Chaudhry v. Barr
| Decision Date | 06 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:19-CV-0682-TLN-DMC-P,2:19-CV-0682-TLN-DMC-P |
| Parties | RAMZAN ALI CHAUDHRY, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM P. BARR, et al., Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Petitioner, Ramzan Ali Chaudhry, proceeding with retained counsel, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pending before this Court is Respondents' motion to dismiss and response to order to show cause (ECF No. 7).
Petitioner is a 43-year old native and citizen of Pakistan who has lived in the United States for almost 30 years. He is married to a U.S. Citizen, and together they have three U.S.-born children. On August 7, 1998, what is now the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear—charging Petitioner with removal. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture("CAT"). On January 5, 2012, following an evidentiary hearing, an Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claim, and ordered Petitioner removed. Petitioner appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). The BIA dismissed the appeal on May 23, 2014. Petitioner appealed the BIA's decision and on August 25, 2017, the Ninth Circuit denied the Petition for review. ECF No. 14-1 at 1-9.
On February 19, 2019, Petitioner was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and transferred to Yuba County Detention Center. On February 19, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen with the BIA based on changed country conditions. Petitioner claims he fears being the victim of an honor killing if returned to Pakistan. Petitioner also filed an emergency motion for stay of deportation with the BIA, which was denied on March 26, 2019. Though the BIA denied Petitioner's stay motion, the BIA has not yet ruled on his motion to reopen. On March 26, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for review of the BIA's denial of the motion to stay in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Case No. 19-70722 ECF No. 1. On April 22, 2019, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal because the denial of a stay is not a final order of removal. See Id. at ECF No. 8.
On February 20, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in this District, Case No. 19-cv-00327-JAM-GGH, seemingly challenging the merits of his final removal. See Case No. 19-cv00327, ECF Nos 1 and 6. The magistrate judge assigned to the case issued Findings and Recommendations on February 26, 2019, recommending that the petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at ECF No. 6. The Court adopted those findings on April 17, 2019, and the case was closed. Id. at ECF No 8-9.
Petitioner thereafter filed a second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court on April 22, 2019, and a motion for Preliminary Injunction on April 23, 2019. ECF Nos. 1 and 3. On May 7, 2019, this Court construed Petitioner's motion for Preliminary injunction as a motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and so construed, granted the motion, ordering the government to show cause why Petitioner's Preliminary Injunction should not be granted. ECF No. 5. On May 20, 2019, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for mootness; response toorder to show cause. ECF No. 7. In this motion Respondent informed the Court Petitioner was removed to Pakistan on April 23, 2019. Id. Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss on May 27, 2019, and Respondent filed their reply on July 10, 2019. ECF Nos. 9 and 10.
On July 10, 2019, this Court ordered Petitioner to file a status report, which Petitioner filed on July 11, 2019. ECF Nos. 10 and 11. The status report indicates Petitioner is alive but in hiding in a hotel in Karachi, Pakistan, surviving on money sent from his family in the U.S. ECF No. 11. Subsequently, this Court ordered additional briefing from the parties on subject matter jurisdiction and whether Petitioner's deportation rendered this case moot and held a hearing on Respondent's motion to dismiss on July 19, 2019. ECF No. 12 and 15. Respondent raises two main arguments in their motion to dismiss— (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and (2) the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is moot.
This case presents a complex jurisdictional question related to the relationship between habeas corpus and immigration law. The jurisdictional question here is also highly specific, relating only to circumstances like the one present here where: (1) an individual has filed a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions and a motion to stay removal in immigration court, (2) and the immigration court either denies the motion to stay or fails to rule on the motion to stay, but the motion to reopen remains pending, (3) and as a result, the individual faces imminent deportation or is deported, and finally that (4) the individual files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a district court attempting to remedy or prevent the due process violation created by the imminent or actual deportation.
This Court recognized its jurisdictional authority in its May 7, 2019, order granting Petitioner's motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). ECF No 5. Respondent, not having the benefit of challenging jurisdiction at the TRO stage, now objects to this Court's jurisdiction in their motion to dismiss. Both parties have fully briefed the issue and their arguments are summarized, in general, below.
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Respondent argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas claim because Congress has expressly divested federal district courts of jurisdiction to review "any claim 'arising from' the Government's execution of an alien's final order of removal." ECF No. 7 at 4 (citing Section 1252(g)). Respondent argues, Section 1252(g) divests federal district courts of subject matter jurisdiction—relying on the plain language of 1252(g) as support.
Notably, in their motion to dismiss, Respondent does not argue sections 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), or (d)(1) expressly divest federal district courts of jurisdiction, but rather section 1252(g) alone is the jurisdictional stripping provision.2 Respondent asserts that sections1252(a)(4), (a)(5), (b)(9), and (d)(1) outline the administrative process for aliens challenging the merits of their immigration cases, but do not, by themselves deprive federal district courts of jurisdiction. Respondent argues the administrative and judicial review procedures created by sections1252(a)(4), (a)(5), (b)(9), and (d)(1) are the exclusive forms of relief available to an alien and because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is outside this administrative framework, such a petition is improper. Respondent argues that this would make this Court's exercise of jurisdiction over such a petition similarly improper.
Petitioner argues this Court has jurisdiction to rule on the 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition because Section 1252 (a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner cites Amarjeet Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2007) for support. Petitioner assets Amrjeet Singh explains that habeas corpus jurisdiction exists where the grounds for petition arose after the entry of the removal order and the only relief sought by the petition was to have a "day in court" at a subsequent proceeding. ECF 1 at 3. Petitioner contendsthat here the alleged new grounds, in the form of the changed country conditions, arose after the entry of his removal order and the only relief he currently seeks is a reasonable opportunity to exercise his statutory right to file his motion to reopen. Id.
Further, Petitioner contends that if Section 1252 deprives this Court of habeas jurisdiction in this case and those like it, such a deprivation violates the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. Petitioner states that under existing Supreme Court law, the Suspension Clause is not violated if the legality of an individual's detention can be challenged in an alternative form which is both adequate and effective. ECF No. 1 at 4 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300(2001)). Here, Petitioner asserts he lacks an adequate and alternative forum to challenge the legality of the Board's denial of his stay request, since denial of the emergency motion to stay is not reviewable by the Ninth Circuit, and without intervention from this Court, Petitioner has no meaningful way to present his motion to reopen before the Board. Id.
This unique jurisdictional issue requires the Court to look at the jurisdictional sections in the INA, and the immigration statutes related to motions to reopen based on changed country conditions and motions to stay removal pending resolution of a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions.
The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005, places jurisdictional limits on judicial review of immigration proceedings, including orders of removal. 8 U.S.C. §1252. There are four relevant previsions limiting judicial review:
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