Chaudhry v. Nucor Steel-Indiana

Decision Date15 October 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-3729.,07-3729.
Citation546 F.3d 832
PartiesSubhash C. CHAUDHRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NUCOR STEEL-INDIANA and Nucor Corp., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Andrew P. Wirick, Christopher D. Cody (argued), Hume Smith Geddes Green & Simmons, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John K. Linker, Marcus R. Patton (argued), Alaniz & Schraeder, Houston, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Subhash C. Chaudhry sued his employer, Nucor Steel-Indiana, alleging that Nucor discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it failed to give him a raise in June 2003 and denied him the opportunity to visit customers, which would have qualified him for increased compensation. The district court granted Nucor's motion to dismiss, relying on Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007) to hold that Chaudhry's discrimination claim was untimely, and then terminated the case on the same day.

Because Chaudhry failed to file a timely EEOC charge regarding Nucor's failure to give him a raise in June 2003, we conclude that the district court properly granted Nucor's motion to dismiss that claim as well as any claims arising from that 2003 decision that do not involve discrete acts of discrimination. But we also determine that Nucor's failure to inform Chaudhry of opportunities to visit customers, which effectively prevented him from qualifying for an annual raise, constitutes a distinct discriminatory act that is not time barred. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.


The district court dismissed Chaudhry's complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so we must take as true the facts alleged in Chaudhry's complaint. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1078 (7th Cir.2008). Chaudhry has been employed by Nucor, which manufactures flat rolled steel sheets, since February 1988. At the time of the complaint, Chaudhry was a Quality Control Inspector ("QCI") for the temper mill production line in Nucor's cold mill department. His job involves inspecting the quality of steel produced by the production employees of the temper mill. In June 2003, Nucor increased the pay grade for QCI's in other divisions such as the melt shop and the hot mill by two grades. However, it did not increase the pay grade for the temper mill QCI's, which meant Chaudhry did not get a raise.

Chaudhry complained to Nucor, pointing out that his duties were more labor intensive than those of the QCI's in other divisions whose pay grades had been increased. Nucor responded with varying justifications for its decision and did not increase his pay grade. Nucor also ignored Chaudhry's complaints that his co-workers called him names, made fun of his accent and religion (Chaudhry is "of Asian-Indian descent"), placed meat on top of his safety hat, and filled his safety gloves with oil.

Additionally, Nucor prevented Chaudhry from visiting customers, which precluded him from qualifying for an annual raise in pay grade. QCI's who make at least four customer visits per year in addition to completing a course at the American Society of Materials in Cleveland, Ohio, become eligible for an increase in pay grade. QCI's are notified of opportunities to visit customers by Nucor metallurgists or supervisors. Although Chaudhry repeatedly asked to be informed of opportunities to visit customers so he could qualify for the increase in pay grade, Nucor failed to tell him about the opportunities.

Chaudhry filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on July 28, 2006. In the charge he complained that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race, national origin, and religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., because he did not receive a raise in pay grade, which had been approved for other QCI's three years prior.

In a separate paragraph, he stated that although Nucor has a policy of allowing one pay grade raise per year for employees who visit four of its customers and take a technical course, Nucor intentionally had prevented Chaudhry from going on customer visits. In later correspondence with the EEOC, Chaudhry also stated that he had been harassed because of his race.

Chaudhry filed suit in district court against Nucor on February 7, 2007, alleging acts of discrimination including: (1) that Nucor had given raises to QCI's in other production lines even though he does more work than the other QCI's; (2) that Nucor "consistently" informed all QCI's other than himself of opportunities to visit customers; and (3) that Nucor failed to take measures to remedy the discriminatory and harassing behavior by other employees toward Chaudhry. Chaudhry alleged that Nucor's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Nucor answered Chaudhry's complaint.

Three months later, the Supreme Court decided Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., holding that for purposes of determining the timeliness of filing an EEOC charge under Title VII, a new violation does not occur every time a paycheck based on a discriminatory pay decision is issued. 127 S.Ct. at 2163. Nucor moved to dismiss Chaudhry's complaint, arguing that Chaudhry's Title VII claims were all untimely under Ledbetter. The district court agreed and dismissed Chaudhry's pay discrimination claim because the decision to give the other QCI's a pay raise in June 2003 had occurred more than 300 days prior to the filing of Chaudhry's EEOC claim. The court then dismissed Chaudhry's harassment claims, holding that they were not related to the allegations in his EEOC charge, and that his later correspondence with the EEOC indicating acts of harassment did not serve to expand the scope of his original charge. Without addressing Chaudhry's claim that he had been denied the opportunity to go on customer visits, the court dismissed Chaudhry's entire suit and entered final judgment that day.

Two days after the court dismissed Chaudhry's complaint (and final judgment), Chaudhry filed a motion to amend his complaint, seeking to add claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because it has a longer statute of limitations and because it does not require plaintiffs to file an EEOC charge first. When Nucor responded that plaintiffs cannot amend a complaint once a suit has been dismissed without first asking to set the judgment aside, Chaudhry responded in his reply brief that the court could construe his motion to amend his complaint as a motion to amend judgment. The district court (apparently reading Chaudhry's reply brief as a Rule 59 motion) relied on the filing date of the reply brief to hold that the motion was untimely and denied the motion. Chaudhry filed a timely appeal.


Chaudhry challenges the dismissal of his complaint, arguing that there were acts of discrimination in his complaint other than Nucor's decision not to give him a raise in June 2003. Specifically, he contends that his complaint contained two claims that were not time-barred. Chaudhry also challenges the denial of his motion to amend, which we address after reviewing the dismissal of his complaint.

We review a district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, accepting as true the complaint's well-pleaded allegations and drawing all favorable inferences for the plaintiff. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081.

A. Chaudhry's claims arising from the June 2003 no raise decision are time-barred

Before challenging an unlawful employment practice under Title VII, an employee must first file a timely EEOC charge. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2166. Such a charge must be filed within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or else the employee may not challenge the practice in court. Id. at 2166-67. The Supreme Court has emphasized the need to identify the specific employment practice that is at issue when considering whether an EEOC charge was filed on time, noting that "[t]he EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place, ... [but] current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination." Id. at 2169. An employment practice is a "discrete act or single occurrence that takes place at a particular point in time." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, one of Chaudhry's complaints is that other QCI's were given a pay grade raise in June of 2003 and he was not. This claim is time-barred; he should have filed an EEOC charge within 300 days of June 2003. Instead, he filed his first EEOC charge years later, in July 2006.

Chaudhry does not dispute that his claim that he was denied a raise in June 2003 claim is time-barred.1 However, Chaudhry maintains that because he continues to be paid less while being given more work than other QCI's, he has alleged an employment practice that is distinct from the June 2003 decision not to give him a raise. Because Chaudhry does not identify what "discrete act" other than the June 2003 decision caused this unequal work distribution, however, what Chaudhry's complaint boils down to is that Nucor's failure to give him a raise in 2003 was a discriminatory act that continued to have discriminatory effects into the statutory limitations period because Chaudhry continues to work more for less money than other QCI's are paid. That the June 2003 discriminatory act continues to affect Chaudhry negatively does not breathe new life into Chaudhry's claim regarding that act because under Ledbetter, he should have filed an EEOC charge by April 2004. Accordingly, the court correctly dismissed any claims relating to the effects of Nucor's June 2003 decision not to give Chaudhry a raise. See...

To continue reading

Request your trial
93 cases
  • Gul-E-Rana Mirza v. The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • May 6, 2009
    ...with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Chaudhry v. Nucor Steel-Indiana, 546 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir.2000)). The action must be "more than a mere inconvenience or an alte......
  • Bank v. Lake of The Torches Econ. Dev. Corp..
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • October 28, 2011
    ...amending the complaint would have been futile because the amended complaint would not survive dismissal. See Chaudhry v. Nucor Steel–Indiana, 546 F.3d 832, 838–39 (7th Cir.2008); Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584–85 (7th Cir.2008); Frey v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 270 F.3d 1129, 1131–32 (7th ......
  • Hukic v. Aurora Loan Services
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • November 20, 2009 the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted de novo. Chaudhry v. Nucor-Steel Indiana, 546 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir.2008). We accept the complaint's well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all favorable inferences in the plaintiff's f......
  • Vazquez v. Navistar Int'l Transp., CAUSE NO. 2:09-CV-434 JD
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • March 30, 2012
    ...our circuit's case law on the Title VII filing deadline for Indiana is, to some extent, in conflict. See, e.g., Chaudhry v. Nucor Steel-Indiana, 546 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[An EEOC] charge must be filed within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or else......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT