Chaturvedi v. Siddharth
| Decision Date | 19 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 20-11880-FDS |
| Parties | RAHUL CHATURVEDI, Plaintiff, v. RAHUL SIDDHARTH; SIDDHARTH SIDDHARTH; MEERA SIDDHARTH; NARINDER THIND; JOHN DOE, INC.; JANE DOE; ARVIND KUMAR JAISWAL; JAMES DUCKETT, JR.; SUBHASH VERMA; RN SHUKLA; and T. EKAMBARAM NAIDU, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND MOTIONS TO STRIKE
This is an action by pro se plaintiff Rahul Chaturvedi alleging, in substance, a vast conspiracy that caused him to lose his medical license and medical center, and forced him to file for bankruptcy at least twice, among other claimed harms. He has brought suit against defendants Arvind Kumar Jaiswal; James Duckett, Jr.; Subhash Verma; RN Shukla; T. Ekambaram Naidu; Narinder Thind; John Doe; Jane Doe, Inc.; Siddharth Siddharth; Meera Siddharth; and Rahul Siddharth.
Defendants Siddharth, Meera, and Rahul Siddharth have moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as well as for sanctions for filing a frivolous lawsuit. Defendant Jaiswal has moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the same grounds, and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. He has also moved to strike certain docket entries. Chaturvedi has moved for leave to amend his complaint, and to strike certain paragraphs of Verma's answer.
For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter; that Chaturvedi's motion for leave to amend his complaint will be granted; that the motions to dismiss will be deemed renewed in light of the amendment of the complaint; that the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the federal claims it alleges; that the motion for sanctions against Chaturvedi will be denied without prejudice; that Chaturvedi's motion to strike will be granted; and that Jaiswal's motion to strike will be denied.
Because the only claims purporting to arise under federal law will be dismissed, and because this case is at an early stage, the Court will decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Accordingly, the action will be dismissed.
On October 20, 2020, Chaturvedi filed a complaint against defendants Siddharth Siddharth, Meera Siddharth, and Rahul Siddharth, who are members of the same family, and defendants Narinder Thind, John Doe, and Jane Doe, Inc. (Compl. at 1, 2). That same day, Chaturvedi filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts. In re Rahul Chaturvedi, Case No. 20-12087, (Dkt. No. 1).1
On November 19, 2020, Chaturvedi amended the complaint, and added defendants Arvind Kumar Jaiswal, James Duckett Jr., Subhash Verma, RN Shukla, and T. Ekambaram Naidu. (Am. Compl. at 1). On December 14, 2020, Chaturvedi moved for leave to amend his complaint for a second time. (Dkt. No. 26).
Chaturvedi alleges that over a twenty-year period, defendants perpetrated a series of frauds leading to the "complete destruction" of his livelihood, his reputation, and his businesses. . He refers to defendants as a "Group" that act "collectively" in "orchestrat[ing] 'frames'" and "false" lawsuits against him, and alleges that their actions have forced him to file for bankruptcy twice. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 10, 11).
The proposed amended complaint alleges ten counts (although it alleges multiple legal theories within some of those counts): defamation as to all defendants (count 1); intentional infliction of emotional distress as to all defendants (count 2); breach of contract as to all defendants except Meera and Rahul, as to whom it alleges "aiding and abetting" a breach of contract (count 3); civil conspiracy as to all defendants (count 4); "[negligent] & [tortious]" interference with contractual relations as to Jaiswal (count 5); unfair and deceptive business practices in violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A as to Jaiswal and Siddharth (count 6); threats in interstate communications and theft and unlawful distribution of "privacy protected information" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876 as to Jaiswal (count 7); a violation of the Computer Fraud Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 as to Jaiswal (count 8); tortious interference with contractual relations as to Rahul (count 9); and civil conspiracy between Siddharth, Rahul, Duckett and Jaiswal (count10). (Id. at 26-35).2
Courts can never assume the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction, but rather, must make an affirmative decision as to its existence. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S 83, 94-95 (1998). Accordingly, the first question is whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action.
As a general matter, federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over cases involving diversity of citizenship or cases arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
Where a party seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal district court under § 1332, the parties must be completely diverse. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Complete diversity does not exist where any plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant. See id. Here, Chaturvedi and defendants Siddharth, Meera, and Thind are all citizens of Massachusetts. (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12, 14, 15). Therefore, the court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the action pursuant to § 1332.
However, Chaturvedi's various complaints all purport to allege certain claims arising under federal law. Chaturvedi's first complaint alleged a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). (Compl. ¶ 55). His second complaint realleged that claim, and added a "theft of intellectual property" claim, which appeared to seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 of non-infringement and/or invalidity of a trademark. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-31, 102, 118). It also added five civilclaims under the following federal criminal statutes: those creating the crimes of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; extortion and threats in interstate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 875 and 876; identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028; and stalking, in violation of § 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. (Id. ¶¶ 93, 94, 95, 112, 116).3
Finally, the proposed third amended complaint alleges a civil claim under the criminal statute for threats in interstate communications, 18 U.S.C. § 876 (count 7), and a civil claim under the Computer Fraud Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (count 8).
Thus, the Court has federal-question jurisdiction over one or more of the claims alleged in this action, regardless of which complaint is operative. The second and third amended complaints also assert claims under state law. In a civil action where a district court has original jurisdiction, the court has supplemental jurisdiction over all related claims that form part of the "same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A court has jurisdiction where state andfederal claims derive from "a common nucleus of operative fact," and when the claims are such that a party would "ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Thus, to the extent the state-law claims in the second or third amended complaints derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact," the Court also has subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims.
Chaturvedi has moved for leave to amend his complaint for a second time. Under Rule 15(a), a party may amend a "pleading" without leave of court in certain relatively narrow circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Nonetheless, amendments may be denied on the basis of "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In determining whether to grant a motion to amend, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances and "exercise its informed discretion in constructing a balance of pertinent considerations." Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2006).
Here, Chaturvedi's proposed amended complaint is substantially more compliant with the rules of pleading, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), than his first and second complaints. Among other things, the proposed amended complaint sets forth specific factual allegations as to each count, numbers each count, and alleges a purported basis for personal jurisdiction over defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (). The proposed amended complaint is also clearer as to the legal theories Chaturvedi is asserting and the relief he seeks. See id. (); (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23, 48, 57, 59). Under other circumstances, the Court might deny the proposed amendment on the ground of futility. However, in light of plaintiff's pro se status, and the fact that the proposed amended complaint is clearer and more compliant with the rules, it appears...
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