784, 312 S.E.2d 40(1983).

The independent crimes of which the State was allowed to introduce evidence at trial were: (1) the 1977...