Chaudry v. Chaudry
| Decision Date | 04 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1794,1794 |
| Parties | SHER ALI CHAUDRY v. NANTARA CHAUDRY |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
UNREPORTED
Graeff, Berger, Eyler, Deborah S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Sher Ali Chaudry, the appellant, challenges an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granting his wife, Nantara Chaudry1, an absolute divorce, a marital award, joint legal and shared physical custody of the parties' children, and child support. He presents for review the following three questions:
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
The parties were married on January 4, 2004, in an Islamic religious ceremony in Virginia. As part of the ceremony, the parties signed an agreement known as a mehr, which we will elaborate upon in our discussion of the questions presented. After they were married, the parties lived at 1009 Hartmont Road, in Catonsville, which was purchased by Sher's parents before the parties' marriage. In 2012, Sher's parents transferred title of that property to him by a deed that did not include Nantara's name.
At the time of the marriage, Sher held an associate degree in applied science and was employed as a certified nuclear medicine technician. He worked full time at Prince George's Hospital, then for a short time at Union Memorial Hospital, and later at Virginia Hospital Center. Beginning in about 2010, in addition to his full-time employment, Sher worked part-time at Prince George's Hospital on an as-needed basis.
At some point, Nantara earned a bachelor's degree in health science from George Mason University. Prior to July 2017, she did not work outside the home except for one year when she worked as a substitute teacher in Baltimore County. The parties had four children: Mohammed H., born February 4, 2007, Myla, born May 8, 2008, Mohammed F., born October 1, 2010, and Naazish, born February 7, 2012.
The parties had a history of domestic violence. Nantara claimed that Sher cursed at, hit, and threatened her, and engaged in extreme intimidation. She accused him of assaulting her in 2008, twice in 2013, and twice in 2017, and testified that on each occasion she sought a protective order. One time, Sher was charged with second-degree assault. According to Sher, that charge was dismissed after he completed an anger management class. Subsequently, he had the case expunged. Nantara claimed that Sher placed a tracking device on her vehicle, that he was very jealous, and that he did not like her to speak with other men.
In July 2017, Nantara obtained full-time employment at a company known as Fiserb. According to Nantara, Sher threatened and harassed her and sent e-mails and text messages "non-stop" when she was at work. When he refused to stop, Nantara called the security office at the hospital where Sher worked. She reported that
As early as March 2017, the Virginia Hospital Center took corrective action against Sher for, among other things, leaving his shift without authorization. On September 7, 2017, Sher was placed on probation for 90 days because of his tardiness. On September 18, 2017, Sher's employment was terminated for violating the terms of his probation by being tardy without authorization on several dates. After his termination, Sher continued to work part time at Prince George's Hospital and obtained part-time employment as a driver for the ride-hailing company Uber. He applied for a job at Walter Reed Hospital and a couple of other positions without success. He claimed that he looked for work and checked job boards "[o]nce a week," but "there is nothing that is in reach."
On November 6, 2017, the parties separated. At that time, there were two properties titled solely in Sher's name. One was located at 1007 Hartmont Road, next door to the family home, and the other was located nearby at 6045 Moorehead Road. Nantara asserted that both properties were rented to tenants. Sher disagreed and testified that at various times, one of his brothers lived at 1007 Hartmont Road and did not pay rent. After the parties' separation, Sher transferred title of both properties to family members.
On January 2, 2018, Nantara filed a complaint for absolute divorce. Sher responded by filing a counter-complaint for absolute divorce or, in the alternative, for limited divorce. A pendente lite hearing was held on May 29, 2018, after which a pendente lite order was entered providing for, among other things, joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the parties' four children.
A hearing on the merits was held on April 30, May 1, and May 2, 2019. In a written memorandum opinion and order entered on September 27, 2019, the court found, among other things, that Sher had attempted "to dissipate the most valuable marital assets for the purpose of depriving [Nantara] of her fair share of marital property." The court also found that Sher continued to collect rent in the amount of $2,550 for the homes at 1007 Hartmont Road and 6045 Moorehead Road, that he failed to report income for purposes of child support and alimony calculations, that he had made insufficient efforts to obtain employment in his chosen field, and that he had voluntarily impoverished himself. The court imputed income to Sher in the amount of $8,826 per month. It granted Nantara an absolute divorce, awarded joint legal and shared physical custody of the children to the parties, made an award of child support to Nantara, and granted Nantara a marital award of $279,374.11.
Within ten days, Sher filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment to correct an error with respect to the calculation of child support. In an order entered on November 1, 2019, the circuit court granted the motion to alter or amend the judgment and reduced Sher's child support obligation to $281 per month. This timely appeal followed.
We shall include additional facts as necessary to our discussion of the issues.
Sher contends the trial court erred by refusing to enforce a mehr2 the parties entered into during their Islamic wedding ceremony. He argues that the mehr was a valid, enforceable prenuptial agreement pursuant to which Nantara agreed to accept a payment of $10,000 in lieu of an equitable distribution of marital property in the event of a divorce. The parties do not dispute that they entered into a mehr during their wedding ceremony. They dispute the terms of that agreement, however.
Recently, in Nouri v. Dadgar, 245 Md. App. 324 (2020), we had occasion to discuss mehr agreements in the context of the marriage of individuals who were of Iranian descent. The parties before us are of Pakistani descent, the facts of the instant case are different from those in Nouri, and neither party produced expert testimony at the hearing below. Nevertheless, our discussion in Nouri of the general purpose and nature of mehr agreements is helpful to our understanding of the issue at hand.
In Nouri, we recognized that in Islam, marriage "is a contractual undertaking, the basic elements of which are offer, acceptance, and [mehr]." Nouri, 245 Md. App. at 334. A mehr "is a religious obligation, prescribed by the Quran[.]" Id. at 335. The mehr is "'a sum of money or some other economically valuable asset that a husband must give to awife.'" Id. at 334-35 (). The mehr may consist of anything of value. Id. at 335. The precise nature and amount of the mehr varies in each contract. Id. In Nouri, we explained:
The mahr is a personal obligation of the groom to the bride, which, "[g]enerally speaking[,] . . . is divided between an immediate gift to the wife" (the "prompt" or "immediate" mahr) "and a deferred payment." Orman, supra, at 291. In principle - or sometimes, under explicit terms of the contract - the wife is entitled to the deferred mahr upon demand at any time following the marriage, and "any delay is a matter of contractual forbearance on her part." Id. at 302. In practice, though, "[s]uch delays are standard," and the deferred mahr typically becomes "due upon divorce or the husband's death." Id.; [Jeanette] Wakin, [Family Law in Islam, in 9 Encyclopaedia Iranica 184-96 (2012), http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/family-law(accessed Feb. 12, 2020)] supra; see also, e.g., Qureshi v. Qureshi [1972] Fam. 173 [186] (Eng.) ( that the "sadaqa in the instant case amounted to a promise by the husband on behalf of himself and his estate to pay to the wife the sum of 9,000 rupees . . ....
To continue reading
Request your trial