CHAUFFEURS, ETC. v. Jefferson Trucking Co., Inc., IP 78-216-C.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. IP 78-216-C.,IP 78-216-C.
• Citation: 473 F. Supp. 1255
• Parties: CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 135 v. JEFFERSON TRUCKING COMPANY, INC.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

473 F. Supp. 1255

CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 135 v. JEFFERSON TRUCKING COMPANY, INC.

No. IP 78-216-C.

United States District Court, S. D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

July 27, 1979.

Richard G. McCracken of Fillenwarth & Fillenwarth, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff.

William T. White, Jr., of Rocap, Rocap, Reese & Young, Indianapolis, Ind., and Barry L. Moon, Flint, Mich., for defendant.

ORDER

STECKLER, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on motions by plaintiff to strike affirmative defenses and for summary judgment and motion by defendant for leave to file motion to vacate an arbitration award. Plaintiff's complaint requests enforcement of an arbitration award rendered in favor of a union member who is an employee of defendant, which award has not been complied with by defendant. Jurisdiction over the claim is predicated upon 29 U.S.C. § 185.

As established by the complaint and other materials before the Court, the complaint is based upon the following facts. Plaintiff Teamsters Local 135 and defendant Jefferson Trucking Company were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which was in effect at the times material to the action. On October 19, 1977, Paul Nettleton, an employee of defendant represented by plaintiff, was discharged by defendant after being involved in an accident the previous day while driving equipment on the job. The written notice of discharge stated that "the accident is a major chargeable accident due to excessive speed for conditions." Thereafter, a grievance was filed by Nettleton and processed according to the agreement. Eventually, the Grievance Committee, whose awards are to be final and binding under the terms of the contract (Art. X § 4(d)), ordered Nettleton's reinstatement with back pay stating:

"It is the majority decision of this Committee based on the facts and evidence presented inasmuch as the company failed to site sic the specific Contract Article or rule violation as well as offense, the employee is to be reinstated with full seniority and paid for all time lost."

The reinstatement was ordered on November 17, 1977. Though plaintiff repeatedly demanded that defendant abide by the award, defendant has refused, bringing about the institution of this lawsuit for enforcement of the award. In addition, plaintiff alleges that defendant's conduct has been such that defendant should be required to pay plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees and costs for prosecuting the action.

Defendant has answered raising several affirmative defenses. These include contentions that the Grievance Committee award went outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement, that the award was not final and therefore not reviewable, that plaintiff is guilty of unclean hands, that plaintiff is unentitled to relief because of the "arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the decision of the Grievance Committee in light of past practices of the Joint Committee. . . .," that the sought-after relief is not available at law and is barred by laches, and that defendant has been denied medical information needed to determine if Mr. Nettleton is fit to drive in accordance with ICC regulations.

In moving to strike defendant's affirmative defenses and for summary judgment, plaintiff advances several contentions. However, the crucial question before the Court is whether defendant, the unsuccessful party at arbitration, who did not move to vacate the disfavorable award within ninety days as required under Indiana law or within three months as required by federal statute, may now raise contentions, which it could have raised as grounds to vacate in such a motion, as affirmative defenses in the instant suit to enforce the award, which suit was filed after the three-month and ninety-day periods but within the time limits set for filing a suit to enforce or confirm an award.

Plaintiff argues basically that the raising of these defenses, no matter how meritorious, is barred by the short statute of limitations on motions to vacate arbitration awards. Plaintiff contends that federal labor policy encourages the use of the arbitration and award procedure to provide speedy final resolutions to labor problems and that a short statute of limitations for moving to vacate awards serves this federal policy. Plaintiff further contends that the speed and finality policies would be frustrated considerably if the loser in arbitration could refuse to comply with the award, sit back idly until the statute of limitations ran on bringing a motion to vacate, and then raise all his defenses anyway if a suit to enforce the award were filed by the other party.

In opposition, defendant advances the argument that since plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations contained in the Indiana Arbitration Act is applicable rather than that contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, an Indiana provision "tolling" the statute of limitations must also be applied. Defendant draws the tolling provision it contends should apply from Indiana Trial Rule 13(J)(1), which defendant maintains allows a defendant to avail himself of a setoff or counterclaim by way of defense even though a claim would otherwise be barred.

Where a federal statute such as 29 U.S.C. § 185 contains no statute of limitations, the federal court shall, as a matter of federal law, select the state statute of limitations most appropriate to the type of action. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-5, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966); Canada v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 446 F.Supp. 1048 (N.D.Ill.1978). Since the present complaint seeks enforcement of an arbitration award, the most appropriate Indiana statute would seem to be contained in sections of the Indiana Code concerning arbitration. I.C. XX-X-X-XX states:

"(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (1) The award was procured by corruption or fraud . . ., (2) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator . . . or corruption . . ., (3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted . . ..

(b) An application under this section shall be made within ninety 90 days after the mailing of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon corruption or fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety 90 days after such grounds are known or should have been known. . . .

* * * * * *

(d) If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the award is pending which motion must also be made within ninety days of the mailing of the award the court shall confirm the award."

I.C. XX-X-X-XX states:

"Upon application of a party, but not before ninety 90 days after the mailing of a copy of the award to the parties, the court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limit hereinafter imposed in XX-X-X-XX quoted above grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in sections 13 and 14 XX-X-X-XX, XX-X-X-XX of this act. Upon confirmation, the court shall enter a judgment consistent with the award and cause such entry to be docketed as if rendered in an action in said court."

Though the language of the Indiana statute seems to quite clearly state that grounds such as those defendant urges as defenses must be raised within ninety days in a motion to vacate and the court "shall confirm" if they are not, defendant argues that cases under 9 U.S.C. § 9 et seq., and cases from other jurisdictions under arbitration statutes similar to the one in Indiana do not support that interpretation of the Indiana statute. In addition, defendant argues that even if the above interpretation of the statute is correct, since under Hoosier Cardinal the federal court must apply the most appropriate state statute of limitations due to the absence of a stated statute of limitations in the federal statute, the court must also apply state provisions which would toll the Indiana statutes of limitation, citing Johnson v. REA, 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). In this case defendant urges the court to apply as a tolling provision Indiana Trial Rule 13(J)(1) which reads:

"The statute of limitations, a nonclaim statute or other discharge at law shall not bar a claim asserted as a counterclaim to the extent that:

(1) it diminishes or defeats the opposing party's claim if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim, or it could have been asserted as a counterclaim to the opposing party's claim before it (the counter-claim) was barred."

Indiana Trial Rule 13(J)(1) will not save defendant from the operation of the limitations periods in I.C. XX-X-X-XX(b) and (d) and I.C. XX-X-X-XX for several reasons. First, it cannot be said that this rule is a tolling provision in the usual sense of the word, that is, Trial Rule 13(J)(1) does not interrupt the running of the limitations period. It was this latter type of tolling provision which was referred to in Johnson v. REA when the court stated that "Any period of limitation . . . is understood fully only in the context of the various circumstances that suspend it from running against a particular cause of action. . . . In borrowing a...