Chatterjee v. School Dist. of Philadelphia

Decision Date02 October 2001
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 99-4122.,Civ.A. 99-4122.
Citation170 F.Supp.2d 509
PartiesBasant CHATTERJEE, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, and the following individuals in their individual capacities: David W. Hornbeck, Jeanette W. Brewer, Joyce B. Harrison, Sheldon Jahss, Henry Parks, Michael Neiderman, James Lytle, Ted Kirsch, Jerry Jordan, and Maxine Stutman, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Basant Chatterjee, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.

Rosemarie Rhodes, Harper & Paul, Philadelphia, PA, for Dr. Basant Chatterjee.

Linda M. Martin, Willig, Williams and Davidson, Philadelphia, PA, for Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Ted Kirsch, Jerry T. Jordan, Maxine Stutman.

Michael J. Feinberg, Philadelphia, PA, for School Dist. of Philadelphia, David W. Jornbeck, Jeanette W. Brewer, Joyce B. Harrison, Sheldon Jahass, Henry Parks, Michael Neiderman, James Lytle.

OPINION

POLLAK, District Judge.

This is a suit filed pro se by Dr. Basant Chatterjee on August 16, 1999 against two groups of defendants: the School District of Philadelphia ("the District") and several of its administrators in their individual capacities (together, "the District defendants"), and the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers ("the Federation") and three of its officials in their individual capacities (together, "the Federation defendants"). Dr. Chatterjee, who describes himself as "born in India of Asian race," Second Am. Compl. § II ¶ 1, has alleged that his discharge from employment with the District was discriminatory and otherwise unlawful under various federal and state statutes, the United States Constitution, and the Pennsylvania state law of torts and contracts. Before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by the District defendants and the Federation defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth herein, the motions are denied with respect to plaintiff's claims against the District under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. The motions are granted on all other claims, including the remaining claims against the District, all claims against those employees of the District in their individual capacities, and all claims against the Federation defendants.

I. Facts

Plaintiff has made scrupulously detailed allegations of fact in his Second Amended Complaint. Only those alleged facts relevant to the instant motions are recounted here. As is proper when confronted with a motion to dismiss, all facts alleged by the plaintiff have been taken as true and have been construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir.1998), Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997).

Between 1973 and 1996, Dr. Chatterjee was employed by the District as a mathematics teacher and worked at University City High School in Philadelphia. Twenty years into his tenure at the school, Dr. Chatterjee took on several extra-curricular appointments in addition to his teaching responsibilities.

During the 1994 school year, Dr. Chatterjee alleges that the school's acting principal "began to harass and discriminate against" him. He has not provided an elaboration in his Second Amended Complaint as to the content or substance of this allegedly discriminatory conduct of 1994. During the same time period, Dr. Chatterjee claims to have "observed discrimination among Asian students and subsequently informed the local news media." Id. at ¶ 5. Dr. Chatterjee filed a discrimination claim with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") on March 9, 1995. The school's new principal James Lytle, initiated a private meeting with Dr. Chatterjee and told him "that he had received communication from the school district's legal department to inquire about Plaintiff's claim of harassment and discrimination." Id. at ¶ 7. Following this meeting, Dr. Chatterjee withdrew his complaint with the PHRC on May 25, 1995.

The following school year, Dr. Chatterjee alleges several instances in which he was unjustifiably and irrationally singled out from his white colleagues. First, he alleges that he was stripped of authority in his capacity as a program director when Lytle began entrusting responsibility to Dr. Chatterjee's program assistant; the program assistants of the school's other program directors, all of whom were white males, were not permitted to take on such responsibilities. Second, on October 24, 1995, Lytle circulated a survey among the faculty members regarding Dr. Chatterjee's performance as a program director; white program directors were never evaluated in this manner. Third, Dr. Chatterjee was specifically criticized in his official performance record for failing to address certain school-wide problems — problems for which all faculty members should have shared responsibility. Fourth, Dr. Chatterjee was the only one of 140 faculty members to receive a mid-year performance evaluation in 1995. Fifth, he was denied compensation for time spent supervising students during their lunch hour and for his extra-curricular work, whereas white faculty members were compensated for such responsibilities.

During the same time period, Dr. Chatterjee also claims to have been subjected to false investigations and charges by the school's administrators in connection with his professional performance and conduct. The accusations culminated in his termination in the summer of 1996. Dr. Chatterjee alleges that, in making these false charges, the school administrators were responding to his filing of discrimination charges with the PHRC and his role in informing the news media of discrimination at the school. First, in September 1995, Dr. Chatterjee was accused of misappropriating funds from his extra-curricular programs and of writing proposals for his own personal gain; Dr. Chatterjee contends that the proposals he wrote and the compensation he received were legitimate, and were substantially similar to the proposals written and compensation received in previous years by white faculty members. Second, Dr. Chatterjee was informed by a memorandum from Lytle dated October 2, 1995 that he had made "several thousands of dollars" worth of unauthorized expenditures; Dr. Chatterjee asserts that Lytle fabricated these allegations. Third, on November 28, 1995, Dr. Chatterjee was accused of changing the locks of certain storage areas without authorization and of failing to provide the other teachers with keys; Dr. Chatterjee maintains that he followed proper administrative procedures at all times in connection with this incident. Fourth, in his official performance record, Dr. Chatterjee was accused of failing to supply his extra-curricular programs with needed supplies and equipment; Dr. Chatterjee asserts that he was again following proper administrative procedures whereby as a faculty member he was not permitted to purchase such supplies and equipment.

In connection with the accusations against Dr. Chatterjee of fiscal impropriety, the District initiated an audit of his expenditures and compensation. Dr. Chatterjee met with Maxine Stutman, his representative at the Federation, and District officials on February 6 and April 8, 1996 to discuss the accusations. On February 12, April 1, and May 8, 1996, Dr. Chatterjee wrote to the Superintendent of Schools to register a complaint of discrimination and to indicate his intention of filing another complaint with the PHRC. On April 15, Lytle recommended to the Assistant Superintendent of Schools that Dr. Chatterjee be dismissed. On July 18, 1996, the District issued a letter to the Board of Education recommending that Dr. Chatterjee be terminated. Dr. Chatterjee found this letter on September 1, 1996 when he returned from his summer vacation.

Dr. Chatterjee conferred with Stutman on September 2, 1996. She advised him that he had two options if he wished to contest the termination: either to undertake a hearing with the Board of Education, or to pursue arbitration under the Federation's collective bargaining agreement. Stutman explained to Dr. Chatterjee the details of these two courses of action. Thereafter, Dr. Chatterjee made several unsuccessful attempts to discuss his situation further with Stutman, and to contact her supervisor at the Federation, Jerry Jordan, before finally reaching Jordan by phone. Jordan informed Dr. Chatterjee that Stutman had given him all the information he needed to reach a decision as to which course of action to pursue. Dr. Chatterjee requested a consultation with the Federation's legal services department, and was informed that, as he was no longer a union member, these services were unavailable to him. Dr. Chatterjee continued to attempt to contact Stutman and Jordan for several months. These attempts culminated in a letter sent to Stutman on May 7, 1997, to which Dr. Chatterjee received no response. In October 1998, Dr. Chatterjee, through his then attorney, scheduled a hearing before the Board of Education. By letter dated May 28, 1999, the request for a hearing was withdrawn.

On September 12, 1996, shortly after his discharge, Dr. Chatterjee filed another charge of discrimination with the PHRC. The PHRC referred the charge to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") for dual filing. On October 5, 1998, Dr. Chatterjee submitted an amendment to the charge, which was likewise dually filed. Dr. Chatterjee filed the instant action on August 16, 1999.

II. Analysis

In his Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges fifteen causes of action. There exists a certain amount of overlap among the fifteen, and it is therefore necessary to summarize and consolidate them as follows. Against the District defendants, plaintiff...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Freedom Bapt. Church of Del. v. Tp. of Middletown
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • May 8, 2002
    ...for violation of the constitution of its own force. One must state a claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Chatterjee v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 170 F.Supp.2d 509, 517 (E.D.Pa.2001); Smith v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 112 F.Supp.2d 417, 430 To plead a proper § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must all......
  • Simon v. Pfizer Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • February 18, 2005
    ...with the definition of gross misconduct, and different courts apply different standards. See, e.g., Chatterjee v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 170 F.Supp.2d 509, 518 (E.D.Pa.2001) (recognizing that there is no definition of "gross misconduct"). Therefore, it is possible that the arbitrator......
  • O'donnell v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • May 16, 2011
    ...Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir.2002) (no individual liability under the ADA); Chatterjee v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 170 F.Supp.2d 509, 515–16 (E.D.Pa.2001) (“[I]ndividuals are not liable in their individual capacities under ... the PHRA.”). See also Walter v. Cumberland Val......
  • Damiano v. Scranton Sch. Dist., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13–2635
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • September 30, 2015
    ...as the termination of employment–which would otherwise operate to deprive them of coverage, id. at § 1163." Chatterjee v. School Dist. of Phila., 170 F.Supp.2d 509, 518 (E.D.Pa.2001). "Under COBRA, an employer is obligated to notify such beneficiaries of this entitlement. Id. at § 1166." Id......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT