Chatwin v. United States Zitting v. Same Christensen v. Same 33

Citation90 L.Ed. 198,326 U.S. 455,66 S.Ct. 233
Decision Date02 January 1946
Docket NumberNos. 31,s. 31
PartiesCHATWIN v. UNITED STATES. ZITTING v. SAME. CHRISTENSEN v. SAME. to 33
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Mr. Claude T. Barnes, of Salt Lake City, Utah, for petitioners.

Mr. Harold Judson, Asst. Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Federal Kidnapping Act1 punishes any one who knowingly transports or aids in transporting in interstate or foreign commerce 'any person who shall have been un- lawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away by any means whatsoever and held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof.' The sole issue confronting us in these cases is whether the stipulated facts support the convictions of the three petitioners under this Act, the indictment having charged that they unlawfully inveigled, decoyed and carried away a minor child of the age of 15, held her for a stated period, and transported her from Utah to Arizona with knowledge that she had been so inveigled and held. We are not called upon to determine or characterize the morality of their actions. Nor are we concerned here with their liability under any other statute, federal or state.

Petitioners are members of the Fundamentalist cult of the Mormon faith, a cult that sanctions plural or 'celestial' marriages. In August, 1940, petitioner Chatwin, who was then a 68-year old widower, employed one Dorothy Wyler as a house keeper in his home in Santaquin, Utah. This girl was nearly 15 years old at this time although the stipulation indicates that she had only a mental age of 7.2 Her employment by Chatwin was approved by her parents. While residing at Chatwin's home, the girl was continually taught by Chatwin and one Lulu Cook, who also resided there, that plural marriage was essential to her salvation. Chatwin also told her that it was her grandmother's desire that he should take her in celestial marriage and that such a marriage was in conformity with the true principles of the original Mormon Church. As a result of these teachings, the girl was converted to the principle of celestial marriage and entered into a cult marriage with Chatwin on December 19, 1940. Thereafter she became pregnant, which fact was discovered by her parents on July 24, 1941. The parents then informed the juvenile authorities of the State of Utah of the situation and they took the girl into custody as a delinquent on August 4, 1941, making her a ward of the juvenile court.

On August 10, 1941, the girl accompanied a juvenile probation officer to a motion picture show at Provo, Utah. The officer left the girl at the show and returned later to all for her. The girl asked to be allowed to stay on for a short time and the officer consented. Thereafter, and prior to the second return of the officer, the girl 'left the picture show and went out onto the street in Provo.' There she met two married daughters of Chatwin who gave her sufficient money to go from Provo to Salt Lake City. Shortly after arriving there she was taken to the home of petitioners Zitting and Christensen. They, together with Chatwin, convinced her that she should abide, as they put it, 'by the law of God rather than the law of man' and that she was perfectly justified in running away from the juvenile court in order to live with Chatwin. They further convinced her that she should go with them to Mexico to be married legally to Chatwin and then remain in hiding until she had reached her majority under Utah law. Thereafter, on October 6, 1941, the three petitioners transported the girl in Zitting's automobile from Salt Lake City of Juarez, Mexico, where she went through a civil marriage ceremony with Chatwin on October 14. She was then brought back to Utah and thence to Short Creek, Arizona. There she lived in hiding with Chatwin under assumed names until discovered by federal authorities over two years later, December 9, 1943. While in Short Creek she gave birth to two children by Chatwin. The transportation of the girl from Provo to Salt Lake City, thence to Juarez, Mexico, and finally to Short Creek was without the consent and against the wishes of her parents and without authority from the juvenile court officials. 3

Having waived jury trials, the three petitioners were found guilty as charged and were given jail sentences. United States v. Cleveland, D.C., 56 F.Supp. 890. The court below affirmed the convictions. 10 Cir., 146 F.2d 730. We granted certiorari, 324 U.S. 835, 65 S.Ct. 858, 859, 860, because of our doubts as to the correctness of the judgment that the petitioners were guilty under the Federal Kidnapping Act on the basis of the foregoing facts.

The Act by its own terms contemplates that the kidnapped victim shall have been (1) 'unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away by any means whatsoever' and (2) 'held for ransom or reward or otherwise.' The Government contends that both elements appear from the stipulated facts in this case. The petitioners, it is argued, unlawfully 'inveigled' or 'decoyed' the girl away from the custody of her parents and the juvenile court authorities, the girl being 'incapable of understanding the full significance of petitioners' importunities' because of her tender years and extremely low mentality. It is claimed, moreover, that the girl was 'held' during the two-month period from August 10 to October 6, 1941, prior to the legal marriage, for the purpose of enabling Chatwin to cohabit with her and that this purpose, being of 'benefit to the transgressor,' is within the statutory term 'or otherwise' as defined in Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128, 56 S.Ct. 395, 397, 80 L.Ed. 522.

We are unable to approve the Government's contention. The agreed statement that the girl 'left the picture show and went out onto the street in Provo' without any apparent motivating actions by the petitioners casts serious doubts on the claim that they 'inveigled' or 'decoyed' her away from the custody of the juvenile court authorities. But we do not pause to pursue this matter for it is obvious that there has been a complete lack of competent proof that the girl was 'held for ransom or reward or otherwise' as that term is used in the Federal Kidnapping Act.

The act of holding a kidnapped person for a proscribed purpose necessarily implies an unlawful physical or mental restraint for an appreciable period against the person's will and with a willful intent so to confine the victim. If the victim is of such an age or mental state as to be incapable of having a recognizable will, the confinement then must be against the will of the parents or legal guardian of the victim. In this instance, however, the stipulated facts fail to reveal the presence of any of these essential elements.

(1) There is no proof that Chatwin or any of the other petitioners imposed at any time an unlawful physical or mental restraint upon the movements of the girl. Nothing indicates that she was deprived of her liberty, compelled to remain where she did not wish to remain, or compelled to go where she did not wish to go. For aught that appears from the stipulation, she was perfectly free to leave the petitioners when and if she so desired. In other words, the Government has failed to prove an act of unlawful restraint.

(2) There is no proof that Chatwin or any of the other petitioners willfully intended through force, fear or deception to confine the girl against her desires. While bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act, petitioners' beliefs are not shown to necessitate unlawful restraints of celestial wives against their wills. Nor does the fact that Chatwin intended to cohabit with the girl and to live with her as husband and wife serve as a substitute for an intent to restrain her movements contrary to her wishes, as required by the Act.

(3) Finally, there is no competent or substantial proof that the girl was of such an age or mentality as necessarily to preclude her from understanding the doctrine of celestial marriage and from exercising her own free will, thereby making the will of her parents or the juvenile court authorities the important factor. At the time of the alleged inveiglement in August, 1941, she was 15 years and 8 months of age and the alleged holding occurred thereafter. There is no legal warrant for concluding that such an age is ipso facto proof of mental incapacity in view of the general rule that incapacity is to be presumed only where a child is under the age of 14. 9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) § 2514.4 Nor is there any statutory warrant in this instance for holding that the consent of a child of this age is immaterial. Cf. In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157, 11 S.Ct. 57, 34 L.Ed. 644; United States v. Williams, 302 U.S. 46, 58 S.Ct. 81, 82 L.Ed. 39; State v. Rhoades, 29 Wash. 61, 69 P. 389. In Utah, parenthetically, any alleged victim over the age of 12 is considered sufficiently competent so that his consent may be used by an alleged kidnapper in defense to a charge under the state kidnaping statute. Utah Code Ann. (1943) 103—33—2. And a person over the age of 14 in Utah is...

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