Chatten v. Snider
| Decision Date | 20 December 1890 |
| Docket Number | 14,598 |
| Citation | 26 N.E. 166,126 Ind. 387 |
| Parties | Chatten v. Snider |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Elkhart Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
H. D Wilson and W. J. Davis, for appellant.
W. L Stonex and E. E. Mummert, for appellee.
The complaint in this action sounds in tort. The appellant is sued in his individual capacity for an alleged wrong charged to have been committed under color of his office as sheriff of Elkhart county.
Three several errors are assigned: the first is that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint, and the second in sustaining the demurrer to the answer.
The third is embraced in the first and second, and need not be stated.
After carefully considering the complaint we are satisfied that it states a good cause of action.
It has been held many times by this court, since the adoption of our civil code, that nothing more than certainty to a common intent is required in a pleading.
The complaint under consideration comes up to this standard, and the facts stated disclose a cause of action.
It appears that Henry Bemenderfer, as executor of the last will of George A. Snider, on the 22d day of June, 1887, recovered a judgment in the Elkhart Circuit Court against the appellee for $ 2,070.43, and for costs, in an action on a promissory note executed by the appellee to the testator, and on the 14th day of February, 1888, execution issued upon the judgment, and was placed in the hands of the appellant as sheriff of said county; that, on the day of February, 1888 the appellant levied said execution upon certain real estate belonging to the appellee (describing it) of the value of $ 7,000; that the appellee was then, and still is, a resident householder of said county, and entitled to claim the benefit of the exemption laws of the State of Indiana, and on the 24th day of March, 1888, made out and delivered to the appellant an inventory covering the provisions of the statute, and demanded that all of his personal property contained in said schedule, amounting to $ 257 in value, be set off to him as exempt from execution, and also demanded that the appellant, after having made sale of said real estate, pay over to him the difference between the appraised value of said personal property, and the sum of $ 600 allowed him as exempt from execution, out of the proceeds of said sale; that at the same time the appellee demanded an appraisement of all of his property, and selected George Burhans, a disinterested householder of the neighborhood, as an appraiser, to act in his behalf in making said appraisement.
It is then averred that the appellant refused to recognize the appellee's claim to an exemption, and went on and sold said real estate, received the purchase-money therefor, and refuses to pay any part thereof to the appellee.
It appears that the judgment is founded upon a debt growing out of contract.
A promissory note is a contractual obligation, and, as already indicated, the judgment was rendered upon a promissory note.
We think it sufficiently appears that a demand was made in proper time, and that the appellee was entitled to some relief whether he was entitled to the $ 600 exemption claimed or only to a $ 300 exemption.
This brings us to the court's ruling, brought in question by the second alleged error.
The answer, in short, averred that the execution referred to in the complaint was an alias; that, as against the first or original execution, the appellee demanded an exemption of $ 600, and filed his inventory and schedule with the appellant, and, pursuant to such demand, $ 600 in personal property was set off and delivered to him, and the personal...
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H.C. Smith Coal Co. v. Finley
...against successive levies on the same judgment, in order to prevent an exhaustion of his property by judicial process (Chatten v. Snider, 126 Ind. 387, 390, 26 N. E. 166), he cannot successfully repeat his claim at various stages in the one proceeding. A cumulative exemption of that charact......
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H. C. Smith Coal Company v. Finley
... ... same judgment, in order to prevent an exhaustion of his ... property by judicial process (Chatten v ... Snider [1890], 126 Ind. 387, 390, 26 N.E. 166), he ... cannot successfully repeat his claim at various stages in the ... one proceeding. A ... ...
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Moss v. Jenkins
...Pickett, supra; Finley v. Sly, 44 Ind. 266;Douch v. Rahner, 61 Ind. 64; State v. Read, supra; Over v. Shannon, 91 Ind. 99;Chatten v. Snider, 126 Ind. 387, 26 N. E. 166; Van Dresor v. King, 34 Pa. St. 201; 75 Am. Dec. 643, and note, pp. 645-653; 1 Freem. Ex'ns, § 215a; Waples, Homest. p. 781......
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Cowan Tent Co. No. 61 v. Treesh
...v. Capron, 89 Ind. 167;Butner v. Bowser, 104 Ind. 255, 3 N. E. 889;Junker v. Hustes, 113 Ind. 524, 16 N. E. 197;Chatten v. Snider, 126 Ind. 387, 26 N. E. 166. [5] The appellee in the instant case, through his grantor's purchase at the sheriff's sale, acquired all the rights of the judgment ......